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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS SUMMARY: 
 
 
1.1     PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 
 
Scientific Revolution refers to the period, from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth 
century in Europe, when new ideas in physics, astronomy, biology, human anatomy, 
chemistry, and other sciences led to the rejection of doctrines that had prevailed from 
ancient Greece through the middle Ages. It has been described as the movement which 
was forged by Johannes Kepler (1571- 1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564- 1642), 
developed by René Descartes (1596- 1650) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646- 
1716), and completed by Isaac Newton (1642- 1727).1 The unprecedented 
advancements in science during the early modern period yielded to enormous 
transformation of man´s thought and way of looking at the world, and laid the 
foundation of modern science.  
The success of the early modern science was orchestrated by historical rise of 
mechanism and materialism, the mathematization of natural philosophy and the 
emergence of profound experimentalism. According to Richard Westfall, its victory, 
over the prevailing Aristotelian doctrine at the time, started with the acceptance of 
Copernican astronomy, the rise of the mechanical philosophy, the decline of astrology 
and transmutational alchemy, and the acceptance of Newtonian physics.2 The synthesis 
of ´mechanic-corpuscularism´ (see section 2.11.7) with mathematics culminated the 
scientific revolution. This materialistic perception of reality precipitated the scientific 
experimentation and observation of the 17th century science, which have been defined as 
the processes that guaranteed the rise of modern science. The scientific processes 
allowed the scientists to conduct objective investigation and reach conclusions based on 
the results. Most importantly, the synthesis of the ´mechanic-corpuscularism´ with 
mathematics proved quite fertile that the human mind exploited various cognitive 
                                                 
1 Peter Hanns Reill, ¨The legacy of the ´Scientific Revolution´ : Science and the Enlightenment,¨ in The 
Cambridge History of Science: Eighteenth-century Science, ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) vol. 4, p. 23 
2 Richard S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics (New York: 
John Wiley pub., 1971) pp. 30-31 
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frontiers never known before. These exploits aroused the euphoria of progress and 
imbued the modern man with strong optimism.  
Modern science became the major force behind the development of the idea of progress. 
Interestingly, the progress or growth of scientific knowledge has been one of the central 
issues in the epistemology of science. It is an issue that has engaged not only 
philosophers; even ¨scientists and laymen similarly agree that one of the striking 
features of the diachronic development of science is the progress that it exhibits.¨3 From 
the origins of modern science in the work of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, until the logical empiricists of the twentieth 
century, scientific progress has been viewed as an evolutionary process of uncovering 
truth in the physical world.  
Traditionally, scientific progress was viewed as a cumulative process moving steadily 
toward the truth. But though the combination of mathematical science and 
corpuscularian conception of nature proved quite fertile, ´neither the mathematical 
exactitude of Kepler´ s laws of planetary motion nor the quantitative rigor of Galileo´s 
laws of falling bodies proved derivable by means of the explanatory tools accepted in 
the corpuscularian world-view.4 This suggests that the scientific knowledge which 
ensued from the activities of these scientists did not strictly flow from those processes 
and norms which have been acclaimed as the principal factors that distinguished the 
science of the early modern period from its predecessors. Hence, the controversy has 
been on whether or not there was a ´Scientific Revolution´?  
Various historiographies of the scientific revolution have sought to find answer to the 
questions of its periodization, personalities, content and context, motive, relevance and 
epistemological implications. These historiographies are represented in the positivist, 
antipositivist and sociologists views which tend to identify the structure, scope and 
constituents of the scientific revolution. But while some of them view Scientific 
Revolution as a concept that is ´philosophically general´, others see it as ´historically 
unique´. The former defines the changes in science as a continual process while the 
                                                 
3 Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 2 
4 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994) p. 512 
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latter designate them, particularly, as the ´upheaval´ which took place during the early 
modern period. 
Until the historiographical revolution of the early 1960´s the scientific processes or 
method of the 16th and 17th centuries were seen as functional parameter for the 
justification of the objectivity, truth, realism and rationality of the scientific knowledge. 
Before this time, positivism had reigned supreme for a century, from Auguste Comte to 
Rudolf Carnap. With respect to scientific authority, this philosophical account typically 
vindicated the acceptance of scientific claims or research programs as rationally 
warranted or reliable.  For the logical empiricists and logical positivists the feature of 
science that make it scientific are formal relations between theories and data, whether 
through the rational construction of theoretical structures on top of empirical data or the 
rational dismissal of theories on the basis of empirical data. This feature of science 
illustrates the validity of its claims. It shows that if science demonstrates the formal 
relations between theories and data it is certain that its claims will be rational, true, real 
and objective. The progressiveness of science was viewed as the mechanism that 
certifies such feature. Consequently, we see in these philosophical accounts the 
conscious intertwinement of the progress of science with its realism, rationality, truth 
and objectivity. 
Nevertheless, the early 1960´s witnessed unreserved criticisms and reactions to this 
unique feature of science that has been painted by the logical positivists and logical 
empiricists. The reactions consisted in demonstrating the stimulus given to (and the 
limitation placed upon) discovery and invention, in the early modern period, by 
industry, hermeticism, religion, capitalism and social structures, and conversely the 
ways in which science has altered economic, social, and political beliefs and practices. 
The concern was for a shift from the traditional ways of relying solely on the content of 
scientific beliefs and methods for the justification of scientific claims, to the veritable 
consideration of the context of their development. This move reiterated the need to 
reevaluate the scientific claims by discussing the scientific procedures of the early 
modern period within the context of their development. It was shown that the actual 
method used by scientists differed dramatically from the then-espoused method. The 
observations of science practice are described as essentially sociological and do not 
speak to how science is or can be practiced in other times and other cultures. 
4 
 
 
1.2     STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The overthrow of the Aristotelian natural science by mechanic-corpuscular philosophy 
and mathematical physics inaugurated tremendous changes in the history of science and 
philosophy. The modern science that ensued afterwards was conceptualised primarily as 
a coherent body of knowledge unified by a common methodology developing 
teleologically toward universal truth.5 It signifies that scientific progress is logically 
intertwined with its truth and objectivity. Such positivist view implies that science 
progresses when poor theories are replaced by good ones which are by all indications 
the more rational, true and objective. Genuinely progressive theories are those which 
have the capacity to explain and predict a larger range of facts than their rivals. 
According to this logical empiricist view, 
 
… Newton´s theory of gravity is better than Descartes´s because 
Descartes´s theory was refuted by the fact that planets move in 
near-elliptical paths, and because Newton´s theory explained 
everything that Descartes´s theory had explained, and also 
explained the refuting facts… Newton´s theory was, in turn, 
refuted by the anomalous perihelion of Mercury, while 
Einstein´s explained that too.6 
 
More still, the Popperian Falsificationism (see section 3.2.1.2) insists that the 
prospective explanatory and predictive range of a theory determines its progressiveness. 
Carl Hempel went further to demonstrate that science evolved in a continuous manner. 
New theory did not contradict past theory: "theory does not simply refute the earlier 
empirical generalizations in its field; rather, it shows that within a certain limited range  
 
                                                 
5 See the discussion on falsificationism in  Imre Lakatos, ¨Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes,¨ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (London: Blackwell Publishing, 1968), 
69: 149-186 
6 Ibid., p.152 
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defined by qualifying conditions, the generalizations hold true in fairly close 
approximation."7 New theory is more comprehensive; ¨the old theory can be derived 
from the newer one and is one special manifestation¨8 of the more comprehensive new 
theory. The logical empiricists would agree, for instance, that Newtonian physics is a 
special case of, and can be derived from, Einsteinian physics.  
 
Their conception of scientific progress was thus a continuous one; more comprehensive 
theory replaced compatible, older theory. Each successive theory's explanation was 
closer to the truth than the theory before. It was the truth, and the prediction and control 
that came with it that was the goal of logical-empirical science. Such perspective 
maintains that one theory´s known successes does not have anything to do with certain 
accidents of history than with the theory itself. However, as J. G Crowther has shown, 
science is ¨the system of behavior by which man acquires mastery of his environment.¨9 
Floris Cohen developed this concept further to argue that modern science is not just a 
thought-construction among others—it entails both an intellectual and an operative 
mastery of nature.10 The operative mastery of nature implies that science should also be 
considered as a social phenomenon, though it is at the same time much more than that. 
This perspective drives from the fact that modern science has been one, or even, the 
principal motor of social transformation over the past two centuries, and also during the 
16th and 17th centuries.  
 
Consequently, some historicists would argue that the new ideas in science, during the 
early modern period were all situated in a wide cultural context. They were closely 
related to religious, political and socio-economic changes.11 The historicist 
historiography demonstrates that the pursuit of purely ´objective´ scientific knowledge 
                                                 
7 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, eds. Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice hall, 1966), p. 76 
8 Ibid. 
9 J. G Crowther, The Social Relations of Science, revised ed. (London: The Cresset Press, 1967). p. 1 
10 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry. p. 4 
11 Shapin examines four themes in the history of modern science: mechanism (the idea of nature as a 
machine); objectivism; methodology and impartiality; and altruism (the idea that science can better the lot 
of mankind). He does so in three deft, incisive sections: "What Was Known?"; "How Was It Known?"; 
and "What Was the Knowledge For?". The third section "What Was The Knowledge For?" explores the 
interactions of the new science with the political, religious and cultural dimensions of the European 
society in which it was embedded. It shows that Scientific Revolution cannot be framed in terms of 
autonomous ideas or disembodied mentalities.(p.4). See Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 119 - 165 
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by disinterested individual is merely an aberration. However, it does not mean that 
knowledge is ´whatever people take to be knowledge.¨12 Therefore, the following 
questions will be adequately treated: 
 
1. If scientific practice is truly influenced by certain social factors how and to what 
extent does science generate true and justifiable knowledge?  
2. If certain social factors have been really decisive in the progress and 
advancement of the scientific knowledge, what is the nature of the objectivity 
that could be identified in the scientific advancement? 
3. If there are no non-contextual or ahistorical scientific processes and norms how 
do we explain the universality of modern science?   
 
1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS  
Outside the implications of the sociology of science and social-constructivism that 
emanated from the historicist narrative of the scientific revolution, one fundamental 
argument that unites the different approaches involved is that scientific processes and 
norms are historically determined. It implies that scientific knowledge cannot be 
universally rational and objective since its processes and norms are historically 
determined. This crucial issue defines the basis of this research´s concentration on the 
historicist model of the scientific revolution.  
This research will demonstrate that more than any other model of the scientific 
revolution narrative, the historicist model represents an assemblage in which the dual 
sense of the term ´Scientific Revolution´ is streamlined. This is certified by the fact that 
it is within this model that the concept of the scientific revolution was created and used 
as an analytical tool to give a close unity to the range of phenomena which together 
constitute the rise of early modern science. Precisely, this model argues that the new 
ideas in science, during the early modern period were all situated in a wide historical or 
cultural context. Its two principal tenets are identified: 
1. Extra-scientific/social factors are decisive in the progress of science, and in most 
 cases, become constituent of the scientific knowledge. 
                                                 
12 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) p.5 
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2. Scientific claims are so historically determined, just like the processes and 
 norms from which they are developed. 
Among the principal theses of the historicist model include:  The Kuhnian thesis by 
Thomas S. Kuhn, Shapin thesis—Steven Shapin, Alfred Rupert Hall—Hall thesis, Boris 
Hessen—Hessen thesis, Robert K. Merton—Merton thesis, Alexandre Koyré—Koyré 
thesis, Pierre Duhem—Duhem thesis, Herbert J. Butterfield—Butterfield thesis, Joseph 
Needham—Needham thesis, Frances Yates—Yates thesis.13 Most of these theses are 
also categorised under the following historiographies: Marxist historiography, 
´territorist´ historiography, ´sociologist´ and the mystical-hermeticist historiographies.  
This research examines their response to the question of the existence of the scientific 
revolution to show how in trying to affirm or deny its success they were more or less 
subsumed in the intricate reactions to the traditional claims of science, which include 
rationality, truth, objectivity and realism. It illustrates how the historicists´ critique of 
the notion of the progress of science is not typically about the success of early modern 
science, but the justification of the traditional claims of science on the basis of the 
scientific processes and norms of the 16th and 17th centuries.  
One of the predominant issues the historicists theses press forth is the incorrectness of 
subsuming the success of the scientific revolution as a logical justification for the 
validity of the scientific claims, as has been manifested in the traditional authority of the 
modern science.  In fact, the success of the scientific revolution lies in the fulfilment of 
the socials functions that have characterized early modern science ever since Francis 
Bacon proclaimed the idea of the dominion over nature by man through the application 
of science. 
This research argues that their identification of the contextual and historical nature of 
scientific norms and processes leads us to the reconsideration of our notion of the 
universality of modern science. It illustrates that the notion of the universality of 
modern science has been the vantage point which makes the validity of those traditional 
                                                 
13 This research bases its discussion of the respective theses of the Scientific Revolution on the works of 
authors written specifically on the subject. ( See Shapin, 1996, Koyré, 1957; 1965; 1968; 1978, Kuhn, 
2000;1996, Duhem, 1991; 1955; 1913-1959, 1996, Butterfield, 1997; 1959, Hall, 1966; 1981; 1983, 
Needham, 1969; 1954; 1981, Merton, 2001, Hessen, 1971, and Yates, 1964, 2010). 
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scientific claims seem plausible. But if there is no non-contextual or ahistorical 
scientific processes and norms it means we likely have to talk about the ´globality´ of 
the modern science and not its universality.  Finally, it demonstrates that universality of 
modern science resides in the replication of equipment (for experiment), the training of 
observes (scientists), the circulation of routine practices and the standardization of 
methods and measures. When equipment, instruments, theories, statements, expressions 
of scientific laws and training are standardized, the same kinds of practices or units will 
become accepted as default options in multiple localities. 
 
 
1.4     OBJECTIVES 
 
The general objective of this thesis is to realise a comprehensive analysis of the concept 
of scientific revolution within the historicist context and its treatment of the cognitive 
and socio-cultural elements in science. Invariably, it demonstrates the implications for 
future studies on the progress of science and the authority of scientific knowledge. It 
illustrates that the lessons from the historicist historiography of the scientific revolution 
demands adequate reconsideration of the notion of the universality of modern science. 
How is it possible to reconcile the intuition that scientific knowledge can transcend the 
conditions of its production with the acknowledgment of the contingent and contextual 
nature of scientific work? 
 
Since every shift in the notion of science has elicited a shift in the epistemological status 
of the scientific knowledge, it suggests that an interactionist epistemology will better 
demonstrate the variety of factors involved in scientific progress unlike the dichotomy 
and exclusion constituted in the objectivist and subjectivist epistemologies.   
 
Interestingly, the popularity of the Kuhnian thesis, in the past half century, has 
overshadowed the vital contributions of other historicists’ historiographies of the 
Scientific Revolution to the development of the history and philosophy of science. This 
research brings into focus their enormous contributions to the understanding of science 
and the development of philosophy of science. It is important to note here that all the 
theses of the scientific revolution discussed in this work are to be drawn from the 
aforementioned authors’ different works written specifically on the Scientific 
9 
 
 
Revolution. It is the historical character of their works that made them to be grouped 
under the historicist model of the scientific revolution irrespective of the school of 
thought they belong. This forms the basis on which they are called theses of the 
Scientific Revolution unlike the positivist model that dwelled just on the analysis of the 
scientific advancement in general. In fact, there was little mention of scientific 
revolution as a philosophical topic in the works of logical empiricists and logical 
positivist. 
 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
The procedure of investigation used in this thesis is mainly the bibliographical revision 
of the works of major authors who have written specifically on the Scientific Revolution 
from a historical perspective. Consequently, the terms; historicists, historicist 
historiography, historicist model and historicist narrative will be used interchangeably to 
refer to the authors´ analysis of the Scientific Revolution. It is from their works that a 
comprehensive selection of relevant text was made for the development of this theme, 
the approach and objectives of the thesis. The secondary data are mainly drawn from 
relevant sources, from journals, books and articles. The reason for incorporating both 
primary and secondary data is to provide adequate elaboration, on the theme, for 
readers, so as to facilitate proper understanding of the topic and the different variable 
that are involved in it. 
 
This work is divided into three sections. The first section which treats on the 
historiography of the scientific revolution comprises the first two chapters. Chapters one 
describes the origin and history of the term ´Scientific Revolution´, while chapter two 
discusses the ten principal historicist historiographies of the Scientific Revolution. The 
second sections which consists of chapter three and four, illustrates the historicists 
reactions to the traditional claims of science and the theoretical mechanisms they 
employed to demonstrate that the justification of the traditional claims of science cannot 
be, plausibly, based upon the scientific processes and norms of the 16th and 17th 
centuries. The initial approval of those processes and norms as guarantors of the validity 
of scientific claims drives from the belief that the entities and processes of theory exist 
in nature, and science has the duty to discover them. However, certain developments in 
10 
 
 
the nineteenth-and twentieth-century science had shown such scientific realism to be 
wrong. A good example was the atomic physics of Werner Heisenberg. According to 
Cecil Schneer, Heisenberg´s indeterminacy led to the conclusion that ¨the world of 
nature is indeterminate. The behavior of the particle is uncertain and therefore the 
behavior of the atom is an uncertainty.¨14 Thus at the atomic level, ¨even the 
fundamental principle of causality fail[ed].¨15 Heisenberg wrote thus, 
 
At the instant when the position is determined—therefore, at the 
moment when the photon is scattered by the electron—the 
electron undergoes a discontinuous change in momentum. This 
change is the greater the smaller the wavelength of the light 
employed—that is, the more exact the determination of the 
position. At the instant at which the position of the electron is 
known, its momentum therefore can be known only up to 
magnitudes which correspond to that discontinuous change. 
Thus, the more precisely the position is determined, the less 
precisely the momentum is known, and conversely.16 
 
Heisenberg used his thought experiment in measuring the position of an electron to 
show that there are limits to what we can know about the electron.  Precisely, this 
indeterminacy principle is a variety of mathematical inequalities asserting a 
fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties of a 
particle, such as position X and momentum P , can be known simultaneously. It implies 
that ´mathematical realism´17 cannot wholly provide true and objective scientific 
knowledge as the works of Galileo, Kepler and Newton were shown to have done. 
Invariably, the chapters three and four argue that the scientific processes of the early 
modern period, alone cannot justify the validity of the traditional claims of science. 
These scientific processes are situated in history and are quite contextual. To understand 
                                                 
14 Cecil J. Schneer, The Evolution of Physical Science (New York: Grove, 1960), p. 364 
15 Ibid., pp. 358-9 
16 Werner Heisenberg, ¨The physical content of quantum kinematics and mechanics¨, in Quantum Theory 
and Measurement, eds. Wheeler, J. A and Zurek, W. H (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 
p.64. See also pp.174-5 in W. Heisenberg, ´Üeber den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen 
Kinematik und Mechanik´, Zeitschrift für Physik 43, 1927, 172–198. 
17 See section 3.1 for the detailed discussion on the term 
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them and the way they relate to the scientific claims properly, we need to study them 
within the historical and socio-cultural context in which they are developed.  
 
The last section which consists of chapter five, therefore, illustrate that if the scientific 
processes are historically conditioned there is need to re-examine the notion of the 
universality of modern science since such notion drives from the belief that the entities 
and processes of theory exist in nature and science is used in all places to discover them. 
It makes an elaborate illustration of the philosophical, epistemological, social and 
historical aspects of the universality of modern science to argue for the need of further 
research on the reconstruction of our notions of the scientific claims and progress at a 
higher level of integration. 
 
 
1.6 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The ´Scientific Revolution´ is primarily a historian´s conceptual category. It is for this 
reason that this research is being based on the historicist historiography of the scientific 
revolution, and not on any particular author.  As we would see in Koyré formation of the 
term, it was developed mainly as an analytical tool for the study of an epoch in the 
history of science. However, its designation as an analytical tool did not define the 
method and scope of its application. There was neither any specific subject matter it was 
channeled to address. Hence, we will be coming across topics ranging from the demise 
of the Aristotelian natural philosophy to mechanism, experimentalism, hermeticism, 
corpuscularism and mathematical natural philosophy. These range of issues demonstrate 
the wanton search for the precise nature of the ´Scientific Revolution´, its origins, 
causes and results. Perhaps, the lack of a definite pattern for this search serve to 
demonstrate, as John Henry illustrated, that ¨there was nothing like our notion of 
science until it began to be forged in the scientific revolution out of previously distinct 
elements¨.18 Therefore, the purpose of looking at the historical development of what we 
think of as science, should be to understand how the very concept ´science´ arose.19 
                                                 
18 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science. 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 
2002) p. 6 
19 Ibid., p. 5 
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Finally, the historicist model of the scientific revolution not only shows us the real 
process of the fundamental changes in modern science, it also defines what should be 
the real nature of science claims. 
13 
 
 
SECTION I 
 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION:  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
1.1 HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
 
The term ¨Scientific Revolution¨ was first given wide significance through Herbert 
Butterfield´s series of lectures on The Origins of Modern Science20 delivered for the 
History of Science Committee in Cambridge in 1948. These lectures later came out in 
book form in 1949. However, it was the French historian and philosopher of Russian 
origin, Alexandre Koyré, who in the 1939 created it as a conceptual tool for 
understanding the birth of early modern science through the publication of his three 
essays collected together under the title Études Galiléennes21.  
 
The history of the concept of scientific revolution has common historical characteristics 
with the history of the concept of ´revolution´ itself. When one asks; what history lies 
behind the terms ´revolution´ and ´scientific revolution´? The answer that ensues would 
be an intriguing mix of accounts of physical phenomena, political fortunes, and 
conceptions of chance, fate, and history. Such answer indicates why it is necessary to 
have thorough study of the history of the concept of revolution in order to get a defined 
view of the concept of the scientific revolution since ¨such history has a number of 
closely related themes that are relevant to the subject of revolution in science.¨22 
.  
1.1.1 THE MEANING OF REVOLUTION IN ANCIENT GREEK 
                                                 
20 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800, revised ed. (New York: Free Press, 
1997) First published in 1949 
21 See Alexandre Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 2nd ed. (Paris: Hermann, 1966 [1939-1940]); Alexandre 
Koyré, Galileo Studies, trans. John Mepham (Hassocks: The Harvest Press, 1978) 
22 I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 2001[1985]), p. 52 
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The pre-historic and ancient Greek periods did not have any particular word with which 
the term¨ revolution¨ was designated. In the works of historians like Herodotus and 
Thucydides and philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, various synonyms were used 
which demonstrated ´their fill of revolution´, though they had no single word for it.23 
Herodotus and Thucydides had both used the term ἐπανάστασις ´uprising´.24 
Thucydides further speaks of μϵταβoλή πoλιτϵίας ´change of constitution´25 or 
νϵωτϵρίζϵιν την πoλιτϵίαν26 ´to revolutionize the state´. In Plato´s Republic and 
Aristotle´s Politics νϵωτϵρίζϵιν27, νϵωτϵρισμός28 (revolution) and μϵταβoλή και 
στάσις29 (Change with uprising) were used respectively.  
 
Generally, these Greek words were used to demonstrate changes in the political system 
or societal transformation, and were intermittently employed to illustrate both cyclical 
phenomena and radical change. The cyclic theory of revolution could be seen in Plato´s 
formation of the process of the ideal state in which timocracy deteriorates into 
Oligarchy and through democracy into tyranny. However, the cycle was perfectly 
completed later by Polybius who started by making kingship to pass to tyranny, through 
aristocracy and oligarchy to democracy and mob-rule which in turn produces the 
kingship again. But then, Aristotle was apt to reject this cyclical connotation and readily 
uses μϵταβoλή to reflect new change and ´μϵταβoλή και στάσις´ when it is accompanied 
by violence.  
 
These illustrations of the Greek etymology of the term show that ´revolution´ is not just 
a modern concept. The Greeks knew about it and even express it in words. The only 
difference between the modern expression of the concept and the Greek is that the 
Greeks did not always choose the same word to express it, and sometimes two or more 
                                                 
23 Arthur Hatto, ¨ ´Revolution´: An Enquiry Into the Usefulness of an Historical Term¨, in Mind (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1949) p.498 
24 Ibid. (See also Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Aubrey de DeSélincourt. (London: Penguin, 2003); E.S. 
Shuckburgh, Herodotus Book VI (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976) pp.30-50. First 
published 1889 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Plato. Republic, Book IV, 424b, 565b (Cf. Plato. Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Vol. III, 1903) 
28 Ibid. 
29 Cf. Aristotle. Aristotle´s Politica. Book 1, 1252a ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957) 
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words were used. It could be asked why didn´t they have a particular word for such 
familiar concept they knew about and lived in their daily encounters? Arthur Hatto 
offers a very clear and historic answer. He wrote thus, 
 
The reason for this must be sought in the fact that their 
civilisation had experienced no classic revolution as did ours in 
the Revolution of 1789.30 
 
What he seeks to emphasise is that though the Greeks experienced many revolutions 
and near-revolutions or proto-revolutions as well, they were not witness to a classic 
revolution in the sense that Europe did in the French revolution of 1789.  It was from 
this period that the concept of revolution gained the status of total change and radical 
overturn and became frequently identified with similar events. 
The Greek sources serve to demonstrate the origin of the cyclical notion of revolution 
and the traditional sense in which it was used during the ancient period. Nevertheless, 
such notion did not stop with the ancient. It prevailed the medieval and renaissance 
sense of the word and has continued to be concurrently functional with the modern 
´radical change´ connotation that was initially introduced during the enlightenment 
period. 
 
 
1.1.2 NOTIONS OF REVOLUTION IN THE MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE 
CONTEXT 
 
In general etymological sense, ´revolution´ is derived from the mediaeval Latin 
´revolutio´ which means a rolling back or a return, usually with an implied sense of 
revolving in time.31 Its Latin root verb is ´re-volere´ which means ´to roll back´.   
In later Latin, the noun ´revolutio´ had the sense of ´conversio´ of classical Latin, of 
which its root verb ´convertere´ has the sense of turning on an axis or of rotating, and so 
is akin to revolving. The latin word that is very similar to the modern notion of 
revolution is ´mutatio rerum´ as could be found in Machiavelli’s The Prince Ch. 26, 
                                                 
30 Arthur Hatto, ´Revolution´ : An Enquiry Into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, p. 500 
31 See Felix Gilbert, ¨Revolution,¨ in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. Philip P. Wiener. 5 vols (New 
York, 1973), IV, 152-67 
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though he employed it in an Italian form ´mutazione di stato´32. In this chapter, the 
phrase that occurs is ´tante revoluzioni d´Italia´ (meaning, many revolutions in Italy), 
although it was used in the general sense of mutazioni (mutations), rather than in the 
special sense of ´revolution´.33  
 
However, the medieval Italian word ´rivoluzione´ is etymologically equivalent to the 
English term ´revolution´ in its specific sense of radical overturn or in the sense of 
¨constitutional change¨34 as was used by the Italian historian and statesman, Francesco 
Guicciardini. By the early sixteenth century, this Florentine historian, Guicciardini was 
writing of a change in government as  ´rivoluzione´.35 It shows why the anti- and pro-
Medicean Revolutions in Florence in the years 1494, 1512 and 1527 were all called 
´rivoluzione´. In a general sense, rivoluzione was a ´return to a starting point´, and it is 
in this sense that the banishment of the Medici in 1494 could also mean a return to a 
more democratic regime, while its reinstatement in 1512 was a return to the regime of 
before 1494, and then its second banishment in 1527 a return to the regime before 1521. 
 
The medieval concept of the term ´revolution´ shows it as mere mutations (mutation 
rerum, mutazioni) that re-establish pre-existing order through radical historical events. 
However, the distinctive character of the revolutions the aforementioned Latin and 
Italian words referred to is not merely that they are cyclical succession of phenomenon 
in the sense that the word ´revolution´ itself means to roll back, but they mainly indicate 
the dramatic changes at the time. 
 
Moreover, the usage of the substantive ´revolutio´ as a technical term in astronomy 
beginning in the Latin Middle Ages serves to illustrate the clear sense in which the word 
was first accommodated in science. It was employed to illustrate the daily revolutions 
observed in the stars and in the sun, moon, and planet, and the orbital apparent motions 
of the planets. It appears emphatically in the title of Copernicus´s classic work De 
Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres, 1543) 
                                                 
32 See Machiavelli, ´The Prince Ch. 26, quoted in I.B Cohen, Revolution in Science, p.57 
33 Arthur Hatto, ´Revolution´: An Enquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, p. 503  
34 Francesco Guicciardini, Storie Fiorentine, dal 1378 al 1509 ed. Roberto Palmarocchi (Bari: Tipografi-
Editori-Libra, 1931), chap. 2, pp. 20-21 
35 Francesco Guicciardini, Opere. ed. Emanuella Lugnani Scarano. (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice, 
1970) p. 81 
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and also appeared in various places in Galileo´s dialogue On the Two Chief World 
Systems, 1632.  
 
Evidently, the varying sense of the cyclical and radical use of the words ´revolution in 
science´ could be found in the recurrent distinction usually made between ´rotation´ and 
´revolution´. ´Rotate´ comes from the Latin verb ´rotare´ meaning to turn, or to swing 
around. Here rotation is used to refer to the turning of a body on its axis and revolution 
as the motion in a circuit along closed path or orbit. However, the two words were used 
interchangeably in Renaissance and late seventeenth century period. In this case the 
primary astronomical meaning of revolution was the circular motions of the heavens 
and its astrological signification of the way such motions affect or even determine the 
course of men´s lives and of the state. Consequently, in the renaissance context, the 
notion of ´revolution´ is more typified by the physical motions of physical images and 
objects, like the sun and clock towers of Renaissance buildings, than it is purely 
intellectual metaphor. 
 
 
1.1.3 REVOLUTION AS A CONCEPT OF ´ABRUPT CHANGE´ IN THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT PERIOD 
 
It was not until the American Revolution of 1776 and French Revolution in 1789 that a 
new meaning came to predominate the term ´revolution´ as a breach of continuity or a 
secular change of real magnitude. Its usage ever since has commonly implied what I. 
Bernard Cohen (1976) describes as, 
 
 
 a radical change and a departure from traditional or accepted 
modes of thought, belief, action, social behaviour, or political or 
social organisation.36 
 
This explanation of revolution depicts the concept of a change that is sudden, radical, 
and complete, often accompanied by violence or at least the exercise of force. Such 
                                                 
36 I. Bernard Cohen, ¨The Eighteenth-Century Origins of the Concept of Scientific Revolution¨, Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 1976, 37(2),  p. 258. 
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fundamental change has a dramatic character that usually enables observers to discern 
that a revolution is taking place or has just done so. For instance, the English ¨The Great 
Rebellion¨ of 1640-60 could not be termed a ¨revolution¨ until 1826-27 by analogy with 
the French Revolution of 1789.37 In its own century the English Revolution was referred 
to as ¨The Great Rebellion¨ and ¨The Civil War¨ as reflected in Clarendon´s History of 
the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England38. Christopher Hill wrote on the English 
Revolution, 
 
A great revolution took place¨ during ¨the decades 1640-
60...comparable in many respects with the French Revolution of 
1789.39 
 
In the enlightenment context ¨Revolution¨ refers to basic upheaval, radical break, 
profound change, and new beginning. These new meaning, evidently, bring some bits of 
confusion and ambiguity about the actual significance of the term ´revolution´ not only 
to science but to political events. The reason for such ambiguity is that the older sense 
of ¨revolution¨ as a cyclical phenomenon, a kind of return and repetition still remain. 
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the writers on science in the eighteenth century 
developed the notion of revolutionary scientific events, comparable to political events 
and usually with the work of a single individual like Copernicus, Descartes, Newton etc. 
Consequently, the term ´The Scientific Revolution´ has become the name commonly 
given today to the particular scientific revolution (or set of revolutions) of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, by means of which modern science was established, and 
often associated with such figures like Copernicus, Vesalius, Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, 
Kepler, Harvey, Huygens and Newton. 
 
The above illustrations denote two prevalent senses in which the concept of revolution 
has been used, namely:  
 
1. The technical sense (astronomical)  and 
2. General sense (Political) 
                                                 
37 Arthur Hatto, ´Revolution´: An Enquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, p. 504 
38 Edward Clarendon, Earl of. 1888. The  History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England begun in the 
year 1641. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Culled from Bernard I. Cohen, Revolution in Science. p. 71) 
39 Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714. 2nd ed. (London: Sphere Books, 1972) p. 165 
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François Pomey (1691) in Le Dictionaire Royal made two separate entries for the term 
´revolution´. They are ´Tour´40 meaning circuit or rotation and ´Changement d´ état´41 
meaning overturning of the state or change of state. These entries indicate that in a 
technical sense, ´revolution` refers to the traditional motion of circularity and the going 
around of the heavenly bodies. In this case the notion is not only used as a purely 
intellectual metaphor but was exemplified in definite physical images and objects like 
the daily apparent motion in revolution of the celestial sphere like sun, stars and moon. 
While in the general sense, ´revolution´ is devoted to political change, change in 
general, and even the advance of time and the vicissitude of fortune. 
 
The clear objective of these separate entries of Pomey would be to emphasize that it was 
in the socio-political sphere that talk of revolution as a successful uprising and 
overturning became common. In this sense a revolution is a successful revolt, 
´revolution´ being an achievement or product term whereas ´revolt´ is a process term. 
Christopher Hill justifies the origin of this common concept of revolution when he 
writes that, 
 
 Conventional wisdom has it that the word ´revolution´ acquired 
its modern political meaning only after 1688. Previously it had 
been an astronomical and astrological term limited to the 
revolution of the heavens, or to any complete circular motion.42 
 
The fully modern conception of revolution as involving a break from the past in the 
sense of an abrupt, humanly-made overturning rather than a natural-overturning, 
depended on the linear, progressive conception of history that originated in the Italian 
Renaissance or at least the Protestant Reformation. Arthur Hatto demonstrated that from 
the bare factual history of ´revolution´ as a political term it is clear that its origin has to 
be sought not in France but in Italy, where the first revolutions of the epoch occurred.43 
However, the radical connotation of revolution as a political term gained strength during 
                                                 
40 François Pomey, Le Dictionaire Royal (Lyon: Molin, 1691) p. 839 
41 Ibid. 
42 Christopher Hill,  A Nation of Change and Novelty: Radical Politics, Religion and Literature in 
Seventeenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 82 
43 Arthur Hatto, ´Revolution´: An Enquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term, p. 509 
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the two seventeenth-century English revolutions of the 1640s and the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. 
 
The import of this modern concept with root in the Italian Renaissance is to illustrate 
that the notion of ´abrupt change´ of ´revolution´ is very reflective of the prevalent 
rejection of the idea of cosmic determinism at the period. This is because it is only 
within the context of cosmic determinism that the cyclical notion of ´revolution´ could 
be justified and in that way the meaning of revolution would just be mere changes or 
ordinary overturn rather than a radical and sudden departure from the past. It is on this 
basis that one can establish the difference between the cyclical and radical notions of 
revolution as ´abrupt change´.  
 
Eventually, the modern conception gained its strength in the eighteenth century, and 
became practically dogma among the champions of the scientific Enlightenment. In the 
early eighteenth century in France, the term ´revolution´ had pure political definition 
and was being used often, though not in an explicit way, to mark significant 
developments at the time.  By the mid eighteenth century it was obvious that Alexis-
Claude Clairaut (1749), Diderot, D´Alembert et al (1751) sometimes applied the term to 
scientific developments, including Newton´s achievement but also Descartes´ rejection 
of Aristotelian philosophy.44 And then by the end of the century several French authors 
were referring explicitly to one or another revolution in the sciences.45 
 
 
1.2 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AS A DUAL SENSE ´PHILOSOPHICALLY 
GENERAL´ AND ´HISTORICALLY UNIQUE´ CONCEPT 
 
Floris Cohen (1994) did remarkable analysis of the concept of scientific revolution by 
clearly distinguishing between notions of the ´Scientific Revolutions and The Scientific 
                                                 
44 I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science. pp. 216-220 
45 Ibid. See also Le Marquis de Condorcet. Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human 
Mind. Trans. June Barraclough (New York: The Noonday Press, 1955; Hyperion reprint, 1979, Westport, 
Conn.: Hyperion Press); Jean-Etienne Montucla. Histoire des mathématiques. 2 vols. (Paris: Chez  Ch. 
Ant. Jombert, 1758), and in the revised edition, 4 vols. (Paris: Chez Henri Agasse, 1799) 
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Revolution´46. The term ´Scientific Revolutions´ which is generic stands for a 
philosophical idea about the on-going process of science. He explains it thus, 
  
It signifies the idea that scientific discovery generally proceeds 
in a convulsive sort of way....Scientific revolution are taken to 
occur with a certain frequency, or even regularity; there is 
nothing unique about them.47 
 
This concept of scientific revolutions emerged during the 1960s and 1970s at a period 
when the historiography of science came to maturity primarily with important works on 
the Scientific Revolution. Thomas Kuhn published The Copernican Revolution in 1957 
and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, adding the important ¨Postscript—
1969¨ to the second edition of 1970. Both Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend 
challenged received views of science and made talk of revolution and 
incommensurability central to history and philosophy of science. They asserted that 
major conceptual changes lay in the future of the various sciences as well as in their 
past. Therefore, no science of any particular epoch is inherently privileged than another. 
Feyerabend, introduced the term ´incommensurable´ in his “Explanation, Reduction and 
Empiricism”48 , while Kuhn reiterated that there have been many scientific revolutions 
both small and large occurring in scientific specialty areas, with even very few 
members, though outsiders (non-members of that scientific community) might see those 
transformations as very normal and cumulative progress. As such, scientific revolutions 
are not quite highly distinctive developments even though there are deep conceptual 
changes. 
In contrast, the term ´Scientific Revolution´ is specific. It stands for a historical idea 
about one concrete episode in the past of science. According to Floris Cohen, 
 
It signifies the idea that there has been a period in history, 
which is hard to date with precision but which almost always is 
                                                 
46 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry,  p. 21 
47 Ibid. 
48 Paul Feyerabend, “Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism”, in Scientific Explanation, Space, and 
Time, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, eds. H. Feigl & G. Maxwell, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1962) pp. 28–97 
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meant to include the first decades of the 17th century, when a 
dramatic upheaval occurred in science.49 
 
This concept indicates that there is existence of scientific revolution as highly 
distinctive development. For instance, works like The Origin of Modern Science: 1300-
1800 (Herbert Butterfield, 1949), Scientific Revolution: 1500-1800 (Hall, 1954) and 
Études Galiléennes (Koyré, 1939) are some of such works that are characterized by 
their grand narratives of the science of the early modern period as highly distinctive 
development. 
 
Since the middle of the 20th century, the frequency of revolutions and accumulations of 
historical data have produced an outpouring of studies on revolution from varying 
viewpoints. Therefore, in order not to be buried under the mass of material or lost in the 
confusion of differing conceptions, it is necessary to select a definition which can be 
focused on the scientific revolution. In doing this, the above analysis of the etymology 
of revolution has demonstrated that its modern use as a sudden and surprising change 
invariably neglects the political implications of the meaning of rolling forward or 
backward to a starting point, as illustrated in the Greek and medieval origin, and plays 
down the decisive part played by astronomical and astrological conceptions in its 
semantic development.  
 
Various works on the scientific revolution have sought to give account of its 
development along the dual sense of the concept and such attempts have precipitated 
into two basic traditions, which will be carefully traced and discussed. 
 
 
1.3 EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPT 
 
There was tremendous rise and subsequent rapid spread of the concept of the ´Scientific 
Revolution´ during the periods between 1924 and the 1960´s. Two major factors are 
responsible for this development. Firstly, this concept was particularly forged as an 
analytical tool for the study and understanding of the emergence of modern science as a 
                                                 
49 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, p.21 
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historical issue. The other was the establishment of the history of science as a 
professional academic disciple which occurred as a result of the fresh academic 
opportunities offered by the evolving articulations of the new concept of the Scientific 
Revolution. It was within the first decades of the twentieth century that a genuinely 
historical debate over the nature and the causes of the changes in the sixteenth-
seventeenth-century science flourished. 
 
In 1924 Edwin Arthur Burtt published The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science. His philosophical thesis analyses how the human spirit has been read 
out of the cosmos at large through the advent of modern science. It makes a paradoxical 
representation of how the autonomy of the human mind was downgraded and banished 
by the same atomic universe it created through modern science.  The thesis provides a 
framework for an overview of drastically novel ideas, mostly those in the mathematical 
and the corpuscularian mode, from Copernicus to Isaac Newton (1642-1727), but with 
much emphasis on Newton. 
 
Alexandre Koyré, in Études Galiléennes (1939) coined ´Scientific Revolution´ and 
applied it as an analytical tool for grasping the essence of the rise of modern science. He 
analyses the concept in very restricted sense as the deep ramifications of Galileo´s novel 
mathematically idealized treatment of motion. Here, Galileo´s work was interpreted as a 
sort of Platonic intellectual transformation. Also, one need to read together Koyré´s La 
revolution astronomique (1961) and his Newtonian Studies (1965) to get an adequate 
picture of the expanded meaning he gave to the concept in later years. In the Galileo 
Studies he worked out the physic-mathematical current in early modern science, while 
in the Newtonian Studies adequate consideration was given to the empirical and 
experimental current with deliberate appreciation of the Democritean conception of the 
atomic structure of reality.  
 
In The Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800 (1949), Herbert Butterfield, a British 
political historian, wrote a comprehensive summary of what we now term the Scientific 
Revolution. In the Origins Butterfield applied the revolution label not only to the 
Scientific Revolution and to several of its components but also to ¨The Postponed 
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Revolution in Chemistry¨50, as if it were a delayed component of the Scientific 
Revolution. One could see in this work a clear divide between inner and outer Scientific 
Revolution. The inner Scientific Revolution runs across the various scientific 
adventures from Copernicus to Newton and was effectively distinguished from an outer 
Scientific Revolution which he superficially and rapidly surveyed in a technically 
undemanding way. Likewise, the anti-whiggism which he had advocated in his The 
Whig Interpretation of History (1931), after being imported from political history, 
became a major constraint on the new historiography of science, especially in the 
Anglophone world. Above all, it was his Origins that suggested to many readers that 
there had been several scientific revolutions and not just one single enormous one. 
 
Subsequently, A. Rupert Hall, a full-fledged historian of science who worked from 
primary sources, published his The Scientific Revolution (1954). In this moderately 
technical survey that runs from 1500 to 1800, Hall treats the creation of modern science 
at the hands of, mostly, Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Antoine Lavoisier 
(1743-1794) as the gradually emerging triumph of rationality. The organization of the 
book is more diffuse than those previously listed, partly because it gave ample attention 
to such non-mathematical disciplines as chemistry and the life sciences. Later on, many 
other scholars spoke of the Scientific Revolution, the achievements of the period from 
Copernicus to Newton, including such luminaries as Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, 
Huygens, Boyle, and Leibniz. 
 
Long before these scholars and many of their contemporaries formally recognized the 
rise of modern science as a legitimate historical problem, scientists and philosophers 
were already writing on the nature of the modern science. Such works include Ernst 
Mach´s The Science of Mechanics (1883)51 and William Whewell´s History of the 
Inductive Sciences (1837)52 and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840)53. 
                                                 
50 ¨The Postponed Revolution in Chemistry¨ is a chapter title in Herbert Butterfield´s The Origin of 
Modern Science. In it he illustrates how the new foundation of chemistry was laid by the works of Robert 
Boyle, Joseph Priestley, Joseph Black, Henry Cavendish and Antoine Laviosier. See Herbert Butterfield, 
The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800, pp. 203-221 
51 Ernst Mach. The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, trans. 
Thomas. J. McCormack 4th ed (Palm Springs, USA: Watchmaker pub., 2010[1919]). Original German 
version Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwickelung historisch-kritisch dargestellt. (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1883) 
52 William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time. 3rd ed. 3 
vols. (London: Parker, 1857) 
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According to Whewell, scientific progress is dependent upon the ability of men of 
genius to formulate clear ideas and apply them to distinct facts. When this is done 
science flourishes and there is an Inductive Epoch. It is possible to have preludes and 
sequels to the Inductive Epochs and, since science is sometimes stagnant, we also find 
Stationary Periods. The Middle Ages is the prime example of a Stationary Period 
between the era of Greek science and the rise of modern science. 
 
However, Continuity theorists such as Pierre Duhem (1906), John Herman Randall 
(1940), Alistair C. Crombie (1959), Marshall Clagett (1959), and more recent historians 
such as Peter Dear (2001) have pointed out very major difficulty in speaking of ¨the 
Scientific Revolution.¨54 This difficulty lies in locating the alleged sharp break of 
modern science from medieval and Renaissance practices that discontinuity historians 
like Alexandre Koyré and Thomas S. Kuhn had illustrated. According to the continuity 
theorists, when examined closely in their own cultural context, all the supposed 
revolutionaries are found to have had one foot in the old traditions and to have relied 
heavily on the work of predecessors.  
 
Consequently, the debate has since remained on how did this vast enterprise of modern 
science get its start? What were the unique elements in the Western tradition that 
stimulated its creation and rapid growth? Did science emerge because of a mutation in 
the intellectual life of Europe or through a long development process? Does its origin 
and growth depend upon external factors, such as socio-political and economic 
conditions, or upon factors from within science? These are questions that have 
perplexed historians for years. For more than half century now, historians attempting to 
answer them have turned to the histories of science, economics, religion, 
intellectualism, psychoanalysis, political ideology, art and the occult, and sociology. For 
many historians, ´the Scientific Revolution´ now describes a topic area rather than a 
                                                                                                                                               
53 William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon Their History. 2nd ed. 2 
vols. (London: Parker, 1847) 
54 See Pierre Duhem. Études sur Léonard de Vinci: Ceux qu´il a lus et ceux qui l´ont lu. 3 vols. Paris: 
Hermann, 1906; 1913 (2nd impression, Paris: De Nobele,  1955); John. H Randall, The Making of the 
Modern Mind. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1940), 1st published in 1926; Alistair C. Crombie. Medieval 
and Early Modern Science (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959); Marshall Clagett, The Science of 
Mechanics in the Middle Ages. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Peter Dear. 
Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001) 
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clearly demarcated event. Invariably, the concept of Scientific Revolution has remained 
what Margaret J. Osler has called the ´single most unifying concept in the history of 
science´.55 
 
Various attempts by historians and philosophers of science to find out what was 
characteristically new about modern science as distinct from previous systems of natural 
philosophy have precipitated into varying theories which can also be regarded as theses 
of the scientific revolution. The theses include The Kuhnian thesis by Thomas S. Kuhn, 
Shapin thesis—Stephen Shapin, A. Mark Smith—Smith thesis, David C. Lindberg—
Lindberg thesis, Edgar Zilsel—Zilsel/Craftsman thesis, Boris Hessen—Hessen thesis, 
Robert K. Merton—Merton thesis, Alexandre Koyré—Koyré thesis, Pierre Duhem—
Duhem thesis, Herbert J. Butterfield—Butterfield thesis, Joseph Needham—Needham 
thesis, Frances Yates—Yates thesis, Richard S. Westfall—Westfall thesis, The 
Continuity thesis—Alistair C. Crombie, The Hall thesis—A. Rupert Hall, The Ben-
David thesis—Joseph Ben-David, The Popkin thesis—Richard Popkin, The Mandrou 
thesis—Robert Mandrou, The Burtt thesis—Edwin A. Burtt and the Eisenstein thesis—
Elizabeth Eisenstein. A good number of these theses have been given comprehensive 
analysis in various works on the historiography of the Scientific Revolution.56 
 
 
1.4 TWO TRADITIONS OF ACCOUNT OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
 
Various works of philosopher-scientists of the late Enlightenment period illustrated 
well-articulated interest in the history of science but in a way of giving general account 
for how science progresses. Science was clearly shown as a revolutionary affair and the 
kind of conception of the birth of early modern science was one that is at once 
systematic, analytical and broadly interpretive its own right.  
                                                 
55 Margaret J. Osler ed., ¨The Canonical Imperative: Rethinking the Scientific Revolution¨, in Rethinking 
the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.3 
56 H. Floris Cohen´s The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (1994) is the first most 
comprehensive and full-length historiography of the Scientific Revolution. Unlike other historiographies, 
he employed his analysis of the works of the historians of the Scientific Revolution as an occasion for 
pressing forward the inquiry into the nature and causes of the Scientific Revolution and not just to record 
their conclusions. See also George Basalla ed. The Rise of Modern Science: Internal or External Factors. 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath, 1968); and Maria L.R. Bonelli & William R. Shea (eds.). Reason, 
Experiment, and Mysticism in the Scientific Revolution (NY: Science History, 1975) 
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1.4.1 PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVANCEMENT 
 
In The Critique of Pure Reason (1787) Immanuel Kant discusses the definitive way to 
turn metaphysics into science. He demonstrated that in its actual stage metaphysics 
displays the ´mere groping in the dark¨57 characteristics of a non-secure science. 
Generally, the ´concerns of Reason´ that had acquired ¨the secure pace of a science¨58 
are logic, mathematics, and the empirical sciences. Then he goes on to illustrate this 
how mathematics after being turned into an established and indubitably secure science 
by the Greeks set the stage for the empirical sciences to achieve the status of a secure 
science. A field of thought gains the secure pace of science when it passes from the 
stage of aimless observations to active interrogation of its subject material through 
conscious experimentation. It is this revolution in mode of thought that gave such 
figures like Francis Bacon, Galileo Torricelli and Stahl the prominence in the big picture 
of the modern science. The reason was because of their key discoveries that enabled the 
empirical sciences to move on from the groping stage to the secure pace of mature 
science. They also inspired others to follow the right track of achieving genuine science. 
 
August Comte´s Positive Philosophy (1853) is another pioneer attempt to discuss how 
true scientific enterprise emerges. It argues that the history of each science could be 
divided into three successive stages. Each branch of knowledge passes successively 
through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the 
Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive.59 In this overall developmental 
process the theological and the metaphysical have a function of their own, which is 
more or less to usher in the positive stage, to which every science should aspire. This 
evolutionary development is governed by an accumulation process whereby mere 
augmentation of a thing or things produces a change of quality, of characteristics and 
conversely this qualitative change produces a quantitative one. Therefore each 
successive stage or sub-stage in the evolution of the human mind necessarily grew out 
of the preceding one, and this depicts the function of the principle of lawfulness. 
                                                 
57 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D Meiklejohn (New York: Dover, 2003) p. 
xxiv . The first and second editions were published as German as Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781 and 
1787 respectively. 
58 Ibid., pp. xix, 15. In page 15, he refers to such science as a ´science whose roots remain indestructible.´ 
59 Auguste Comte,  The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, trans. Harriet Martineau (New York: 
Calvin Blanchard, 1855[1853]), pp. 25-26 
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Consequently, Comte describes the 17th-century Revolution in Science as marking the 
onset of the positive stage of science.  
 
Whereas, Auguste Comte had argued that the ´principle of lawfulness´ (the description 
of phenomena) governs the whole of thought, the French chemist and philosopher of 
science, Emile Meyerson suggests that this was not the whole of thought. He argues that 
Comte ¨rigorously condemned all attempts to know anything beyond the law¨.60 But it is 
anomalous to assume that if the law explains phenomenon it is useless to go beyond it. 
This is because in the attempt to understand a phenomenon we do not just apply the 
´principle of lawfulness´ but the ´principle of causality. Hence, it is in that portion of 
science devoted to explanation that we ought to see the principle of causuality play a 
most conspicuous part.61 Science, he says, attempts equally to explain phenomena. This 
explanation consists in the identification of antecedent and consequent. His empirical 
study of scientific theories thus proposes two innate principles of reason. The first 
principle of reason leads us to expect the regularity of natural events. We expect to find 
that the relationship between conditions and property behaviour in nature remains 
constant. He wrote that, 
 
Our acts are performed in view of an end which we foresee; but 
this foresight would be entirely impossible if we did not have the 
absolute conviction that nature is well ordered, that certain 
antecedents determine and will always determine certain 
consequences.62   
 
The second innate principle leads us to expect identities between the antecedent and 
consequent of a change, and this underlies the success of scientific laws. Thus, he wrote 
that mechanistic or atomic theories would always be accepted because the human mind 
is always satisfied when it recognises them as valid, or as having even a chance of 
appearing as such.63 Therefore the principles of reason are factual rather than normative. 
                                                 
60 Émile Meyerson, Identity and Reality, trans. Kate Loewenberg (New York: Dover, 1962). The original 
version in French was published in 1908 as Identité et réalité. (Paris: F. Alcan), I quote from the reprinted 
version published by the Muirhead Library of Philosophy (Routledge: London, 2002) p.48 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 19 
63 Ibid., p. 91 
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This implies that the acceptance by the seventeenth-century scientists of the theories of 
the mechanical philosophy is a clear illustration of the timeless psychological processes 
that transcended any particular historical context.  
 
The principal aim of this work is not to do a study of scientific inductions, what the 
above illustrations intent to achieve is just to showcase the context under which initial 
study on the advancement of science was based. However, the illustrations of 
mathematics as completed science in the works of Kant and Comte, coupled with the 
influence of Comte´s positivism, generated increased interest on the part of 
philosophers in mathematics and of mathematicians in philosophy. 
 
The French Idealist philosopher, Léon Brunschvicg, in Les étapes de la philosophie 
mathématique (The Stages in the Philosophy of Mathematics), sets out the principal 
stages of philosophical reflection on mathematics. What fundamentally concerns him 
here is the problem of truth. He writes in the preface that he aims to resolve this 
problem by ´a meditation on the discipline which has employed the greatest 
scrupulousness and subtlety in its search for the truth´.64 Towards the end of his work, 
he reiterates that mathematics represents one of the most powerful and lasting 
achievements of the human genius. It reveals to us the capacities of the human intellect, 
and should be as much a foundation for our knowledge of the mind as it is for the 
natural sciences. Therefore, ´the activity of the mind has been free and productive only 
since the epoch when mathematics brought to mankind the true standard of truth´.65 
 
This particular epoch was the period between sixteenth-seventeenth-century when such 
figures like Galileo and Kepler orchestrated the mathematization of nature which 
became the defining feature of the early modern science. Such historical defining role of 
mathematics in the emergence of the early modern science was later to be given another 
perspective by a one-time student of Brunschvicg who had earlier listened to his 
lectures at Sorbonne. This student was Alexander Koyré and his conception of the 
Scientific Revolution of the 17th century was confined basically on the works of Galileo 
and Descartes, who developed the mathematical foundation of the early modern science. 
                                                 
64 Léon Brunschvicg. Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique, revised ed. (Paris: Blanchard, 1972) p. 
xi. First published in 1912 
65 Ibid., p. 577 
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1.4.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS IN EARLY 
MODERN SCIENCE 
 
Alexandre Koyré´s Études Galiléennes (Galileo Studies) projected a coherent Platonist-
idealist view into the account of the early modern science which eventually became the 
pioneer historical overview of scientific ideas in the course of the 17th Revolution in 
Science. Koyré is recognised to have been the first to coin the term ´Scientific 
Revolution in its current meaning. The Galileo Studies66, a 1978 translation from Koyré 
´s original 1939 French version, discusses the development of Galileo´s theories of 
motion and their impact on the scientific world. He lists its intellectual achievements as 
the geometrization of space and the subsequent dissolution of the cosmos which 
allowed the universe to be broken into its constitute parts and the substitution of the 
concrete space of the pre-Galilean physics with the absolute space of the Euclidian 
geometric system. The historicity of Koyré account lies in the fact that he tied his notion 
of the revolution in the science of the 17th century with the work of Galileo, one its 
major propounders.  
 
Central to Koyré account of Galileo achievement was his introduction of mathematics 
to physics which lead to genuine geometrization of space and the overthrow of the 
impetus theory. Galileo was heavily influenced by the thought of Plato which made him 
to side with ´Platonian ´mathematicism´ against Aristotelian empiricism with its claim 
that real physical bodies have no geometrical forms´.67 Koyré notes that the classical 
concept of motion developed by Descartes, Galileo and Newton shows motion as a state 
in time, and also, that bodies have a set inertia. These fundamental achievements refuted 
three essential facts central to the Aristotelian physics. The first is that natural motion 
did not exist. Second, motion is not the consequence of the nature of the body. Third, 
none of such nature could bring it to rest. However, the way Koyré greatly emphasized 
the importance of mathematics in the Galilean achievement shows his understanding of 
physics as truly the incarnation of mathematics—indicating why the language of 
mathematics really expresses the essence of reality.  
 
                                                 
66 See Alexandre Koyré, Galileo Studies, trans. John Mepham (Hassocks: The Harvest Press, 1978) 
67 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, p.78 
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Another mathematician by training, Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis reiterated the view of the 
mathematization of nature as the defining feature of early modern science. His The 
Mechanisation of the World Picture (1950) was written with the intent of surveying the 
way in which the mechanistic conception of the world came into being. It began by first 
describing the impact of the mechanistic conception in the time of Newton. He writes, 
 
It was this conception that first led to the methods of research 
and treatment that have caused the great flourishing of physical 
science...of which we are reaping the fruit in our own day: 
experiment as the source of knowledge, mathematical 
formulation as the descriptive medium, mathematical deduction 
as the guiding principle in the search for new phenomenon to be 
verified by experimentation.68  
 
Dijksterhuis attempts to record the development over time of those particular ideas in 
the history of mechanics that ultimately were incorporated into Newtonian mechanics. 
Hence, he made a delineation of the obstacles that obstructed advances in science during 
each period of scientific development, including, in particular, those obstacles leading to 
the adoption of the mechanistic conception in the time of Newton. In order to articulate 
the incremental development of the history of physical science during antiquity he 
describes six major factors, and explains why each of them fell short of the 
requirements needed to promote classical science. Such factors include: ancient 
mathematics, corpuscular theories, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Neo-
Platonism.   
 
This study will not pretend to analyse all these factors one after another. The important 
fact that could be extracted from the above analysis is that Dijksterhuis´s emphasis on 
the common hindrance which affected the success of each historical period depicts his 
believe in continuity in science. Invariably, the hindrance created the need for a 
mechanistic conception to advance the study of science and nature which could not 
                                                 
68 Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture (London: Oxford University Press, 
1961) p. 3. The original Dutch edition was De mechanisering van het wereldbeeld (Amsterdam: 
Meulenhoff, 1950).  
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materialise until the time of Newton. However, Dijksterhuis concept of continuity has 
not been acceptable by some scholars. 
 
For instance, H. Floris Cohen (1994) tried to demonstrate that Dijksterhuis was not 
quite the advocate of ´continuity´ he appeared to be. He argued that Dijksterhuis 
abandoned continuity when he came to Copernicus´s De Revolutionibus. Thus, 
 
...despite the [Dijksterhuis´s] protestations of continuity and 
despite organizing his book so that the period of early modern 
science is made to begin with Copernicus, the attentive reader 
leaves the book with the impression that in the past of science  
we find one unique break, which was occasioned in the main by 
the Archimedean Galileo and by Kepler, the Platonist and 
Pythagorean—the first two scientists truly to mathematized 
nature.69 
 
What Cohen failed to say here is that Dijksterhuis´s survey of the history of science 
found fault with the science of both Galileo and Kepler. While discussing Galileo, 
Dijksterhuis wrote that, ¨...in Galileo´s work, verification by experiment sometimes 
appears to be of secondary importance because it may be regarded as somewhat 
superfluous if the preceding reasoning seemed convincing; thus only purely mental 
experiments remain or the experiments are only described without being performed.¨70 
In discussing the new elements of Kepler´s work a similar fault is found. Dijksterhuis 
explained that Kepler´s new method does not deviate greatly from the old system, it is 
only different.71 Hence, he actually maintained his continuity thesis because at the time 
of the scientific activities of these scientists human thinking had not reached 
independence with a completely functional mechanistic conception.  
 
Even while Dijksterhuis discusses Newton´s scientific achievements, he does not say 
that a complete and useable mechanistic conception of the world was achieved. He sees 
this state of scientific investigation having to wait for those that followed Newton. 
                                                 
69 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, p. 69 
70 E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, p. 345 
71 Ibid., p. 322 
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Dijksterhuis treatment of the historic ideas of the early modern science on their 
particular propounders during the period mirrors the changing scientific mentalities put 
forth by Herbert Butterfield in The Origin of Modern Science (1949).  
 
Butterfield had published his work a year before the publication of Dijksterhuis´s in 
which, as a ´general historian´ than a ´historian of science´, demonstrated the 
importance of understanding the achievements of the early modern science only in the 
historical context of the era. His historical survey of the emergence of the scientific 
ideas in the early modern science lends huge sense of historical importance to the 
concept of Scientific Revolution. He portends that the novelty and magnanimity of the 
achievements of such figures like Galileo, Bacon, Copernicus, Newton, Harvey and 
Boyle could only be appreciated by defining them within the context these scientists 
lived and worked. The transformations they achieved were ones that required a different 
kind of thinking-cap, a transposition in the mind of the scientist himself.72 
 
A. Rupert Hall is also one of such early historians to establish a historical overview of 
the account of the science of the early modern period. Unlike Butterfield, he is a full-
blown historian of science. However, he recognises Butterfield, Alexandre Koyré, 
Joseph Needham and Charles Singer as his mentors. His principal objective was to 
illustrate that ´there was no unique reason for the development of science in early 
modern Europe, since one is free to argue that every feature of the European civilisation 
was a contributing factor´.73 What made the science that developed in Western Europe 
between 1500 and 1800 so unique was the overall rational character which marks it 
throughout. His objective was more to discuss the rational nature of the Scientific 
Revolution as opposed to the various brands of mysticism, magic, superstition, and the 
like, which early modern science conquered and gradually out-grew. The importance of 
Hall´s work is that it has served to showcase the predominate tendency among historian 
in trying to identify one factor or another as the cause of the scientific revolution. The 
two predominant structures of account of the causes of the scientific revolution include 
the positivist and historicist models.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800, p.17 
73 A. Rupert Hall, The Revolution in Science 1500-1750 (London: Longman, 1983[1954]) p. 36 
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1.5 THE POSITIVIST MODEL 
 
The positivist model of the scientific revolution account is not symmetrical to 
Positivism in philosophy. It represents the principal account of the scientific 
advancement during the 19th to early 20th century. This model includes the accounts of 
the scientific advancement by William Whewell (1794-1866), Isidore Auguste Marie 
Francois Xavier Comte (1798-1857), Pierre Humbert (1891-1953), Gaston Bachelard 
(1884-1892), Johann Christian Poggendorff (1796-1877) and Henri Louis Bergson 
(1859-1941). It would rather be regarded as general account of the scientific 
advancement than thesis of the Scientific Revolution. Moreover, it was concerned with 
the demonstration of the natural science as the progressive discovery of naïvely realistic 
truth about the external world. Likewise, its principal aim was to indicate how 
´scientific theory offers accurate reference to or portrayal of independent reality´.74 
 
Such account of the scientific advancement comes from the belief that the seventeenth 
century, employing the methods of Bacon and Galileo, had produced firm and 
permanent foundations of science, which might require adaptation and minor 
restructuring but no major reconstruction. This type of account tries to state 
categorically that the genuine science was born in the early modern period, and as such, 
other natural practices prior to this period cannot be accounted as science in the actual 
sense of the term ´science´. This explains why most accounts of this nature repudiate the 
ancient and medieval sciences since both of them permitted metaphysical claims to 
knowledge of the natural realities.   
 
For Auguste Comte, the era at which the final overthrown of the predilection for 
metaphysical speculation in the previous sciences is that time ´when the human mind 
was astir under the precepts of Bacon, the conceptions of Descartes, and the discoveries 
of Galileo´ 75 He goes further to argue why this period was actually the period marked 
the triumph of positive science. He wrote, 
 
Then it was that the spirit of the Positive philosophy rose up in 
opposition to that of the superstitious and scholastic systems 
                                                 
74 Jarrett Leplin ed., Scientific Realism. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)  pp. 1-2 
75 Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy, p.29 
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which had hitherto obscured the true character of all science. 
Since that date, the progress of the Positive philosophy, and the 
decline of the other two, have been so marked that no rational 
mind now doubts that the revolution is destined to go on to its 
completion.76 
 
Comte´s contempt for metaphysics was later criticized by William Whewell (1794-
1866) who insisted that there is in Galileo, Kepler, Gassendi, and the other fathers of 
mechanical philosophy, as much of metaphysics as in their adversaries of the previous 
era of science. Whewell pointed clearly that, 
 
Physical discoverers have differed from barren speculators, not 
by having no metaphysics in their heads, but by having good 
metaphysics while their adversaries had bad, and by binding 
their metaphysics to their physics, instead of keeping the two 
asunder.77 
 
Whewell had earlier given a positivist account of the scientific revolution whereby he 
had stated that science advances by progressive generalization from bare facts to general 
truths. Older truths are always modified by subsequent discoveries and are made fixed 
part of the body of knowledge.  Therefore, ´the earlier truths are not expelled but 
absorbed, not contradicted but extended; and the history of each science, which may 
thus appear like a succession of revolutions, is, in reality, a series of developments´.78 
 
The difference in Whewell account is that he presented a conception of science, 
ultimately Kantian in inspiration, according to which ideas supplied by the mind interact 
with factual data supplied by the sense in a dialectical process that leads to scientific 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 William Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon Their History. 2nd ed, vol. 
1. (London: Parker, 1847) p. x 
78 William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time. 3rd ed, vol. 
1 ( London: Parker, 1857) p.8 
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knowledge.79 In the case of Comte, he believed that positive science limits itself to 
relations among visible features of the world.  
 
However, Whewell handled the whole body of science and its advancement more as a 
resounding success story that would not be totally acceptable to those who have 
witnessed the sudden shift in historical consciousness orchestrated by the historians of 
science in the 20th century. Eventually, the rise in awareness regarding the importance of 
history in the understanding of science culminated in two dynamic narratives within the 
historicist model of the scientific revolution 
 
 
1.6 THE SOCIOLOGIST NARRATIVE 
 
The sociologists’ account of the scientific revolution arose from the growing awareness 
in the early half of the 20th century of the need to consider the body of a scientist´s work 
as an indissoluble part of its social, economic, and political context. This has been 
called the contextual approach to the account of the scientific progress. With this 
approach the objective of the cultural studies of science has been, mostly, to define the 
context and not just the content of the scientific works. It is rather a ´more or less´ 
search for the causes of progress in science, especially during the early modern period. 
 
 The American sociologist, Robert K. Merton, is the main pioneer of the sociology of 
science. His doctoral thesis which was defended in 1935 greatly contributed to the 
strong historical underpinnings of the many studies he devoted since then to 
sociological aspects of the scientific enterprise. His thesis Science, Technology and 
Society in Seventeenth-Century England, which was later published in 1938, 
demonstrated how Puritanism unintentionally provided social and cultural support for 
the science emerging in 17th-century England. He used massive amount of statistical and 
historical data to support his cautiously drawn conclusions that Puritanism provided a 
system of values and beliefs which fostered the development of seventeenth-century 
English science.  
                                                 
79 David C. Lindberg, ¨Conceptions of the Scientific Revolution from Bacon to Butterfield: A preliminary 
sketch¨, in Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution eds. David Lindberg & Robert S. Westman ( 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.11 
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However, the force of Merton argument seems to be weakened by the fact that he 
focused his attention upon the relationship between religion, science, and technology in 
England alone. Could not his argument have been more plausible if he had identified 
other parts of Europe where such Protestant ethic stimulated the scientific progress? The 
absence of the Protestant ethic did not either prohibit the progress of science in the pre-
Reformation Italy. What insight, then, does the account of the support of Puritanism to 
science and technology in England bring to the whole idea of the Scientific Revolution 
in early modern period?  
 
However, by systematically studying a particular national culture he facilitated the 
acceptance of his conclusions. In fact, the peculiar factor that made Merton´s work a 
classic of the sociology of science is that he avoided the error of over generalisation and 
unsupported account covering the whole scope of European science. Rather, he gathered 
and examined the existing, relevant data in the critical period of one society, and while 
affirming the possibility of peculiar causal connection in other societies he feels certain 
to have revealed the source of seventeenth-century English scientific activity by linking 
together Puritanism, technology, and science 
 
Merton´s argument that interacting socio-economic and religious forces incited on the 
growth of science in England was inspired by Boris Hessen thesis. From June 29 to July 
3, 1931, the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology 
met in London. A large Soviet delegation, headed by the eminent Communist theorist 
Nikolai I. Bukharin, came to present the Marxist explanation for the development of 
science. Professor Boris Mikhailovich Hessen presented an extraordinary paper titled 
¨The Social and Economic Roots of Newton´s ´Principia´¨.80 In the paper he claimed 
that Newton´s great masterpiece of mathematical physics, the Principia, was a product 
of seventeenth-century England´s commercial and industrial activity and the social 
system associated with it. He asserted that all the subjects handled in the three books of 
the Principia derive from technological issues that had come up during preceding 
decades of the century as a result of the needs of incipient capitalism.  
                                                 
80 Boris Hessen, ¨The Social and Economic Roots of Newton´s ´Principia.´¨ in Science at the Cross 
Roads: Papers presented to the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology Held in 
London from June 29th to July 3rd, 1931, by the Delegates of the USSR, 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1971) pp. 
149-212. First published in 1931 
38 
 
 
 
Most of the scientific activities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have their root 
in the technical needs of Europe´s newly emerging bourgeoisie. For instance, the 
development of the merchant capital created a set of quite distinct problems in several 
areas of technology: transportation over water, the mining industry, and arms 
production. Some of the technical needs in these areas include ¨an increase in the 
tonnage capacity of vessels and in their speed ¨methods of ventilating the mines,¨ and 
¨the stability combined with least weight of the firearm¨.81 Hessen later formed with 
Henryk Grossman the celebrated classical Marxist historiography of science. This is due 
to the fact that their work displays a specifically Marxist approach. Gideon Freudenthal 
and Peter McLaughlin (2009) affirmed that they conceptualize science as one kind of 
labor within the system of social production. Their discussions of the social context and 
the cognitive content of science are modelled on Marx´s analysis of the labor process.82  
 
However, Hessen has been severely criticised for his distortion of historical facts to fit 
his ideological mold. Nevertheless, his work has led more judicious historians and 
sociologists of science to consider the social and economic components of what might 
first appear to have been problems within the strict domains of science. Edgar Zilsel, an 
Austrian philosopher/scientist, the author of popular paper on the Sociological Roots of 
Science,83  adopted a more moderate economic-deterministic approach in his researches. 
He propounds the idea that the early capitalistic society broke down the ancient barriers 
separating the scholar from the craftsman, or what George Basalla (1986) identified as 
the ´man of formal knowledge´ from the ´man of practical knowledge´84 
 
From antiquity through the Middle Ages, the philosopher and the priest were socially 
superior to the metallurgist, potter, ship-builder, or other craftsman. On the different 
extremes the scholar excelled in logic, speculative thinking, and mathematics while the 
craftsman has a special knowledge of the material objects. Hence, theory and practice 
                                                 
81 d., pp. 158, 161, 164 
82 Gideon Freudenthal & Peter McLaughlin eds., ¨Classical Marxist Historiography of Science: The 
Hessen-Grossmann-Thesis¨, in The Social and Economic Roots of the Scientific Revolution, Boston 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 278 (Boston: Springer, 2009) p.1 
83 See Edgar Zilsel, ¨The Sociological Roots of Science,¨ The American Journal of Sociology, 1942, 47 
(4), 544-562 
84 George Basalla ed., The Rise of Modern Science: Internal or External Factors (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Heath, 1968) p. x 
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were separated for centuries until the needs of an emerging capitalistic society joined 
them together to produce modern science.  
 
Another sociologist whose work is very central to the social historiography of science is 
Joseph Ben-David. In his The Scientist´s Role in Society85 he sought to identify ´how 
and when´ was the ´role´ of the modern scientist established in European society? As 
such, his work tends to shift the focus from the emergence of modern science to the 
emergence of the role of the modern scientist. Of course, the larger question remains 
whether or not the intellectual basis of modern science must necessarily precede the 
creation of the social role of the modern scientist?  
 
All these illustrations of the rise of modern science reviewed here have been based on 
external causes. External factors (social, economic, religious, artistic etc.) have been 
advocated as the true stimuli of scientific progress thereby treating scientific ideas as if 
they do not have a life of their own. However, this idea has been attacked and rejected 
by some internalists who believe that the history of science is purely an intellectual 
history, such that though the general cultural, social and economic setting may exert an 
influence on science they do not determine the direction and rate of growth of scientific 
thought. Such internalists like Alexandre Koyré and A. Rupert Hall would argue that it 
is no more meaningful to search for the economic and social roots of Newton´s 
Principia than it is to seek the economic and social roots of Kant´s Critique of Pure 
Reason. Therefore, what the sociologist of science can only do is an attempt at an 
understanding of the specific social conditions which made possible the pursuit of 
science. What such scholar cannot do is to explain scientist´s thoughts in terms of their 
social environment.  
 
 
1.7 CONVENTIONALIST NARRATIVE 
 
The conventionalist narrative also known as the social-constructivist account of the 
scientific advancement has to do with the increasing application to the history of science 
                                                 
85 See Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist´s Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1971) 
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of the categories of social history and psychological analysis. It grew out from the 
moderately relativist conception of the scientific endeavour by Thomas Kuhn´s 
Structure of Scientific Revolution in which he demonstrated that science not only 
progresses by the fixed criteria of science but also by other attendant social-cultural 
factors.  Kuhn actually sought to demonstrate that historical and logical evidence 
showed that new conception of objectivity, rationality and progress are needed, and that 
this new conception was what he attempted to provide. His target for his own account of 
science was to demonstrate the virtue of importing interpretive resources beyond simple 
logical relations and a rather simple empiricist epistemology. This is why he emphasised 
the importance of scientific practices, most of which proceed on the basis of acquired 
expertise rather than explicit methodological rules. His thesis will be treated fully in 
section 2.12 
 
 
1.8 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The historiography of the scientific revolution has received all kinds of scholarly 
analyses which are usually characterized by sharp oppositions between old and new, 
external and internal, continuity and discontinuity, inductive and conventional. These 
dichotomies reflect the historiographical tendencies operative since the 1920s, which 
are generally characterized by the search for causes to explain the rise of the modern 
science. Such explanations have most commonly taken the form of establishing 
continuities (in some cases discontinuities) with currents of thought prior to the 
Scientific Revolution. These currents include the medieval Aristotelianism, Renaissance 
Aristotelianism, Humanism, Neoplatonism, Hermetism, Skepticism and Copernicanism. 
Another broad category of explanations links the Scientific Revolution to religious 
currents like Puritanism, Protestantism and Catholicism. 
 
Frances Yates´s Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (1964) even went further 
to link it to the hermetic and natural magic traditions. More still, other attempts tend to 
explain it within the context of the commercial/Marxist capitalism of the early modern 
European history. There are also attempt to compare the fate of science in early-modern 
Europe with the fate of science in other civilizations like ancient Greece, pre-1600 
China and the medieval Islamic civilization. All these historicist account of the 
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scientific revolution have really revolutionized the empiricist philosophy of science and 
our general notion of science.  
 
The next chapter will discuss, in detail, the ten principal historicists’ accounts of the 
scientific revolution to illustrate how their concern for a shift, from the traditional ways 
of relying solely on the content of scientific beliefs and methods for the justification of 
scientific claims, to the veritable consideration of the context of their development, 
broadens our notion of the scientific progress. 
 
Finally, it is important to note here that these theses are drawn from the authors’ 
different works written specifically on the Scientific Revolution. This forms the basis on 
which they are called theses of the Scientific Revolution unlike the positivist model (see 
section 1.5) that dwelled solely on the analysis of the scientific advancement. It is the 
historical character of their works that made them to be grouped under the historicist 
model of the scientific revolution irrespective of the school of thought they belong.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.1 HISTORICIST ACCOUNTS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
 
The concept of the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
achieved its own historiographical dominance in the period after the World War II.  
However, it has been demonstrated that even before this period the works of Martha 
Ornstein in 1913, Alfred North Wihtehead in 1923, E. A. Burtt in 1925, John Herman 
Randall Jr. in 1926, Preserved Smith in 1930, and J. D. Bernal in 1939 had all pressed 
forward with the concept of the Scientific Revolution as an event of major significance 
for the creation not only of modern science but of the modern world.86 It was not until 
the early 1940s and the 1950s that the concept of the Scientific Revolution was 
considered as a major historiographical concept. In the Revolution in Science, I. B. 
Cohen identified the works of Alexandre Koyré, Herbert Butterfield, and A. Rupert Hall 
as the pioneers to inaugurate ´the Scientific Revolution´ as a historiographical 
concept.87   
 
The attempts by historians and philosophers of science to treat the ´Scientific 
Revolution´ as a historiographical concept, beginning from the early 1940´s, have been 
the crucial factor in making the Scientific Revolution one of the most unifying concepts 
in the history of science. Unlike the historic approach to the historiographical study 
used by Koyré, Butterfield and Hall, the subsequent innovative works by Joseph Agassi 
and Thomas Kuhn, especially Kuhn, were instrumental in making the concept of 
´Scientific Revolution´ one of the central focuses in the historiography of science.  As a 
historiographical concept, the ´Scientific Revolution´ has brought comprehensive 
insights valuable not just to the understanding of science but also to the writing of the 
history of science.  Generally, the historiography of science is regarded as the study of 
the history and methodology of the sub-discipline of history, known as the history of 
science. This study includes all its disciplinary aspects and practices such as methods, 
                                                 
86 Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, ¨Newton as Final Cause and First Mover¨, in Rethinking the Scientific 
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theories and schools, and also the study of its own historical development or what might 
be called the history of history of science.  
 
In the course of this chapter two of the major terms that will be recurrent are 
historiographical and historical. It is important, then, to make a clarification of the sense 
in which the two terms are used. Historiography refers to the writing of history. 
Therefore, historiographical and historical do not have the same meaning. Galileo or 
Newton´s historical significance derives from who he was and what he did. His 
historiographical significance derives from the great attention that has been paid to him 
by historians of science. Hence, historiographical controversies are conducted by 
historians while historical controversies are conducted by important people in history. 
 
Most pragmatically oriented historiographies of science usually fall into the mistake of 
focusing on ´scientists´ circumstantial attempts to fix beliefs without discussing the 
scientific importance of the beliefs in the first place.88 In this context the historian had 
only to tell the success story of discovery, with its consequent value judgements upon 
both the results and the methods of past science as either progressive or erroneous. This 
approach implied the treatment of past science on the basis of being steps towards either 
the best science now known, or as deviations from it. Such comparatively 
straightforward way of writing the history of science came from the belief in natural 
science as the progressively discovery of naïvely realistic truth about the external 
world.89 The triumphalist attitude of evaluating past science by the precepts of  the 
modern science has, sometimes, led historians of science to engage in pointless 
exercises of identifying the progress of science with the progress of any imaginable 
historical event, and at times remain mute about crucial aspects of the development of 
science. 
 
Joseph Agassi (1963) criticises what he describes as the uncritical acceptance, on the 
part of historians of science, of two incorrect philosophies of science historiography. 
These are the inductive approach and conventionalist approach. The ¨inductivist¨ 
                                                 
88 See Renan Springer De Freitas, ¨What happened to the Historiography of Science?¨, Philosophy of the 
Social Sciences,  2002, 32(1), 92-106 
89 Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Sussex: Harvester Press, 
1980) p. xv 
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historian of science supposedly starts with present-day textbooks and approaches the 
past with a view to allocating credit for the findings codified there. And sometimes 
blames are unleashed on those whose efforts could be regarded as impeding or having 
impeded scientific progress at a time. The ¨conventionalist,¨ since he adopts the view 
that we prefer the simple theory to the less simple one, not a true theory to a false one, 
is distinguished for accepting ¨a new criterion of graded valuation to replace the old 
inductivist criterion which divides theories into the good and the bad.¨ Agassi 
categorised this approach as that according to which scientific theories are 
mathematical pigeonholes  for classifying facts.90 Although the conventionalist 
approach seem to have some improvement over the inductivist, he asserts that the 
Popper´s critical philosophy of science, provides a possible remedy which should guide 
historians of science 
 
However, the arguments over which of the approaches best serves as the proper method 
for the study of the history of science are sometimes complicated by the fact that 
accurate demarcation is not usually made between three important factors. The first is a 
criterion of interest for selecting past scientific works for discussion in the 
historiography of science. The second factor is a criterion of importance for rating the 
significance of particular scientific findings, and thirdly, a criterion of merit for 
assessing the worth given a piece of scientific work. It is difficult to make a clear cut 
demarcation among the factors because a rather unimportant finding may be of great 
historical interest if it involves some conceptual or methodological innovation. In this 
case the first and second criteria are intertwined. Likewise, in the issue of merit: a man 
who makes a very important finding may deserve little credit as scientist if he stumbles 
upon it unwittingly while a man who makes a very unimportant finding may deserve 
substantial credit as scientist if he had to deploy substantial talent in arriving at it. 
 
Nevertheless, Agassi´s Towards an Historiography of Science (1963) and Thomas 
Kuhn´s The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions (1962) are two exemplars of such 
works that treated in a very philosophical way the question of approach to the 
historiography of science. Kuhn considered the nature of science as evident in its 
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history (not just in its historiography) in comprehensive and systematic fashion. Agassi 
complimented such view by demonstrating the reciprocity that should exit between the 
historiography of science and its philosophy, sociology and formalism. The importance 
of these two works indicates why the early Sixties of the 20th century could be referred 
to as the period when the explicit presentation of the Historiography of Science was 
made. It was in this period that very innovative attempts were made in modelling an 
adequate approach to the historiography of science. It also explains why one could find 
Gerb Buchdal (1965) reporting of ¨A Revolution in Historiography of Science¨91 
making reference to the innovative studies of Thomas Kuhn and Joseph  Agassi. Gerd´s 
work therefore suggested that these two writers had inaugurated the sub-discipline by 
distinguishing clearly between the history and the historiography of science.  
 
It is very insightful to see how the emergence of the historiography of science occurred 
within the context of the treatment of the ´Scientific Revolution´ as a historiographical 
concept. This means that the concept of the scientific revolution generated the essential 
elements that constitute the basics of the historiography of science. Notwithstanding the 
controversies regarding the issue of methodology in the historiography of science, the 
fact remains that its course content have their substances drawn from the crucial 
constituents of the ´Scientific Revolution´. The constituents would be treated according 
to their different presentations by various authors to see how they actually demonstrate 
a veritable philosophy of the scientific development and the significance of their impact 
on the history and philosophy of science. They will be discussed under the following 
categories; ´discontinuist´ historiography of Koyré, ´continuist´ historiography of 
Duhem, ´periodization´ historiography of Butterfield and Hall, ´territorist´ 
historiography of Needham and Merton, marxist historiography of Hessen, hermeticist 
historiography of Yates and sociologist historiography of Kuhn and Shapin. The reason 
for this taxonomy is primarily to aid easy study of the different issues they treated. It is 
not absolutely exclusive since there are interpositions of themes in virtually all the 
theses. 
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2.2 ´DISCONTINUIST´ HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE KOYRÉAN THESIS 
 
The ´Scientific Revolution´ was first developed as an analytical tool for the study of the 
scientific advancement of the 16th and 17th century by Alexandré Koyré. Steven Shapin 
asserted that Koyré is widely known to have coined the term ´Scientific Revolution´ in 
1939 to describe this epoch.92  This French historian of Russian origin is generally 
recognised for his ´philosophical´ interest in the history of science. In the Galileo 
Studies where he demonstrated his thesis of the ´Scientific Revolution´ he cited 
charitably the enormous influence the works of Pierre Duhem, Émile Meyerson, Ernst 
Cassirer and Leon Brunschvicg made on his understanding of the history of science. 
Although Koyré is best known as a philosopher of science, he started out as a historian 
of religion. In fact, much his originality rested on his ability to ground his studies of 
modern science in the history of religion and metaphysics. His root in metaphysics 
seems to have come from his earlier studies in Germany. In Göttingen, Germany (1908-
11), he studied under Edmund Husserl and David Hilbert. Whereupon Husserl did not 
approve his dissertation, he left for Paris to study from 1912, notably under Henri 
Bergon and Léon Brunschvicg.  
 
Alexandre Koyré (Aug. 1892 – Apr. 1964) thesis of the ´Scientific Revolution´ is 
illustrated in his conviction that it was not the experimental or empirical nature of 
Galileo´s and Newton´s discoveries that actualised the Scientific Revolution of the 16th 
and 17th Centuries. He asserted that it is rather a shift in perspective, a change in 
theoretical outlook toward the world. In the introduction to his Galileo Studies he 
argued that, 
 
The study of the evolution (and the revolutions) of scientific 
ideas... shows us the human mind at grips with reality, reveals to 
us its defeats and victories; shows us what superhuman effort 
each step on the way to knowledge of reality has cost, effort which 
has sometimes led to a veritable ´mutation´ in human intellect, 
that is to a transformation as a result of which ideas which were 
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´invented´ with such effort by the greatest of minds become 
accessible and even simple, seemingly obvious, to every 
schoolboy.93 
 
Koyré´s idea of the mutation of human intellect is greatly derived from Gaston 
Bachelard´s concept of epistemological obstacle and epistemological break. He cited 
Gaston Bachelard´s Le nouvel espirit scientifique94 (The New Scientific Spirit) in his 
´Au l´aurore de la science moderne. La jeunesse de Galilée (1) published in the Annales 
de l´Université de Paris 10 (1935), pp. 540-41. It was this article that later became the 
introduction to the Etudes galiléenes (Galileo Studies). And then in the 1939 volume, he 
added Gaston Bachelard´s La formation de l´ esprit scientifique. Contribution à une 
psychanalyse de la connaissance objective95 acknowledging both works for the idea and 
term ´mutation´. 
 
Bachelard´s studies of the history and philosophy of science in Le nouvel esprit 
scientifique (¨The New Scientific Mind¨, 1934) and La formation de l´esprit scientifique 
(The Formation of the Scientific Mind¨, 1938) were based on his vision of historical 
epistemology as a kind of psychoanalysis of the scientific mind, or rather of the 
psychological factors in the development of sciences. He was critical of Auguste 
Comte´s positivism, which considered science as continual progress. To Bachelard, 
scientific developments such as Einstein´s theory of relativity demonstrated the 
discontinuous nature of the history of sciences. Such models like the Comte and Émile 
Meyerson´s which framed scientific development as continuous seemed simplistic and 
erroneous to Bachelard. Hence, he used his concept of ´epistemological break´ to 
underline the discontinuity at work in the history of science.  
 
It is this idea of break that informs the basis from which the scope of Koyré´s thesis was 
developed. This notion of ¨epistemological rupture´ developed by Bachelard and later 
re-interpreted by Alexandre Koyré was to be used by Thomas S. Kuhn to develop his 
theory of the paradigm shifts as we shall see in sections 2.12.1 and 2.12.5. When 
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Bernard Cohen recommended Koyré to Kuhn, he read Koyré ´s Etudes Galiléennes and 
¨loved them. I mean, ¨ as he testified later, ¨this was showing me a way to do things.¨96 
Koyré´s impact on the development of the history of science is well attested by Kuhn 
later. ¨Within a decade of their [Etudes] appearance,¨ wrote Kuhn, ¨they and his 
subsequent work provided the models which historians of science increasingly aimed to 
emulate. More than any other scholar, Koyré was responsible for … the 
historiographical revolution.¨97 
 
Koyré strongly criticized what he called the ¨positivist¨ notion that science should only 
discover given phenomena, the relations between them and certain laws that would help 
to describe or predict them. For Koyré the central constituent of science is theory. That 
is an aspiration to know the truth of the world, of uncovering the essential structures 
from which phenomena and the basic laws relating to them arise.  He was suspicious of 
scientists´ claims to prove natural or fundamental truths through experiments. He argued 
that these experiments were based on complicated premises, and that they tended to 
prove the outlook behind these premises, rather than any real truth. He repeatedly 
critiqued Galileo´s experiments, claiming that some of them could not have taken place, 
and therefore brought into question the results that Galileo claimed and which modern 
historians of science had hitherto accepted. Stromholm Per (1975) argued that for Koyré 
it was not observation and experiment that were the driving forces in Galilean science 
but unaided reason bursting the fetters of experience.98 Koyré even went on to argue 
that the inclined plane experiment, which was meant to demonstrate the law of free fall, 
was an accumulation of sources of error and inexactitude.99  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Thomas Kuhn, The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical 
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2.2.1 PHILOSOPHICAL PURPOSES OF AN ANALYTICAL TOOL 
 
Koyré coined the term ¨Scientific Revolution´ as an analytical tool to illustrate the 
disparity that exists between the science that prevailed before the 16th and 17th Centuries 
with that which existed afterward. He aimed to show, through the study of the history of 
science, the changes in the way human beings reason. For him the mind has a history. In 
virtually all his writings he continued to distinguish several revolutions in science. 
These revolutions include the Greek creation of the idea of the Cosmos; the revolution 
of Galileo and Descartes, and the 20th century revolution of Einstein and Bohr. He 
characterised the Scientific Revolution as a ¨mutation¨ of the human intellect, a 
¨profound intellectual transformation¨ of which classical physics is ¨both the expression 
and the fruit¨.100 The ´birth of early modern science was not just the emergence of a 
number of new statements about nature; not even such fundamental propositions as the 
principle of inertia or Newton´s second law marked the transition in their own right´.101 
Their very discovery and subsequent adoption could only be accounted for in the 
framework of the larger transition, which Koyré described as fundamentally new overall 
conception of motion.  
 
Koyré´s analysis of conceptual changes dwelled on the historical mutation from the 
Aristotelian conception to that of classic physics. He argued that after Galileo, space 
was no longer a concrete space, in which objects occupy their given place, but rather the 
abstract space of Euclidean geometry.  Koyré would dedicate most of his work to the 
history of the intellectual revolution that led to modern science. He regarded this 
revolution as a slow process, which for him began as early as the fourteenth century, 
when the early Italian humanist, such as Petrarch, started to display a lack of interest in 
Aristotelian scholastics.102 For him, the Renaissance prepared Galileo´s and Descartes´ 
revolution which later led to Newton´s physics. He recapitulated this revolution 
primarily as an intellectual change, which brought about a mutation in aims, values and 
worldview. 
                                                 
100 Alexander Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 3 vols. (Paris: Hermann, 1939). For the quote used here see 
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 His analysis of this mutation has generally centred on Galileo, Plato and Newton. 
However, his lectures series delivered at the Johns Hopkins University in 1953, which 
was later published as From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe,¨103 treated on the 
rise of early modern science and the change of scientist´s perception of the world during 
the period from Nicholas of Cusa and Giordano Bruno through Newton.  In this work, 
he argued that the world itself changed.  
 
Initially the Aristotelian and medieval world had the earth at its centre, enclosed in 
concentric spheres, on which the planets were carried. This world was ontologically 
differentiated. In such world the heavenly spheres were incorruptible and moved 
circularly and eternally, whereas the sub-lunar world was corruptible, and its motions 
were rectilinear. What scientific revolution achieved was the substitution of this 
Aristotelian-scholastic world with an open and infinite universe, in which there is no 
ontological difference between celestial and terrestrial bodies, and consequently the 
same physics applies to heaven and earth. Therefore, in this new infinite universe, the 
earth lost its central place. Consequently, 
 
Movement ceased to be regarded as a goal-oriented process in 
our heterogeneous, finite Cosmos; largely through the work of 
Galileo and Descartes, movement henceforth came to be 
regarded as a value-neutral state of bodies on their way through 
the homogeneous infinity of Euclidean, geometrized space.104 
 
Koyré identifies this huge transformation as an intellectual change to indicate that the 
scientific advancement of that period could not have taken place if an even wider 
framework of new conception of the universe at large was not established in the mind of 
these scientists. However, he maintained that the scientific revolution had not only 
implemented a dramatic change of worldviews, but also a change in questions and 
methods. For him, the post-Galilean world is a mathematical world. As such the 
objective of the post- Galilean science is to measure, rather than to establish qualitative 
                                                 
103 See Alexander Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 
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104 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, p.75 
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difference among things as did the Aristotelian-scholastic science. What the koyréan 
thesis sought to establish, in essence, was that the revolution of the early modern 
science was in the minds of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europeans. In fact, the 
revolution ¨changed the very framework and patterns of our thinking.¨105 It not only 
changed man´s approach to the nature but also changed the world itself. 
 
 
2.2.2  GALILEO AND THE ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS. 
 
The scope of what Koyré termed ´the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century´ in the 
Galileo Studies was confined in its usage, solely, to the activities of Galileo and 
Descartes. Galileo was the first scientist to realize the idea of a mathematized physics 
while Descartes was the first to think up, in a systematic way, a world consisting of 
nothing but bodies moving through infinite space in accordance with the principle of 
inertia. However, in the Newtonian Studies he incorporated a third actor, Isaac Newton, 
who completed the revolution circle by unifying the corpuscular philosophy of 
Gassendi, Roberval, Boyle and Hooke with the panmathematism of Galileo and 
Descartes.106 
 
Koyré emphasis on the ´mutation´ the human mind underwent on its way to achieving 
the modern science of mechanics was to capture the immensity of the ingenuity 
employed to overcome the intellectual hurdles posited by the Aristotelian natural 
motion. The Aristotelian natural theory asserted that all heavy terrestrial bodies had a 
natural motion towards the centre of the universe. This implies that motion in any other 
direction was violent motion because it contradicted the ordinary tendency of a body to 
move to what was regarded as its natural place. Such motion depended on the operation 
of a mover. Therefore, a body would keep in movement only so long as a mover was 
actually in contact with it, imparting motion to it steadily. Once the mover stops to 
prompt the movement of the body it falls straight to the centre of the earth which is its 
resting place.  
 
                                                 
105 Alexander Koyré From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. v 
106 Alexandre Koyré, Newtonian Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) p.12 
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In its own right, the Aristotelian theory does not sound stupid because it corresponds in 
a self-evident manner with most of the data available to common sense. However, there 
are facts which cannot square well with it even when analysed on the common-sense 
level. For instance, on the common-sense level the Aristotelian theory imply that an 
arrow ought to have fallen to the ground the moment it lost contact with the bow-string. 
Naturally, it should be so since neither the bow-string nor anything else could impart a 
motion which would continue after the direct contact with the original mover had been 
broken. Therefore, this theory cannot make a logical claim on how an arrow fired into 
the wind could be carried forward by the reaction of the air.  
 
The Aristotelian theory of natural motion held sway for centuries before the advent of 
the Scientific Revolution not because its inconsistencies were not noticed but because 
there was no immediate alternative since the colossal intellectual system to which it was 
a part gained hold on medieval scholastic thought. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian 
teaching carried such an intricate dovetailing of observations and explanations which 
was hard for the human mind to escape from. Reconstructing the deficiencies of the 
Aristotelian motion meant dismantling the whole natural philosophy on which it was 
built. The cosmos of the Aristotelian natural philosophy is ´a finite and hierarchically 
ordered, therefore qualitatively and ontologically differentiated universe.107 
 
The Parisian terminists who were the first men in the middle ages to launch great attack 
on the Aristotelian theory were also conscious of the fact that this colossal issue was 
involved in the task. Such men like Jean Buridan and Nicholas of Oresme pointed to 
alternative interpretation that would eliminate the need for the Intelligences that turned 
the universe. This alternative was contained in the impetus physics of the Parisian 
tradition. The impetus theory conceives motion as the effect of a force contained within 
the moving body. Koyré highlighted the importance of this theory in creating the first 
departure from Aristetolianism. He stated that impetus physics makes it possible to 
separate the body´s motion from the idea of the goal, towards which it is directed, and 
makes it possible to isolate the moving body from the rest of the Universe.108  
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The theory of impetus takes motion to be the effect produced by a cause internal to the 
moving body. Impetus could then be identified as an efficient cause producing motion 
as its effect. With the impetus theory the Parisian terminists especially Giordano Bruno 
sought to replace Aristotle´s close and finite world with an open and infinite universe 
and this involved the rejection of the notion of ´natural´ and ´violent´ motions. In some 
ways, this impetus-dynamics helped the Parisian terminists to displace the Aristotelian 
dynamics. The theory was able to refute some of the arguments of Aristotle. ´Yet it was 
not able to meet all of them; still less was it able to carry the structure of modern 
science.´109  
 
Similarly, the Galilean physics rejected the notion of the ´natural´ and ´violent´ motions. 
This physics maintained that a motion never reveals nor expresses the nature of a body. 
Motion does not affect the moving body in itself and is only possessed by the moving 
body in relation to something other than itself. For Galileo, gravity or ´heaviness´ is the 
only natural property of bodies and is also the only natural source of motion. This 
implies that since gravity or heaviness is a universal natural property of all bodies, it is 
what produces in all bodies a natural motion in a downwards direction. As such fall is a 
natural and universal motion. However, Galileo does not take gravity as a natural 
quality of bodies. Though gravity refers to something in reality which he was not 
capable of mentioning, he restated that it does not constitute the ´nature´ of bodies 
neither is it one of their essential properties. It is rather an empirical property than a 
theoretical property of bodies. Its empiricity is derived from common sense. As such it 
is just a name assigned to ´downwards tendency´ of natural bodies. Galileo identified 
the essence of bodies as their mathematical properties. Koyré summaries thus, 
 
It can be seen that in Galileo´s view (as in Descartes´, and for 
the same reasons) what constitutes the essence of bodies, or of 
matter, that which we cannot think of them as being without, and 
consequently that without which they could not exist, are their 
mathematical properties.110 
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In the actual reality the mathematical idea Galileo propounds does not designate any 
essential quality of bodies. It should be noted that he was not discussing real bodies as 
we definitely observe them in the real world. The bodies to which he makes such 
mathematical attributes are geometrical bodies moving in a world without resistance 
and without gravity. The type of world implied here is that boundless emptiness of 
Euclidean space which Aristotle had regarded as unthinkable by his strong rejection of 
the existence of a vacuum. Herbert Butterfield reiterated that even the ´Aristotelians 
regarded ´such´ a complete void as impossible, and said that God Himself could not 
make one´.111 For Koyré, this ingenious effort of Galileo in establishing a different 
wider framework to account for the local motion needed a ´veritable mutation in human 
thought´. Therefore, The Scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was without 
doubt such a mutation.112 The ´mutation´ that Koyré had in mind here was a product of 
the geometrization of space and the dissolution of the cosmos, both contained in the 
principle of inertia, first stated by Galileo and fully articulated by Descartes.   
 
 
2.2.3 KOYRÉ´S INTERNALIST APPROACH 
 
In almost all his major works on the scientific revolution Koyré used a very unique 
mechanism. This mechanism consisted in discussing the scientific revolution of the 
seventeenth century by first identifying and analysing the content of its major 
constituents before attempting an explanation of its historical occurrence. The reason for 
this method was because of his priority in showing the changes in the way human being 
reason through the study of the history of science. In this way, he tried to distinguish 
active science (scientific inquiries) from applied science. His approach is largely 
successful search for legitimation of the new science than its applicability.  
 
He writes thus, 
 
I do not see what the scientia activa has ever had to do with the 
development of the calculus, nor the rise of the bourgeoisie with 
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that of the Copernican, or the Keplerian, astronomy. And as for 
experience and experiment—two things which we must not only 
distinguish but even oppose to each other—I am convinced that 
the rise and growth of experimental science is not the source  but, 
on the contrary, the result of the new theoretical, that is, the new 
metaphysical approach to nature that forms the content of the 
scientific revolution of  the seventeenth century, a content which 
we have to understand before we can attempt an explanation 
(whatever this may be) of its historical occurance.113 
 
What Koyré demonstrated here is a total disapproval of any explanation of scientific 
thought that threatened to undermine the autonomy of its internal development as a 
process guided above all by an inherent logic all its own. This does not mean that he is 
totally against the externalist explanations in the history of science. Such externalist 
explanations investigate, mainly, the social-cultural conditions that made the emergence 
of early modern science possible. However, he sought to reject such unguided social 
reductionism of the scientific ideas. In a similar vein, Mary Hesse also criticised such 
reductionism. She argued that a proper historical perspective neither involves uncritical 
accumulation of ever minor writing of forgotten figures, nor is it necessarily vitiated by 
the imposition of our standards of rationality on an alien age.114  
 
The imposition of our standards of rationality to other historical periods is, perhaps, 
what defines the efforts by some authors to create continuous link between the science 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with those before them. However, Koyré 
illustrated that the arguments for the historical continuity depreciate the ´decisive 
mutation.´115 There is no logical justification in establishing continuity between the 
medieval physics of the Parisian precursors of Galileo with the classical physics issuing 
from the thought of Galileo and Descartes.116 Contrary to the appearances of historical 
continuity demonstrated by Pierre Duhem, Koyré argued that the precursor and inspirer 
of classical physics was neither Buridan nor Nicole Oresme. This is because the 
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medieval physics operated on a different terrain unlike the classical physics which 
operated on a terrain that could be defined as Archimedean. If any precursor of Galileo 
is to be mentioned then, it has to be Archimedes not Buridan or Oresme. However, 
thanks to the ambitious works of Pierre Duhem many insightful scientific progresses are 
now known of the medieval scientific thought.  
 
 
2.3 ´CONTINUIST´ HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE DUHEM THESIS 
 
Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem (Jun.1861 - Sept.1916) strongly defended a thesis of 
continuity between medieval and early modern science. In arguing for the absence of 
abrupt discontinuities between medieval and early modern science he highlighted the 
positive role played by religion in the development of science in the Latin West and the 
cumulative nature of the history of physics. His work in the field of medieval science 
was originally prompted by his research into The Origins of Statics (1905–06) in which 
he first makes case for the existence of the medieval science. In the preface to the work 
he states thus, 
 
the mechanical and physical science of which we are well within 
our rights proud in modern times flows, by an uninterrupted 
series of scarcely sensible improvements, from the doctrines 
professed in the heart of the schools of the Middle Ages; the 
intellectual revolutions alleged have not been, most often, but 
slow and long-prepared evolutions; the self-proclaimed 
renaissances but reactions frequently unjust and sterile; the 
respect of tradition is an essential condition of scientific 
progress.117  
 
It was while writing The Origins of Statics in 1904 that Duhem came across an unusual 
reference to a then-unknown medieval thinker, Jordanus de Nemore. Jordanus de 
Nemore was recognised by Ferrari as the pioneer scientist to determine the apparent 
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weight of a body posed on an inclined plane thereby claiming the invention for such 
geometer of the 13th Century for him. Duhem pursuit of this reference, and the 
subsequent research to which it led, has been widely acknowledged to have created the 
field of the history of medieval science. Thereafter came the three-volume Etudes sur 
Léonard de Vinci118 and the ten-volume Le Système du monde119, in which his thesis of 
the continuity of late medieval and early modern science was fully displayed. 
 
 
2.3.1  THE CONTINUITY THESIS 
 
From 1906 to 1913, Duhem delved deeply into his favourite guide for the recovery of 
the past science. This guide was the scientific notebooks of Leonardo de Vinci. He 
published a series of essays uncovering De Vinci´s medieval sources and their 
influences on the modern age. The third volume of Duhem´s Etudes sur Lèonard de 
Vinci gained a new subtitle, Les précurseurs parisiens de Galilée (the Parisan precursors 
of Galileo), announcing Duhem´s bold new thesis that even the works of Galileo had a 
medieval heritage. He argued that in the 14th century a number of natural philosophers 
at the University of Paris had laid the groundwork for the early modern science. Their 
teachings were gradually received in Italy, where, in the 16th century, they came under 
attack from orthodox Aristotelians with a strongly Averroist inspiration. It is this 
reinforced Aristotelianism that Galileo engaged in battle. Galileo achievement was the 
recovery and, at a later stage, elaboration of the science already created in Paris two and 
a half centuries earlier. While reviewing the historical accomplishment of Galileo he 
stated thus, 
 
When we see the science of Galileo triumph over the stubborn 
Peripatetic philosophy of somebody like Cremonini, we believe, 
since we are ill-informed about the history of human thought, that 
we are witness to the victory of modern, young science over 
medieval philosophy, so obstinate in its mechanical repetition. In 
truth, we are contemplating the well-paved triumph of the science 
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born at Paris during the fourteenth century over the doctrines of 
Aristotle and Averroes, restored into repute by the Italian 
Renaissance.120 
 
Duhem presents the Galilean dynamics here as a continuous development out of 
medieval dynamics. He had demonstrated this by making reference to Jordanus 
Nemorarius attempt to determine the apparent weight of a body posed on an inclined 
plane years before that of Galileo. He also recovered the late medieval theory of 
impetus, tracing it from John Philoponus´ criticism of Aristotle to its mature statements 
in the fourteenth century works of John Buridan and Nicole Oresme: “The role that 
impetus played in Buridan's dynamics is exactly the one that Galileo attributed to 
impeto or momento, Descartes to ‘quantity of motion,’ and Leibniz finally to vis viva. So 
exact is this correspondence that, in order to exhibit Galileo's dynamics, Torricelli, in his 
Lezioni accademiche, often took up Buridan's reasons and almost his exact words”.121 
Duhem then sketched the extension of impetus theory from terrestrial dynamics to the 
motions of the heavens and earth: 
 
Nicole Oresme attributed to the earth a natural impetus similar to the 
one Buridan attributed to the celestial orbs. In order to account for the 
vertical fall of weights, he allowed that one must compose this impetus 
by which the mobile rotates around the earth with the impetus 
engendered by weight. The principle he distinctly formulated was only 
obscurely indicated by Copernicus and merely repeated by Giordano 
Bruno. Galileo used geometry to derive the consequences of that 
principle, but without correcting the incorrect form of the law of inertia 
implied in it.122 
Duhem could not proof with actual facts that Galileo had direct access to the studies of 
Buridan and Oresme. However, he insinuated that the means of transmission of the 
medieval ideas to modern science could be found in the availability of the works of 
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Albert of Saxony which were reprinted during the sixteenth century. These works could 
be the possible link to Galileo. There is possibility that he might have had access to 
them since he had once used the phrase Doctores Parisienses referring to the popular 
name with which the Parisian Doctors, Buridan and Oresme are known. Therefore, 
based on evidence including references to certain unusual doctrines and the particular 
order in which the questions were arranged, Duhem conjectured that Galileo had 
consulted George Lokert's compilation of Albert of Saxony, Themo Judaeus, and others, 
and also the works of the Dominican Domingo de Soto.123  
 
 
2.3.2  THE ROLE OF THE PARIS TERMINISTS. 
 
The terminism of the fourteenth century was a reaction against the formalism of John 
Duns Scotus which has to do with his claim of the non-qualitative property responsible 
for individuation. The ´subtle doctor´ as was nicknamed had demonstrated his realist 
inclination about universal by calling the extra-mental universal the ¨common nature¨ 
(natura communis) and the principle of individuation the ¨haecceity¨ (haecceitas) of all 
realities. Paul Spade (1994) described this common nature in Scotus as that which is 
¨indifferent¨ to existing in any number of individuals.124 But it has extra-mental 
existence only in the particular things in which it exists, and in them it is always 
¨contracted¨ by the haecceity. In this way the common nature ´humanity´ exists in both 
Mr A and B, while both are made different individuals by their haecceitas which is non-
repeatable.  
The terminists opposed this formalism of Scotus, and taking as their motto pluralitas 
non est ponenda sine necessitate (plurality is not to be posited without necessity), made 
a veritable destruction of metaphysical notions of the Scotus´s formalism. Terminism is 
usually equated with nominalism. But though the Paris terminists were all nominalists 
in their logic, making extensive use of Ockhams´ logica moderna, they rejected the 
nominalist analysis of motion in natural philosophy and developed realist views of their 
own. They rather devoted themselves consistently to investigating the physical causes of 
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motion; introducing the concept of impetus and quantifying the forces and resistance 
involved in the natural movements of bodies.125 These Paris terminists included Jean 
Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Nicole Oresme. 
 
 
2.3.2.1  JEAN BURIDAN 
 
Jean Buridan is regarded as the most influential Parisian philosopher of the fourteenth 
century.  He is best known for his development of the concept of impetus as a cause of 
projectile motion and of the acceleration of falling bodies. His most famous work is the 
Summulae de dialectica (Compendium of Dialectic), a text of astonishing breadth and 
originality aimed at redeeming the older tradition of Aristotelian logic using the new, 
terminist logic of ´moderns´ such as Peter of Spain and William of Ockham. In it, 
Buridan redeems the older medieval tradition of Aristotelian logic through the newer, 
terministic logic that had gradually replaced it. Due to the accessibility of the work to 
masters and students alike, it became extremely popular at Paris and in newly-founded 
universities like Heidelberg, Prague, and Vienna. 
 
 
2.3.2.2  NICOLE ORESME 
 
Nicole Oresme showed greater competence in mathematics than Buridan. He applied 
the Mertonian techniques which were earlier developed by the nominalists in Oxford for 
the discussion of both terrestrial and celestial motions. The Mertonians were highly 
imaginative in their treatment of kinematical problems, but did so in an abstract 
mathematical way, generally without reference to the motions actually found in nature. 
These Mertonians were the members of the Merton College at Oxford, and the major 
contributors to this new natural philosophy were Walter Burley, Thomas Bradwardine, 
William of Heytesbury, and Richard Swineshead.126 Oresme´s work, in fact, provided 
some basis for the development of modern mathematics and science. He contributed to 
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the development of geometrical methods of summing series and integrating linear 
functions. He also adumbrated some of the concepts of analytical geometry.  
 
The works of these Paris terminists spread throughout Western Europe and continued to 
shape the European thought well into the Renaissance. As these works were mainly 
commentaries and critiques of the Aristotelian natural philosophy it meant that the 
Master would teach Aristotle by reading and explaining their works to the class, and by 
that means paved way for their works to make big impact. It is for this reason that 
pioneer historians of medieval science, such as Duhem, spoke of the Paris terminists as 
the ¨Parisian precursors of Galileo.¨127 
 
 
2.3.3  CONTINUITY THESIS EXPANDED 
 
Duhem´s target had been to challenge the historiography of science that depicts the 
medieval period as a time of intellectual and cultural desolation, and such works of 
historians like Voltaire and Condorcet who denigrated the impact of the middle ages on 
science. Condorcet´s history of science strived to show that the ancient achievement, 
such as it was, fell before barbarian invasions and the triumph of Christianity. For him, 
the triumph of Christianity was the signal for the complete decadence of philosophy and 
the science.128 
The astounding discovery of the rich scientific heritage of the Parisian school and its 
exposition in Duhem´s work echoed the danger of such negligence of the medieval 
science. This is because the history of scientific development does not follow a sporadic 
process; rather it is subject to the law of continuity. And it is in this regard that the great 
discoveries are almost always the fruit of slow and complex preparation, which is 
pursued in the course of the centuries. The awakening created by the continuity concept 
of Duhem led to massive subsequent works that sought to provide details of medieval 
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scientific achievements and uncovering the ¨germs of later scientific discoveries¨129 in 
the works of medieval masters. 
In The History of Science and the New Humanism130, George Sarton, argued that science 
was first introduced to Western Culture in the 12th century during the Arabic-Latin 
translation movement. It was later introduced again in the 17th century during what 
became known as the ¨Scientific Revolution¨. The first occurrence was when a number 
works, predominantly those by Aristotle, were translated from Arabic into Latin and 
thus became known in the West for the first time. The major developments brought by 
this movement were however stagnated during the Renaissance. The Renaissance 
humanism had put more emphasis on form over fact and adored ancient authorities over 
empirical investigation. The humanists’ revival of Platonism neglected the epistemic 
importance of experience which was visible in the Aristotelian thought that was made 
popular during the translation movement. Even though the disposition to experiment in 
the Aristotelian thought is bit defective and not that tangible to guarantee productive 
experimentation in the sense of the modern science, his thought was marked throughout 
by the awareness of the epistemic importance of experience. This awareness was totally 
lacking in the humanist´ Platonism. Likewise, the humanists were almost like the 
scholastics in their great regard for authorities. Hence, Sarton´s idea that science had to 
be introduced to Western culture twice was due to the first appearance of science being 
swept away by Renaissance humanism before science had to be re-introduced again in 
the 17th century.  
He states thus, 
It does not follow, as so many ignorant persons think, that the 
medieval activities were sterile….The Middle Ages were 
pregnant with many ideas which could not be delivered until 
much later. Modern science, we might say, was the fruition of 
medieval immaturity. Vesalius, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton 
were the happy inheritors who cashed in.131  
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Unlike the usual claim that the Middle Ages were notable for the decline in scientific 
activities the sympathisers of the continuity thesis argued that it was the Renaissance 
and not the medieval period that cause stagnation to the scientific progress. The 
Australian mathematician and historian of science, James Franklin (1982), claims that 
the Renaissance was in face a period when thought declined significantly, bringing to an 
end a period of advance in the late Middle Ages. Just like Sarton he argues that the 
twelfth century was the ¨real, true and unqualified renaissance.¨132 The reason is that the 
rediscovery of ancient knowledge, which the later Italian humanists claimed to 
themselves, was actually accomplished in the 12th century. Edward Grant (1996), also 
complimented this view by arguing that the origins of modern science lie in the Middle 
Ages133, and was due to a combination of four factors. They include the Translation into 
Latin of Greek and Arabic scientific texts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; the 
development of universities, which were uniquely Western and used the translations as 
the basis of a science curriculum; the adjustments of Christianity to secular learning and 
the transformation of Aristotle´s natural philosophy.  
Generally, the emphasis of these continuity theses on the importance of the medieval 
science has centred mainly on the medieval activities within the European environment 
thereby leading to a Eurocentric conception of the Scientific Revolution. Arun Bala 
argued on the contrary. In The Dialogue of Civilizations in the Birth of Modern 
Science134, he claimed that the activities of the middle ages that yielded to the triumph 
of the Scientific Revolution should be sought in the foreign multicultural influences on 
Europe within the medieval period. For instance, Islamic science gave the first exemplar 
of a mathematical realist theory with Alhazen´s Book of Optics in which physical light 
rays travelled along mathematical straight lines. The swift transfer of Chinese 
mechanical technologies in the medieval era shifted European sensibilities to perceive 
the world in the image of a machine. The Indian number system, which developed in 
close association with atomism in India, carried implicitly a new mode of mathematical 
atomic thinking. And then the heliocentric theory which assigned central status to the 
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sun, as well as Newton´s concept of force acting at a distance, were rooted in ancient 
Egyptian religious ideas associated with Hermeticism.  
The continuity theory has been very instrumental in development in the studies of the 
medieval science. However, most of the studies have not been able to prove in very 
satisfying way how the science of the early modern period was a continuation of its 
medieval predecessor. Evidently, the two sciences have not operated within the same 
framework. The cosmology within which the medieval science was developed does not 
provide the mechanism that facilitated the activities of the early modern science. Still, 
studies on the medieval science have brought up many crucial issues which the 
historiography of science could not neglect without losing its central focus. 
Notwithstanding the wonderful insights brought by the continuity theory, ´majority of 
scholars on the ´Scientific Revolution´ still hold to the traditional view that it occurred 
in the 16th and 17th centuries.135 
 
 
2.3.4  INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE DUHEM THESIS 
 
The Duhem thesis has been acknowledge by historians of science as the foundation of 
what has been turned into an area of specialization in the historiography of science in its 
own right—the history of medieval science. With his studies on the origins of statics 
(1905-1906), on the mechanical tradition linked to Leonardo da Vinci (1906-1913), and 
on cosmology from Plato to Copernicus (1913-1958), he founded single-handed the 
history of medieval physics.136 Perhaps, this explains why Duhem´s work in the history 
and philosophy of science has been viewed by Lowinger (1941) as an attempt to defend 
the aims and methods of energetics.137  Duhem´s works pointed to many interesting 
adumbrations of the three centuries before the ´Scientific Revolution´.  However, their 
peculiar weakness has been the consistent evaluation of the performance of the Parisian 
terminists against the yardstick of the achievements of such scientists like Galileo, 
                                                 
135 See Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and its Ambitions, 1500-1700 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Howard Margolis, It Started with Copernicus (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2002); Richard S, Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and 
Mechanics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971. Reprinted version Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009[1977]) 
136 Roberto Torretti, The Philosophy of physics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.242. 
137 See A. Lowinger, The Methodology of Pierre Duhem (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941) 
65 
 
 
Descartes, Kepler, Newton etc even when the activities of the two groups do not match 
in some cases. For instance, he knew that the Parisians had written in manuscripts and 
their tracts were produced too early to benefit from the invention of printing. In the face 
of seeming irreconcilability between the two periods he conjectured that Galileo might 
have consulted George Lokert's compilation of Albert of Saxony, Themo Judaeus, and 
others, and also the works of the Dominican Domingo de Soto where he could have 
gotten access to the Parisian studies. 
Duhem´s latter works in which the continuity theory was developed seem very 
distanced from his earlier works in the history of science. His previous work had three 
main features: it assumed that physics was completely independent of metaphysics—the 
separability thesis138—or could easily aspire to be so. It focused on the historic 
justification of his own thermodynamic approach to physics, and ignored the Middle 
Ages entirely. All three were now abandoned. In his later works beginning from the 
Origins of Statics he increasingly focused on the mutual relations of physics and 
metaphysics in practice. One has to take into account Duhem´s previous stand on the 
history of science to understand most of the tension that arise from his continuity thesis.  
While reviewing Duhem´s The Origin of Statics, R. N. D. Martin (1996) illustrated that 
historians who wish to judge Duhem´s work have to consider how far Duhem came to 
clarify his new position and what resources he may have had to defend it.139 The next 
generation of historian of science, led by Alexandre Koyré and Anneliese Maier, 
constructed elaborate metaphysical justification for the repudiation of continuity thesis. 
Two themes divide Koyré's historical work from that of Duhem. The Koyréan thesis 
presents histories of science in which metaphysics plays a primary role in explaining 
scientific change and it espouses a historiography that gives a central place to the 
concept of revolution. Medieval thought and early modern science are judged to be 
different in kind as well as in content. 
                                                 
138 Roger Ariew, ¨The Duhem Thesis¨, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 314 
139 See R. N. D. Martin, book review of Pierre Duhem, The Origins of Statics: The Sources of Physical 
Theory, translated from the French by Grant F. Leneaux, Victor N. Vagliente and Guy H. Wagener, with a 
Foreword by Stanley L. Jaki, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 123. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991. Pp. xxxvi + 593, The British Journal for the History of Science, 1996, 29, p. 
362 
66 
 
 
At the start of his essay on Void and infinite space in the 14th century, Koyré quotes a 
passage from Duhem that has become infamous: “If we were obliged to assign a date to 
the birth of modern science, we would undoubtedly choose 1277, when the Bishop of 
Paris solemnly proclaimed that a multiplicity of worlds could exist, and that the system 
of celestial spheres could, without contradiction, be endowed with straight line 
motion.”140 Koyré rejected Duhem's date for the birth of modern science; he remarked 
that Duhem even gave another date elsewhere, corresponding to Buridan's impetus 
theory being extended to the heavens. He dismissed it by arguing that “it is as false as 
the first date”.141 For Koyré, the introduction of Platonic metaphysics, the 
mathematization of nature, marks a break with the Aristotelian Middle Ages. 
 
 
2.5 PERIODISATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
 
The traditional account of the scientific revolution usually centres its interpretation of 
the scientific advancement of the early modern period on the achievements of such elite 
figures like Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and Newton. In this context limits of 
space, time and theme are inevitably placed to demarcate the scope within which the 
transformations wrought by these men were achieved. However, as a periodization, the 
Scientific Revolution has grown increasingly complex. As it has attempted to take 
account of new research and alternative perspectives, new additions and changes have 
been made. Since the institution of the ´Scientific Revolution´ as a major 
historiographical concept, beginning from the 1960s, a number of sub-periodizations 
have been generated by more narrow research topics, usually from a more focused 
topical theme or from a narrower chronological period. Some of these sub-
periodizations include The Copernican Revolution, the Galilean Revolution; the 
Keplerian Revolution; the Cartesian Synthesis; and not least, the Newtonian Revolution 
and the Newtonian Synthesis. Understood as an historical periodization, which is 
periodization defined by geographical, chronological and topical element, the Scientific 
                                                 
140 Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci, vol 2. p. 411, quoted in Alexandre Koyré, “Le vide et 
l'espace infini au XIVe siècle,” Etudes de l'histoire de la pensée philosophique. (Paris: Gallimard, 1961) 
p.37 The essay was originally published in 1949 but was later included in his work on the Studies of the 
history of the philosophical thinking.  
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Revolution refers to European developments extending over periods of at least 80 to 
300 years. These developments involve changing conceptual, cultural, social, and 
institutional relationships involving nature, knowledge and belief. 
Many scholars do not agree on the exact dates of the scientific revolution. Various 
historians of science now consider the term ¨Scientific Revolution¨ as very 
problematic.142 Some have reduced or entirely denied the earliest years of the Scientific 
Revolution, usually associated with what had been long known as the ´Copernican 
Revolution´.  Some argued that if there was a Copernican Revolution, then it began and 
ended in 1610 with the work of Galileo and Kepler. Other scholars, emphasizing the 
development of key conceptual elements, have the opinion that the key period of the 
Scientific Revolution was 1610-1660. Some others, specializing in social institutional 
elements, have suggested that the period after 1660 was more crucial, as it was then that 
scientific periodicals and state-sponsored science emerged. The question is: have there 
been other comprehensive revolutions? Recent scholars have suggested the existence of 
a ¨second scientific revolution¨ in the institutional structure of the sciences in the 
decades around 1800. On this same period authors like Thomas Kuhn (1962), identifies 
a multidisciplinary revolution in the ¨Baconian sciences¨(chemistry, electricity, 
magnetism, heat, etc). Likewise, it has been illustrated that there was a general 
revolution in the sciences in the decades around 1900.143 In fact, the issue of the 
periodization of the scientific revolution has shifted historiographically across 
chronological, geographic, thematic, and methodological boundaries. 
Two English men, Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979) and A. Rupert Hall (1920-2009), 
have been very outwithstanding in handling this problem of periodization and 
prompting its diverse analysis within the historiographical context. The former is 
generally recognised as having introduced the expression ´the Scientific Revolution´ 
into historical discourse while the latter has been a vigorous opponent of attempts at 
monocausal explanation and one-sided interpretation of the Scientific Revolution. 
                                                 
142 For illustration of the relevant issues see Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), pp.1-4; David C. Lindberg, “Conceptions of the Scientific Revolution from Bacon 
to Butterfield,” in Reappraisals of the Scientific Revolution, eds. David C. Lindberg & Robert Westman 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 1-26; and A. Rupert Hall, “Retrospection on the Scientific 
Revolution,” in Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, Craftsmen and Natural Philosophers 
in Early Modern Europe, eds. J. V. Field and Frank James (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 239-
250) 
143 See I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science, chapter 6 
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2.5.1 THE BUTTERFIELD THESIS  
 
Six decades ago the British historian Herbert Butterfield (Oct. 1900 – Jul. 1979) started 
a stir by arguing that the emergence of modern science between 1600 and 1700 
´outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and 
Reformation to the rank of mere episode, mere internal displacements, within the 
system of medieval Christendom´.144 The Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth 
century marked a watershed in Western Civilization and Modern Thought. It challenged 
Christian revelations, altered the world view of philosophers, permeated university 
curricula, established new literary genres, and suggested new approaches for economic, 
political, and social theorists. The idea that there was something called ¨the scientific 
revolution¨ was popularized by Butterfield in The Origins of Modern Science (which 
has been his only work on the topic) published in 1949. 
 
Unlike the 19th century historians who claimed that the great changes that ushered 
Europe into the modern age were the Reformation and the Renaissance, Butterfield 
argued in The Origins of Modern Science that the major breakthrough were in the paired 
advance of scientific conceptualization and factual discovery that began in the 16th 
century. It was this double advancement that led to the ´Revolution´ in science which 
overturned the authority not only of the middle ages but of the ancient world—it did not 
only result to the eclipse of scholastic philosophy but also the destruction of Aristotelian 
physics. He identified the Scientific Revolutions as the upheaval in science during the 
period between 1300 and 1800. Though the period of the scientific revolution has been 
popularly associated with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries he recognised that it 
reached ¨back in an unmistakably continuous line to a period much earlier still.¨145  
The long duration assigned to the scientific revolution gives rise to serious doubt on 
what significance dating its start from 1300 holds for him? One could see that the whole 
historical survey in his work centred entirely on the period between Copernicus and 
Newton while describing the scientific revolution. His account of the period was mainly 
the 16th and 17th achievements in astronomy and mechanics, which for him hold the 
strategic place in the whole movement. However, his major reason in putting the date so 
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early could be to incorporate the era of the impetus physics which he claimed was the 
starting point of the scientific revolution. He wrote, 
A particular development of ideas which was already taking 
place in the later middle ages has come to stand as the first 
chapter in the history of the transition to what we call the 
scientific revolution.146  
This first stage was started by that school of thinkers who as far back as the fourteenth 
century were challenging the Aristotelian explanations of motion. They were able to put 
forward an alternative doctrine of ´impetus´ which though was imperfect in itself but 
represented a major step to the final break from the authority of the Aristotelian physics. 
Just like Duhem, he identified his group of thinkers as Jean Buridan, Albert of Saxony 
and Nicholas of Oresme. However, these men could not achieve such final break 
because of their resort to ´verbal subtleties´ and ´excessive straining of language´ to 
resolve the complicated issues involved in the Aristotelian intricate dovetailing of 
observations and explanations. It was on this aspect that the modern law of inertia 
triumphed though on a total different framework. Butterfield argues thus, 
…the modern law of inertia is not the thing you would discover 
by mere photographic methods of observation—it required a 
different kind of thinking-cap, a transposition in the mind of the 
scientist himself; for we do not actually see ordinary objects 
continuing their rectilinear motion in that kind of empty space 
which Aristotle said could not occur, and sailing away to that 
infinity which also he said could not possibly exist; and we do 
not in real life have perfectly spherical balls moving on perfectly 
smooth horizontal planes—the trick lay in the fact that it 
occurred to Galileo to imagine these.147  
The actual transformation occurred in Galileo´s thought of mathematical ways to 
formulate things and his idea of geometrical bodies moving in a world without 
resistance and without gravity. Such thought requires a ´transposition in the mind´, ´new 
thinking-cap´ which has to do away with the framework of the older system of  
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ideas—therein lays the major triumph of the scientific revolution. It did not just stop 
there, the extension of the date to 1800, illustrates that the revolution in chemistry 
which started with Robert Boyle(1627-1691) and subsequently culminated in the 
achievement of Antoine Lavioser (1743-1794), who maintained that weight was 
conserved through the course of chemical reactions even those involving gases, are 
included in this historical period. 
It could be asserted that the notion of scientific revolution popularized by Butterfield 
was an analysis of the concept already developed by Edward Burtt in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Science(rev. ed. 1932), and more deeply by Alexandre Koyré in 
Études Galiléennes(1939) and From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957). 
Also some influence of the continuity thesis of Duhem could be seen in his work. 
However, his concept of the scientific revolution offered a framework with which to 
contrast our accounts of ancient and medieval science and within which to develop the 
story line leading to modernity. His thesis helped narrowed the internal versus external 
divide that often appear on the narratives of scientific progress by tying the very content 
of the questions that provide the agendas of the sciences to the material conditions and 
social practices of the various disciplines. In fact, the Butterfield thesis presented a 
picture of the development of the scientific disciplines that overcomes the separation of 
history of ideas from history of social structures and interests. In doing so, he has 
stretched the date to include the 18th century for the benefit of the Enlightenment and 
the revolution in chemistry. 
 
 
2.5.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND `WHIGGISHISM´ OF THE ORIGINS 
 
The structure of his Origins, however, contradicts his historical theory in The Whig 
Interpretation of History (1931) and has often been criticized as the most classic 
example of whiggishness in the historiography of science. In The Whig Interpretation of 
History he had criticized the Whiggish history because it twists the past to see it in 
terms of the present, to squeeze the contending forces of such periods like the mid-17th 
century into those which remind us of ourselves most and least, or to imagine them as 
struggling to produce our wonderful selves. He wrote that ¨Whiggishness¨ is too handy 
a ¨rule of thumb… by which the historian can select and reject, and can make his points 
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of emphasis.¨148 Therefore, he argued that the historian must seek the ability to see 
events as they were perceived by those who lived through them. However, The Origins 
of Modern Science appears to be typical of such whiggish history as a result of its 
emphasis on the canonical set of subjects in the scientific revolution by considering the 
achievements of such canonical individuals like Copernicus, Tycho, Kepler, Galileo, 
Vesalius, Harvey, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton, with their predecessors.  Another 
important work that followed the traditional histories of the Scientific Revolution which 
customarily focus on a list of canonical individuals who explored a canonical set of 
subjects is Rupert Hall´s The Revolution in Science, 1500-1750.149 
 
 
2.6 ALFRED RUPERT HALL—HALL THESIS 
 
Alfred Rupert Hall (Jul. 1920 – Feb. 2009) account of the progress of the early modern 
science is one of the pioneer works that made visible the dilemma in exact periodization 
of the scientific revolution. His earliest effort to address the challenges generated by 
Butterfield´s Origins is contained The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800: The Formation 
of the Modern Scientific Attitude (1954). The title provides a useful label for the changes 
in approach to the natural world, the new institutions, and the power that new 
knowledge generated. The book's range and its accessibility made it a landmark, 
opening up the history of science for a new generation.  
Just like Butterfield, he placed science at the centre of modern Western culture and 
pointed to the scientific revolution as the great moment of change, the point at which 
both science and the West broke free from medieval stasis and commenced their steady 
progress. This movement was motivated by certain crucial principles which also inform 
the new attitude towards nature. The basic principles of this new attitude were that "the 
only sort of explanation science could give must be in terms of descriptions of 
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processes, mechanisms, interconnections of parts," and that "the only realities were 
matter and motion."150 
These principles stood in sharp contrast to the medieval world view, inherited from 
Aristotle, which explained things in organic, teleological, and animistic terms. Equally 
important is the fact that adherents of the "new philosophy" married theoretical 
abstraction to rigorous empirical observation, unlike their forebears who had seen 
philosophical inquiry and empirical practice as unrelated endeavours. Hall thesis of the 
scientific revolution is more a historical overview albeit concise, and is also somewhat 
more technical. However, the purported intimidating mastery of the technicalities of 
Hall´s work seems quite hard to be accepted in the face of various inconsistencies that 
could be found in his work. It is, for example, a very serious error to assert that 
"Kepler's discoveries might have been expressed in the terms of the geostatic 
system."151 
Of course, none of Kepler's laws can be expressed in a geostatic system, nor can his 
theory of planetary distances, etc. Likewise, it makes little sense to claim on the one 
hand that "Galileo concedes that the motions of the heavenly bodies are perfectly 
circular", but "to the question: how and by what are the planets moved? Galileo returned 
no answer."152   
And on the other hand that "Galileo, it is clear, was far more confident of the truth of the 
mechanical principle that bodies possess the property of inertial rotation on a perfect 
circle."153 Finally, Newton's proof of the law of equal areas is of course not carried out 
"with the aid of the parallelogram of forces"154 since there is only one force involved 
(namely gravity). 
Hall makes the Scientific Revolution start around 1500 because that was when, in his 
view; European science began to cut loose from the Greek heritage for the first time. 
His account started with the description of science in 1500, emphasizing both the power 
of the Aristotelian system and the slow emergence of challenges to it, such as impetus 
theory. These challenges were limited in scope and ambition, and they remained so 
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throughout the sixteenth century. By stretching the stronghold of the Aristotelian system 
till the sixteenth century Hall meant to demonstrate that neither Copernicus nor Vesalius 
was a revolutionary, though their ideas and discoveries later inspired others who were. It 
was in the new mechanics and the new astronomy of the early seventeenth century that 
the taints of various brands of mysticism and magic of the previous sciences were 
conquered and modern science emerged. The unique character of this transformation 
which his account seeks to underscore is the rational nature of the Scientific Revolution. 
 
 
2.6.1 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AS MAINSTREAM OF RATIONAL 
SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
The course of the scientific revolution was marked by what Hall illustrated as the 
organized, conscious and rational response to the ubiquitous challenge of Nature.155 In 
From Galileo to Newton, 1630—1720 (1981), the revolution in physics initiated by 
Galileo and culminated in Newton´s achievements was not recounted as mere narrative. 
Hall, rather, sought to characterise the nature of the changes initiated into the spirit and 
ideas of science by these scientists. The distinguishing feature of the Scientific 
Revolution, he argues, is its rational character. It was during the first quarter of the 
seventeenth century that the force of scientific ideas began to act. With the appearance 
of the Galileo´s Dialogues on the Two Chief Systems of the World (1632) a new structure 
of thought was established. Hall argued that it is no exaggeration to describe [Galileo´s 
mechanics]...as the beginnings of exact science which consciously set itself to proceed 
by other ways than those of the past.156 
The new scientific tradition would act as process of purification of all forms of 
mysticism, magic and superstition from nature. This true scientific tradition ´invariably 
opposed the magical view of nature, the view that events are governed by spirits or 
demons or other unknowable forces not obeying the normal laws of cause and effect.157 
In fact, the critical feature of seventeenth-century science was that it embraced new or 
revived ideas, and this was achieved by such academic professionals like Galileo, 
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Kepler, Cavalieri, Wallis, Newton, Hooke, Leibniz, Huygens, and other like Harvey, 
Fermat, Descartes, or Hevelius.158 Hall´s abhorrence to the irrationality of metaphysics 
ascribes to the vicious generalization that all of primitive science was to be found 
wholly in the realm of the occult, or , more specifically, in magical activities. In fact, 
Hall is just one of a small army of science historians who abhor the irrationality of 
metaphysics mixed up with modern science.  Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason had 
illustrated that such ´corrupt nature´ of metaphysics has to be purified before it could 
turn into science.  
However, historians like Barnes have demonstrated the generic relation of religion and 
magic, and revealed the origins of science as proceeding primarily from everyday 
secular and common place activities.159 E.A Burtt´s The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science (1924) and Frances Yates´ Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic 
Tradition (1964) also illustrated in a very analytical way the metaphysical 
underpinnings and implications of the scientific accomplishments  of such figures like 
Kepler, Galileo and Newton. Maybe it was Hall´s objection to such tendency in 
introducing ´irrationality´ to the scientific realm, as these works have insinuated, that 
made him to make no mention of Burtt or The Metaphysical Foundation in his The 
Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800.  
The enormous controversies that the rationality of science has generated, often, have to 
do with the identification of rationalism with `mathematical realism´160 in the early part 
of the twentieth century by philosophers of science. It also later came to mean same for 
the historians of science. However, the historians conflated empiricism and Baconian 
experiment with mathematical realism, which they traced to Plato, the Pythagorean 
tradition, the Mertonian scholastic tradition, or something arising for the first time with 
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Galileo.161 The insistence by some historians in identifying rationality with science has 
been somehow prompted by the ´concept of the Scientific Revolution´ itself and its 
mechanism of interpreting the past scientific heroes as if their thought patterns were 
basically like our own, even when they did not see their achievements the way we do. 
Betty J. Dobbs writes 
 
I think the problem arises somewhat in this fashion: we choose 
for praise the thinkers that seem to us to have contributed to 
modernity, but we unconsciously assume that their thought 
patterns were fundamentally just like ours. Then we look at them 
a little more closely and discover to our astonishment that our 
intellectual ancestors are not like us at all: they do not see the 
full implications of their own work: they refuse to believe things 
that are now so obviously true; they have metaphysical and 
religious commitments that they should have known were 
unnecessary for a study of nature.162 
Dobbs demonstrated that judging the achievements of the 16th and 17th century scientist 
based the standard of the rationality created by the modern mind will not offer us a clear 
view of the nature of the science those scientists practised. Our understanding of the 
scientific revolution has been fed with such mix between rationalism and mathematical 
realism that we might be tempted to think that the scientifically rational is that which is 
mathematically real. This tendency explains why authors like Thomas Kuhn and 
Frances Yates has been criticized as propagating irrationalism in science with the 
former´s treatment of the interplay of sociological factors in the scientific progress and 
the latter linkage of alchemy to Newton physics. 
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2.6.2 CHANGE OF DATE 
 
The extension of the end of scientific revolution to 1800 in the earlier work was later 
reduced to 1750 in Hall´s The Revolution in Science 1500-1750. In the preface to the 
work he gives reason for the reduction in date. 
I now conclude my story near the middle of the eighteenth 
century. [Because]When Newton died the great creative phase of 
the scientific revolution was already finished, though its 
acceptance and assimilation were still incomplete. Therefore I 
now omit the successor phases of the eighteenth century in 
which the science of chemistry and electricity received their first 
coherent forms.163 
In the earlier work the date was stretched to include the purported emergence of 
´rational´ chemistry, biology, and electrical science during the eighteenth century. It was 
Hall insistence in demonstrating the rational character of scientific revolution that 
guaranteed the need to include the early history of electrical and magnetism in the 
former account.  
Hall´s change of the date demonstrates the general problem in making a definite 
chronological scheme for the Scientific Revolution. The dilemma is how to account for 
a Scientific Revolution within the seventeenth-century physical science where a 
complete revolution in mathematical science has been identified to stand beside an 
incomplete degree of progress in the experimental branches. Thomas Kuhn elaboration 
of the two basic sciences (Classical and Baconian) of this period indicated that complete 
mathematization in the Baconian tradition was delayed till the nineteenth century.164  
Agreeing with Koyré (who had identified mathematization of nature as the crux of the 
revolution), Kuhn argued that ´if one thinks of the Scientific Revolution as revolution of 
ideas, it is the changes in these traditional, quasi-mathematical fields which one must 
seek to understand´.165 The classical and Baconian science did not merge till the 19th 
century when the barriers between the mathematical and the experimental approaches to 
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science finally broke down. Before then the Baconian science which was mark more by 
experimentation existed only as craftship. This implies that a complete historical 
symmetry cannot be established between even the mathematical and experimental 
departments of physics. Hall, therefore, concluded that it would not be surprising then 
that even greater historical asymmetries should exist between the mathematical and the 
chemical, geological and biological science, where the ´Baconian´ features of evolution 
are even more marked than in experimental physics.166     
However, it was not just the revolution in thought that occurred during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries as there were other important historical things which happened to 
the sciences during the period. These were factors that yielded to the integration of 
crafts knowledge with scholarly literary culture in the European early modern period. 
Those factors like the rise of Capitalism, Renaissance and Reformation were 
instrumental to the establishment of an experimental or technology based science in 
Europe which eluded other crafts based civilizations like China and India at the time. 
The British biochemist, Joseph Needham, illustrated the lack of an experimental or 
technology based science in traditional China in terms of the lack of prestige of 
craftspeople and the lack of integration of crafts knowledge with scholarly literary 
culture. 
 
 
2.7 ´TERRITORIST´ HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE NEEDHAM THESIS 
 
Joseph Terence Montgomery Needham (Dec. 1900 – Mar. 1995) was a British 
biochemist but has wide recognition for his pioneer works in bringing the history of 
science and technology in China into the scholarship of the Scientific Revolution. His 
first major work on the theme, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and 
West (1969), heralded the initial studies in cross-cultural history of science. With this 
work another dimension was brought to the controversy surrounding the Scientific 
Revolution—the issue of its geography. His thesis appears to address the question: Can 
the location of scientific endeavour make any difference to the conduct of science? 167  
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Between the first and fifteenth centuries the Chinese were technologically far in 
advance of Europe and it was not until the scientific revolution of the Renaissance that 
Europe drew head. The viable question that Needham thesis sought to investigate was: 
What were the inhibiting factors in their civilisation which prevented the rise of modern 
science in Asia? The Scientific Revolution was given a classic formulation with his 
question on, ¨Why did modern science, the mathematization of hypotheses about 
Nature, with all its implications for advanced technology, take its meteoric rise only in 
the West at the time of Galileo?¨, ¨Why had not modern science developed in Chinese 
civilisation...?¨168 Another issue was even added to make the larger problem more 
interesting. It was noted that ¨between the first century B.C and the fifteenth century 
A.D., Chinese civilisation was much more efficient than occidental in applying human 
natural knowledge to practical human needs.¨169 
 
 
2.7.1 CHINESE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE AND TECHONOLOGY 
 
The Chinese had invented paper, gunpowder, the compass, astronomical coordinates 
and instruments and the astronomical clock. They made technological advances in the 
use of animal power (harness, stirrup, wheel-barrow), water power (crank, driving-belt), 
iron and steel (bridge building), textile (simple flyer), immunization and nautical 
instruments (rudder). Hence, it is very surprising that the modern science did not 
emerge in the Chinese soil given the numerous ancient and medieval Chinese 
technological achievements far ahead of those of the medieval and Renaissance West. 
Besides, numerous observational and natural history records in astronomy and the earth 
and biomedical sciences were made in Europe until much later. The big question 
remains: is: why did not modern science develop in China?  
In two essays Needham addresses the question of why modern science did not develop 
in China. These two essays are reprinted in Needham’s book The Grand Titration: 
Science and Society in East and West (Chapters 5 and 6). Needham’s argument, in part, 
is as follows: there is an “antagonism between manual and mental work which has run 
                                                 
168 Joseph Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1969) p. 16 
169 Ibid., p. 190 
 
79 
 
 
through all ages and all civilizations.”170 He argued that it was only the merchant class 
that could bring together such Greek praxis and theoria, or the corresponding Chinese 
shu and hsueh. He states that,  
…there cannot be much doubt that the failure of the rise of the 
merchant class to power in the State lies at the basis of the 
inhibition of the rise of modern science in Chinese society.171 
One of the major contrasts Needham made between the Chinese and Western science 
was that the Chinese was mainly practical oriented. The Taoist tradition had much 
empirical observation of natural phenomena, and even the logical and rational thought 
of the neo-Confucian tradition were largely confined to the challenges of establishing 
and maintaining social order and cohesion. 
It was not that there was no order in nature for the Chinese, but 
rather that it was not an order ordained by a rational personal 
being, and hence there was no conviction that rational personal 
beings would be able to spell out in their lesser earthly 
languages the divine code of laws which he had decreed 
aforetime. The Taoists, indeed, would have scorned such an idea 
as being too naïve for the subtlety and complexity of the universe 
as they intuited it.172 
Generally, there was not any conscious interest in studying nature as it had occurred in 
the European history, and subsequently there was no vivid combination of rationalized 
thought with an interest in nature. In fact, China did not develop modern science and an 
industrial society for three reasons which are mainly intellectual, philosophical and 
social. 
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2.7.2 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHONOLOGICAL STAGNATION IN CHINA 
 
The reasons for the Chinese scientific and technological stagnation are intellectual, 
philosophical and most importantly political and social.  
Intellectually, the Chinese technical achievements lacked the essential elements of 
science, such as scientific explanations or mathematical proofs. Their mathematical 
concepts were algebraic, not geometric. Chinese mathematical thought was always 
deeply algebraic, not geometrical173, and it is in this regard that it lacked the capacity to  
bring such transformation as witnessed in Galileo´s application of mathematical 
hypotheses to Nature. 
Philosophically, the Chinese didn't have a mechanical view of the world. For them, 
every phenomenon was connected with everything else according to a hierarchical order 
(a perfect copy of their political system). Moreover, the Taoists distrusted reason and 
logic as well as precisely formulated abstract codified laws due to the tyranny of the 
politicians of the School of Legalism. Also, for them the cosmic order of things was 
inscrutable. Hence, Needham argued by quoting a letter written by Einstein to a friend, 
that 
The development of Western Science has been based on two 
great achievements, the invention of the formal logical system 
(in Euclidean geometry) by the Greek philosophers, and the 
discovery of the possibility of finding out causal relationship by 
systematic experiment (at the Renaissance). In my opinion one 
has not to be astonished that the Chinese sages have not made 
these steps. The astonishing thing is that these discoveries were 
made at all.174 
Moreover, the most important reasons for the stagnation were political and social.  
For Needham, there is a fundamental correlation between science and `democracy' 
(liberalism). In China, bureaucratic feudalism (in Marxist terms, the Asian production 
mode) controlled the whole country for more than 2000 years. It was a top-down power 
structure. Imperial power was exercised through an extremely elaborate civil service, 
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`the mandarinate'. ¨To become a mandarin, a man had to be an expert in the writings of 
Confucius and, for much of Chinese history (more than 1000 years) he had to pass very 
difficult examinations in these ancient writings.¨175 
All lords were swept away except one, the emperor, who ruled and collected taxes 
through a gigantic bureaucracy. This bureaucratic system prevented the rise of a 
merchant class. The powerful were opposed to free enterprise and destroyed regularly 
the merchants through excessive regulation and heavy taxation (with a cut for the 
mandarins). The only possibility for individual investment was land. All other economic 
sectors (iron and steel, salt) were nationalized for the well-being of one man, the despot. 
Jared Diamond traced the problem of this bureaucratic system to the geographical 
situation of China.  
In Guns, Germs and Steel176, Jared Diamond, postulates that the lack of geographic 
barriers in much of China (essentially a wide plain with two large navigable rivers, and 
a relatively smooth coastline) led to a single government without competition. At the 
whim of a ruler who disliked new inventions, technology could be stifled for half a 
century or more. In contrast, Europe's barriers of the Pyrennes, the Alps, and the various 
defensible peninsulas (Denmark, Scandinavia, Italy, Greece, etc.) and islands (Britain, 
Ireland, Sicily, etc.) led to smaller countries in constant competition with each other. If a 
ruler chose to ignore a scientific advancement (especially a military or economic one), 
his more-advanced neighbours would soon usurp his throne. However, James Morris 
Blaut had criticized Diamond´s Guns, Germs, and Steel for reviving the theory of 
environmental determinism. He described Diamond as an example of a modern 
Eurocentric historian.177 This kind of Eurocentric determinism is very visible in the 
Needham thesis which does not appear to have made an independent study of the 
Scientific Revolution. His views represent ´a highly selective precipitate of assorted 
portions of the literature on the subject´178 which make the reader to wonder at times if 
his thesis is, really, about the ¨Scientific¨ rather than about the ¨Industrial¨ Revolution. 
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Needham’s rather romantic identification of Daoism with the Chinese scientific spirit is 
questionable, given Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu’s opposition to technological innovations. 
In fact the exception that proves the rule, so to speak, for Needham’s thesis is the 
ancient Mohist School of Chinese philosophers. Their work focuses on optics and 
mechanics and has many features more resembling Western science than any other 
Chinese school. Their ethics which was a strange mixture of extreme utilitarianism and 
Christian-like universal love also had odd resemblances to Western philosophy. Mohists 
also developed logic, something that no other indigenous Chinese sect did. Their 
philosophy was only studied again after Buddhism spread in China. 
The Mohists had no deductive geometry (though they might have 
developed one), and certainly no Galilean physics, but their 
statements often give a more modern impression than those of 
most of the Greeks. How it was that their school did not develop 
in later Chinese society is one of the great questions which only 
a sociology of science can answer.179 
 The Mohists were craftspeople, military engineers, and Mo Tzu himself may have been 
a former slave and is very likely to have worked as a wheelwright. When the empire 
was consolidated around 200 BCE the independent role of the Mohist sects as military 
engineering consultants and defensive mercenaries to various small warring states was 
eliminated and Mohism disappeared, along with Chinese understanding of Mohist logic 
and science.  
 
 
2.7.2.1 WHY SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION DID NOT HAPPEN IN CHINA 
 
Needham emphasized that the triumph of the Scientific Revolution in the West was 
because of the other great events that characterized the European environment at that 
time. He strived to demonstrate that the Scientific Revolution is inextricably bound up 
with the Renaissance, Reformation, and the rise of Capitalism. These three events 
formed together the peak landmarks in the underlying process of the dissolution of 
feudalism and the rise of capitalism from the 15th through the 18th centuries. Therefore, 
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Needham concluded that, ¨To ask why modern science and technology developed in our 
society (Europe) and not in China is the same thing as to ask why capitalism did not 
arise in China, why was there no Renaissance, no Reformation, none of those epoch-
making phenomena of that great transition period of the fifteenth to the eighteenth 
centuries.¨180 He later asserted that the more one knows about the Chinese civilization, 
the more odd it seems that modern science and technology did not develop there. 
Perhaps, this is explained by the fact that Chinese science got along without 
dichotomies between mind and body, objective and subjective, even wave and particle. 
In the West, the dichotomies between mind and body were entrenched in scientific 
thought by the time of Plato. Galileo, Descartes, and others carried them into modern 
times to mark off the realm of physical science from the province of the soul, and it 
formed the basis of liberty on which the secular innovators acted.  
However one of the major questions Needham´s thesis failed to address was whether the 
merchants indeed began to get more closed off in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), at the 
same time that the scientific drive seemed to weaken? Or were there other factors at 
play? To confuse the issue further, in recent years a number of strong scholarly works 
have tracked many new examples of dynamic commercial and economic enterprise in 
the Qing period (circa 1644–1911), during China’s last dynasty, when China appeared to 
be dramatically “falling behind” in scientific energy. The debate is far from over.  
Those who might want to pursue these questions further, whether to rethink them 
fundamentally or to tie them more firmly to Needham’s own magnum opus, will surely 
find no better point of entry than the recent review essay by Professor Nathan Sivin, a 
leading historian of Chinese science. Published in China Review International in 2005, 
Sivin’s essay focused on Needham’s Science and Civilisation: The Social Background, 
General Conclusions and Reflections wherein he gave a poignant and nuanced overview 
of Needham’s work as a whole.  
 
Sivin is by no means convinced that “the Needham Question” needs asking anymore 
after so many years, for he feels—along with many other scholars—that “to explain 
what did not happen is about as rigorous as fiction.” Yet when he steps back and looks 
at all the contributions which have sought to give explanations for what happened to 
Chinese science, Sivin concludes that “Needham’s are the most thoughtful and the best 
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informed,” even if ultimately “none has reshaped our understanding.” If we seek 
certainties about the long hiatus within Chinese science, we are likely to be 
disappointed: “What did happen was the emergence of early modern science in Europe. 
It is Europe that needs to be understood.”181 Consequently, the theory of environmental 
determinism of the scientific revolution generated by the Needham thesis has led to 
various ´scholarly nationalist works´182 on theme, among which is Robert Merton´s  
Science, Technology & Society in Seventeenth-Century England.  
 
 
2.8 MERTON THESIS: PURITANISM AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE 
 
Robert King Merton (Jul. 1910 – Feb. 2003) was famous American sociologist.  The 
Merton thesis originated from Robert Merton´s arguments in a doctoral dissertation 
which was originally titled, ¨Sociological Aspects of Scientific Development in 
Seventeenth-Century England. The dissertation was concluded in 1936, and a revised 
version of it appeared in 1938 as a monograph in George Sarton´series, Osiris, with the 
new title, ¨Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England. It was his 
erudite demonstration of the connections between religion and the rise of modern 
science that launched the historical sociology of science. The Merton Thesis has two 
distinct parts. Firstly, it says that the changes in the nature of science were due to an 
accumulation of observations and better experimental technique. Secondly, it proposes 
that the popularity of science in England in 17th Century, and the religious demography 
of the Royal Society (English scientists of that time were predominantly Protestants or 
Puritans) can be explained by a correlation between Protestantism and the values of the 
new science. He illustrated, specifically, that the English Puritanism and German 
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Pietism were significant causes in the development of the scientific revolution of the 
17th and 18th centuries. Hence, he attributes the connection between religious affiliation 
and sustained interest in science to a strong compatibility between the values of ascetic 
Protestantism and those associated with modern science.  
Merton states thus;  
 
¨The coincidence of such distinguished men of religion as 
ZWINGLI, LUTHER, CALVIN, KNOX, MELANCHTHON AND 
BEZA; of such dramatic and lyric poets as SPENSER, 
MARLOWE, SHAKSPERE AND JONSON; of such scientists as 
BOYLE, WREN, WALLS, HOOKE, NEWTON, HALLEY and 
FLAMSTEED cannot readily be attributed to the chance 
concurrence of individuals biologically endowed with 
predispositions toward special fields of activity. The more 
plausible explanation is to be found in the combination of 
sociological circumstances, of moral, religious, aesthetic, 
economic and political conditions, which tended to focus the 
attention of the geniuses of the age upon specific spheres of 
endeavor.¨183  
 
Merton statement implies that the explanation for the great activities of these geniuses 
of that century has to be sought in the external factors (socio-economic, moral, 
religious, aesthetic and political situations) which in large measure account for the 
marked development of science and for the ´direction of interest into specific 
departments of inquiry.´184 However, the Merton thesis has been criticized on its two 
basic parts. This criticism is focused, firstly, on its insufficient consideration of the roles 
of mathematics and mechanical philosophy in the scientific revolution. The second 
criticism is on its arbitrary distinctions and statistical inaccuracies supporting his 
purported connection between Protestantism and the rise of science. Merton seem to 
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have handled both science and religion as essentially homogeneous entities, as if 
throughout the course of the eventful century no significant changes had occurred in 
either of them. Also, the rise of the English science was explained exclusively through 
the Puritan ethic, whereas in reality the work pretended to demonstrate that not only was 
there mutual relationship between the two, there were other factors which might as well 
have been equally or perhaps even more important in accounting for the phenomenon of 
the scientific change. 
 
 
2.8.1 ´MERTON REVISITED´ 
 
Merton had nowhere in the book claimed to explain, or had explained in fact, the rise of 
early modern science. He did not argue that the English Calvinist theology generated 
scientific innovation. He merely claimed, with many qualifications, that ´Puritans 
shared certain clusters of values that encouraged worldly endeavour, of which inquiries 
into Nature were a part´.185 Perhaps, it was ignorance of this fact that had led to 
numerous criticisms of the Merton thesis, and which Gary Abraham sought to clarify in 
Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis.186 It was Alfred R. Hall´s ¨Merton Revisited¨ that 
actually brought the Merton thesis into the focus of an explanation of the Scientific 
Revolution. Hall faulted the Merton thesis for its limitation of the rise of modern 
science to the case of England thereby making the account incapable of explaining the 
scientific revolution in its entirety, as it was supposed to have done.  
Of course, this was not what Merton set out to do—to explain the Scientific Revolution 
in its entirety which will in this case involve all the prominent figures and the canonical 
subjects. He, however, sought to explain the rise of the science within the English 
context. In trying to make the Merton thesis a good account of the Scientific 
Revolution, Hall implied that it should have incorporated the conceptual overhaul 
accomplished by Galileo and Kepler and many others, and not just the bogus emphasis 
Merton made throughout his work of the Baconian aspect of early modern science. 
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Hall´s disagreement with the Merton thesis is understood by his rejection of any attempt 
at ´external´ explanation of events in the history of ideas. In fact, Hall agreed more with 
the intellectualist approach of Alexandre Koyré in Études Galiléennes (1939). Hence, he 
asserted that ´Merton summed up one epoch, that of the socio-economic historian, 
Koyré opened another, that of the intellectual historian.´187  
In Lilley revisited: or Science and Society in the Twentieth Century (2009) Vidar 
Enebakk, argued that Merton thesis was not the only target of attack in Hall´s ´Merton 
Revisted´. There was another explicit target, and this was Sam Lilley´s Essays on the 
Social History of Science (1953).188 Precisely, Hall refuted such sociological 
interpretation of science because it sustains the Marxist historiography of science which 
typifies a form of social reductionism or extreme externalism.  
However, Steven Shapin dismissed such criticism by illustrating that Merton’s claims 
were ¨not to imply that the discoveries of Newton, Boyle or other scientists can be 
directly attributed to the sanction of science by religion. Specific discoveries and 
inventions belong to the internal history of science and are largely independent of 
factors other than the purely scientific.¨189 Hence, he affirms that it is, indeed, a 
plausible hypothesis that our present-day language of ¨internal¨ and ¨external¨ factors, as 
well as the validation of an overwhelmingly ¨internalist¨ historiography of scientific 
ideas, actually originated from Merton. Nevertheless, the Merton thesis´s illustration of 
viable interaction of socio-economic and religious forces as having incited the growth of 
science in England has some inspiration from Boris Hessen´s The Social and Economic 
Roots of Newton´s ´Principia´(1931) 
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2.9 MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF BORRIS HESSEN THESIS 
 
The Marxist Historiography of the Science was first inaugurated by Boris Hessen thesis 
of the Scientific Revolution which establishes the European ´development of merchant 
capital, international maritime relationships and heavy (mining) industry´190 as factors 
that prompted the rise of the early modern science. At the Second International 
Congress of the History of Science and Technology which met in London in 1931, 
Professor Boris Mikhailovich Hessen (Aug. 1893 – Dec. 1936) presented a paper titled 
¨The Social and Economic Roots of Newton´s ´Principia´.  In the paper he claimed that 
Newton´s great masterpiece of mathematical physics, the Principia, was a product of 
seventeenth-century England´s commercial and industrial activity and the social system 
associated with it. He stated thus, 
In this paper we shall present a radically different view of 
Newton and his work. We aim here to apply the method of 
dialectical materialism and Marx’s conception of the historical 
process to an analysis of the genesis and development of 
Newton’s work within the context of the period in which he lived 
and worked.191 
The point of departure of Hessen´s arguments is the correlation between problems in 
economics, technology and science in the time up to Newton. Certain economic needs 
were correlated with certain technological problems like ballistics, mining and 
maritime, which in turn are correlated with the fields of scientific study. He continued. 
Consequently, we shall first investigate the historical demands 
presented by the emergence and development of merchant 
capital. Then we shall consider what technical problems were 
posed by the newly developing economy and what complex of 
physical problems and knowledge, essential for solving these 
technical problems, they generated.192  
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Hessen’s “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia” formulates three 
theses. The first of which concerns the relation of economic and technological 
developments in the early modern period and the relation of these two to the emergence 
of modern science: Theoretical mechanics developed in the study of machine 
technology. 
The second thesis draws the converse conclusion: In those areas where seventeenth-
century scientists could not draw on an existing technology (heat engines, electric 
motors and generators) the corresponding disciplines of physics (thermodynamics, 
electrodynamics) did not develop. And the third thesis concerns the ideological 
constraints placed on science in England at the time of the “class compromise” or 
“Glorious Revolution” (1688): Because of this compromise Newton drew back from 
fully endorsing the mechanization of the world picture and adapted his concept of 
matter so as to be able to introduce God into the material world. He concluded by 
reiterating the particular point that he has wanted his thesis to underscore. He remarks,  
 
We come to the conclusion that the scheme of physics was 
mainly determined by the economic and technical tasks which 
the rising bourgeoisie raised to the forefront. During the period 
of merchant capital the development of productive forces set 
science a series of practical tasks and made an imperative 
demand for their accomplishment.193 
 
Hessen noted that the further development of trade—merchant capital—depended on 
improved transport.  Naturally, water was the most efficient means of transport for 
goods. Hence, the economic development at the time set the following technical 
problems for transport.  
1. To increase the tonnage capacity of vessels and their speed, 
2. To improve the floating qualities of ships, 
3. To develop means for better navigation, 
4. To improve the construction of canals and docks. 
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The efforts to resolve the technical problems 1, 2 and 4 were what later gave rise to the 
scientific studies in hydrostatics and hydrodynamics while no.3 involved the 
development of chronometers and was also correlated with studies in mechanics. In fact, 
Hessen thesis provided a classical Marxist twist to the factors that provided major boost 
to the rise of early modern science than had done Merton´s thesis on Puritanism and 
science. And for the period throughout the 1930s and 1940s the Hessen thesis provided 
a platform unto various theses in same direction were created. 
 
 
2.9.1 CLASSICAL MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
Classical Marxist historiography of science (2009) is the title designated by Gideon 
Freudenthal and Peter McLaughlin to illustrate the core Marxist approach to the 
historiography of the Scientific Revolution and the methodology of the historiography 
of science inaugurated by the similar works of Boris Hessen and Henryk Grossmann. 
The classical marxist historiography of science captures what they called ´The Hessen-
Grossmann-thesis. Boris Hessen’s “The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s 
‘Principia’” (1931) and Henryk Grossmann’s “The Social Foundation of Mechanistic 
Philosophy and Manufacture” (1935) are the classic programmatic examples of Marxist 
historiography of science.194 Even though these works were produced independently 
Gideon and Peter saw it reasonable to conjoin the two theses because ´both scholars 
were working within the same intellectual tradition with the same conceptual tools on 
the same topic´. Besides, while many Marxists have contributed to the historiography of 
science, Hessen’s and Grossmann’s work displays a specifically Marxist approach: they 
conceptualize science as one kind of labour within the system of social production. 
However, works like these has been criticised as negative paradigm of externalism 
because their explanation of scientific thought undermine the autonomy of its internal 
development as a process guided above all by an inherent logic all its own 
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2.10 HERMETICIST HISTORIOGRAPHY OF FRANCES YATES THESIS 
 
Dame Frances Amelia Yates (Nov. 1899 – Sept. 1981) was a noted British historian. She 
taught at the Warburg Institute of the University of London for many years. Among her 
major works are ´Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition´ (1964) and ´The 
Rosicrucian Enlightenment´ (1972) in which she illustrated the Hermeticist 
reinterpretation of the Scientific Revolution. In the Rosicrucian Enlightenment, she 
made important statement on the hermetic tradition and the new science. She noted how 
Elias Ashmole, charter member of the Royal Society, had written of the hermetic John 
Dee and the Rosicrucian Michael Maier in his Theatrum chemicum and how Newton, a 
later member of the Royal Society, owned and read not only Ashmole´s alchemical 
collection but also the same Rosicrucian material to which Ashmole had referred. She 
wrote thus, 
 
Now it would have been clear to the attentive reader of 
Ashmole´s Theatrum that this work was ´Rosicrucian´ in 
sympathy, that it was in fact a kind of continuation of Michael 
Maier´s revival of English alchemy in the German Rosicrucian 
Movement.195 
 
She illustrated that behind the great exoteric movement typified in Newton’s 
achievements in mathematics and physics was another exoteric movement that has root 
in Rosicrucian alchemy. She maintained that the Rosicrucian movement of ´Magia, 
Cabala, and the Alchemy must have tinged the new science.  
 
According to her, various influential Renaissance philosophers were greatly influenced 
by the Hermetic corpus of writing. Consequently, through the Rosicrucian manifestoes 
of 1614-1615, the advent of new knowledge was proclaimed all over Europe by the 
Rosicrucian movement, and thus prepared the European mind for the Scientific 
Revolution. Among great scientists, she discussed in detail were, Kepler, Descartes, 
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Newton and Bacon. She demonstrated Kepler´s immersion in the Hermetic atmosphere 
of the court of Rudolf II in Prague and Newton’s efforts in alchemy.  
 
Rosicrucianism was described as a Paracelsian current in hermetism that was more 
given to scientific curiosity.  She highlighted that it was through Rosicrucianism that 
hermetic tradition became an antecedent of modern science. Therefore, the seventeenth-
century science could be seen as a mathematical and mechanical manifestation of the 
same impulses expressed in magical and animist philosophies of nature in the preceding 
century.196 
 
This thesis tends to show that the Scientific Revolution was not so much the beneficial 
triumph of rational thought about nature, but rather the agent chiefly responsible for the 
destructive handling of nature, whose consequences we find ourselves facing in the late 
20th century. Hence, the rise of modern science cannot be dissociated from its relations 
to hermeticism. However, some historians of the Scientific Revolutions disagree on the 
significance of the Yates thesis, especially on its affirmation on the Rosicrucian 
motivations in Newton’s science. 
 
 
2.11 STEVEN SHAPIN´S VIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 
Steven Shapin´s ¨Scientific Revolution¨ started with the provocative that ¨There was no 
such thing as the Scientific Revolution.¨197 However, he ended up telling the usual 
stories about great characters of scientific traditions such as Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, 
Descartes, Boyle, Hooke, Huygens, and Newton.  Nevertheless, the book is very 
significant in two important respects. The first pertains to its organization. It is 
organized around three key questions: What was known?198; how was it known199; and 
what was the knowledge for?200 Shapin suggests that ´The Scientific Revolution´ was a 
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period in which new answers to these questions were forged. The second significance of 
the book is a bit more substantive. Shapin believes that the key figures of the revolution 
were a heterogeneous lot, divided over many issues and practices. Perhaps, this is a 
dimension of the history of this period which other historians have tended to ignore. 
Most importantly, he stresses the continuity of seventeenth century science with its 
medieval past. The new ideas in science, he says, were situated in a wide cultural 
context and were closely related to religious, political, and economic changes. But then, 
he was not only interested in this context, he sought to x-ray what people actually did 
when they practiced science, and who these people were. Nonetheless, Shapin’ s notion 
of the scientific revolution could be capitulated under five major issues. These issues 
reflect the basic concepts that underlie what appeared to be his rejection of the existence 
of such thing as the scientific revolution. 
They include: 
1. Mechanism 
2. Objectivism 
3. Methodology 
4. Impartiality 
5. Altruism 
 
These factors will be clearly explained so as to show the vital illustrations they reflected 
on his concept of scientific revolution. 
 
 
2.11.1 MECHANISM 
 
This is a framework which emerged during the late fifteenth century to the early 
seventeenth century. It is the preference of modeling the natural world, explicitly, ´on 
the characteristics of a machine.´201 Before this period, nature was considered as an 
animated entity whose elements have the character of striving to achieve their natural 
ends. This concept explains the natural motion on the basis of animistic and teleological 
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interpretations. For instance, such interpretation would describe the tendency of a stone 
to fall at the centre of the earth on the basis that it is in the nature of the stone to do so. 
 
On the contrary, the concept of mechanism is the preference to reconstruct the natural 
world in an artificial way by employing mechanical means. It strived to reconstruct 
nature, wholly, on concrete or tangible interpretations. This preference was motivated 
by the desire to explain and model physical realities in terms of artifacts. Therefore, the 
interpretation of matter and motion of physical realities were made in terms of size, 
shape and position. 
 
Most importantly, the preference of mechanism over naturalism was on the basis that 
the latter was not intelligible and accurate. But then, Shapin emphasized that 
mechanism does not reflect much intelligence than naturalism. This is because 
mechanism also failed to give a perfect representation of nature with mechanical 
interpretations as it claimed. Based on this, it is not justifiable to place the superiority of 
one over another. 
 
 
2.11.2 OBJECTIVITY 
 
In science, objectivity is often bounded up with questions about the truth and referential 
character of scientific theories. The claim of objectivity affirms that the view provided 
by science is an accurate description of the facts of natural world as they are. The 
implication of this claim is that the view provided by science is one achieved by 
reliance upon non arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for developing, accepting and 
rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make up the view. Likewise, it demonstrates 
that the truth character of the scientific theories stands independent of the influence of 
the scientist that discovered and developed them. Therefore, they are wholly objective. 
 
However, Shapin illustrated that this claim was construed by the science practitioners of 
the early modern period. They believed to have achieved relative confidence in their 
accounts of what the real underlying structure of the natural world was like. It is against 
this background that they caricatured as unscientific and subjective any account of 
nature that is not construed on the exact form of the natural facts as they are in 
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themselves. In other words, a perfect account of the structure of the natural world 
should not be influenced by religious, political, economic or social motives. But then, 
Shapin emphasized that this claim cannot be true since the pure pursuit of objective 
truth by disinterested human beings is not possible.   
 
 
2.11.3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The crucial factor at the centre of the controversy for the authentic pattern of practicing 
science is the problem of method. Shapin shows with clear elucidation that this 
controversy was even acute during the early modern period. For him, it is unfortunate 
that such period should be acclaimed as the era of the scientific revolution. It is not 
logical that an era that is marked by heterogeneity and even the contested status of the 
natural knowledge should be observed or portrayed as the period at which the best 
method of doing science emerged. 
 
He indicated that just as seventeenth-century moderns diverged about the proper 
construal and philosophical role of experience, so they differed on questions of method 
to be employed in making natural philosophical knowledge.202 According to Shapin, 
 
¨Method was meant to be all. Method was what made knowledge 
about the natural world possible and powerful, even though 
prescriptions for that proper method varied greatly¨203 
 
Moreover, it was generally believed that methods could be devised for mechanical 
guidance to inquirers since ´the uninstructed senses were apt to deceive.´204 Such 
methods were accepted to be the key to providing the discipline necessary for 
understanding nature. 
 
Nevertheless, Shapin maintained that the corpuscular, mechanical and mathematical 
interpretations were just choice-patterns adopted to carry out the project of the 
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objectification and mechanization of nature. But then, these methods could not even 
satisfy, efficiently and effectively, the problem-field they were deployed to treat. 
Besides, they are often dominated by the principles developed in the Aristotelian natural 
philosophy. And so, the seventeenth century science is, simply, a continuity of its 
medieval past. 
 
 
2.11.4 IMPARTIALITY 
 
Scientific judgement is usually referred as unbiased. It does not have the imprints of 
subjective and socio-cultural factors. This implies that the truth and objectivity of the 
scientific knowledge are correct and impartial. Hence, the judgement or postulation 
about scientific facts or theories is devoid of interference of the cultural, social or 
economic interests of the context within which an individual scientist works. In this 
regard, the scientist speaks impartially when he presents scientific facts or theories. As 
such, he presents, in an objective sense, the truth-character of the scientific facts or 
theories. 
 
However, Shapin stressed, strongly, that even the science of the early modern period 
had some influences from its medieval past. Likewise, there were great influences of 
other historical events. Therefore, the new ideas in early modern science were all 
situated in a wide cultural context, and they were closely related to religious, political, 
and socio-economic changes. 
 
Of course, ´no body of culture is able to wholly reject its past´.205 And so, the distancing 
of the modern science from its ancient and medieval past was more of a rhetorical 
stance than a reality. In fact, the picture of science that accompanied this rhetoric needs 
to be rejected. The new science has been inaccurately portrayed as something that is not 
subject to the various social forces that influence all other human institutions. Even the 
modern’s rhetoric about methodology was a myth. Shapin grants that such myths ´may 
have real historical functions´ to both justify the new science and distinguish it from 
other practices.206 But as far as he is concerned, science no longer needs this facade. 
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Modern science has an integrity that is not threatened by social analyses, for it is a 
reliable source of knowledge, despite the fact that it is as affected by social factors as its 
pre-modern predecessors were. 
 
 
2.11.5 ALTRUISM  
 
Shapin emphasized here that science can hardly stand independent of the social or 
historical context in which it is practised. The structure of the scientific knowledge 
bears some resemblance to the cultural context within which it emerged. The interplay 
between the progress of the scientific knowledge and the religious, social and political 
changes in Western Europe is a typical example. The principles of science are often 
utilized to restructure the patterns of religious, social and political institutions. In like 
manner, the changes in the religious and social political structures also influence the 
progress of science. 
 
Therefore, science is a contingent, diverse, and at times, deeply problematic product of 
interested, morally concerned, and historically situated individuals. 
 
 
2.11.6 THE ANTHROPOCENTRISM OF THE ARISTOTELIAN NATURAL    
PHILOSOPHY 
 
The anthropocentrism of the Aristotelian natural philosophy centers on the fact that all 
natural motion has developmental character.207 The basic natural elements like earth, 
water, air and fire have their unique natural motions. As such, natural motion always 
tends to natural place.208 Shapin stated thus: 
 
Bodies naturally moved so as to fulfill their natures, to 
transform the potential into the actual, to move toward where it 
was natural for them to be. Aristotelian physics was in that sense 
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modeled on biology and employed explanatory categories 
similar to those used to comprehend living things.209  
 
This implies that all natural motions have natural motives attached to them. However, 
the overthrow of this naturalistic physics began with Galileo’s interpretation of his 
observation of the dark spots on the surface of the sun. Galileo demonstrated clearly that 
these spots are not far from the surface of the sun. They are either contiguous to it or 
separated by interval so small as to be quite imperceptible. Initially, the Aristotelian 
natural philosophy made distinctions between the physics of the heavens and of the 
earth by attributing mutability and decay to the components of the earth and 
immutability and perfection to the components of heaven. Consequently, the rejection of 
the traditional physics of motion was on the basis of its teleological and animistic 
features. It was disparaged as absurd and unintelligible. 
 
Nevertheless, Shapin reiterated that the rejection of the Aristotelian physics on the basis 
of unintelligibility was not logical. This is because the mechanical physics does not 
prove more intelligible either. For instance, what superior intelligibility can one 
discover in mechanism which speaks of the matters of facts and their physical causes 
when the causes which these matters of facts testify to are not visible and accessible to 
the senses? 
 
 
 2.11.7 MECHANIC—CORPUSCULARIANISM   
 
The centre point of mechanical physics is the interpretation of the structure of the 
natural world on its resemblance to the physical artifacts. Of course, the naturalistic 
interpretation had been denigrated and rejected on the basis that it conceded teleological 
motives to the natural elements. Invariably, the destinies of those elements belonged 
naturally to them. But then, the mechanical interpretation sought to shift these destinies 
to the control of the forces that can be manipulated and regulated so that the true nature 
of these elements can be studied and known. 
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Eventually, the method that was employed to the study of nature was the reinterpretation 
of well-known observations in terms of the physical motion and interactions of 
corpuscles. Therefore, all sensory appearances, including color, taste, and even weight 
was explained in terms of the size, shape, position, and motion of the elementary 
corpuscles of base matter. To attribute other qualities to the elementary atoms will be to 
resort to occultism.  
The error of mechanic-corpuscularianism is that it goes to the extreme of trying to 
explain the mechanism of the corpuscles in a realm that could not be observed, and also 
to attribute to them properties which, intrinsically, they do not possess. For instance, the 
sweetness of a pineapple juice could be explained on the basis of the shape or size of the 
corpuscles whereas there is no visible observation which shows that such properties 
belong to them. Therefore, the lack of adequate mechanical interpretations for all 
physical realities makes it illogical to say that the mechanic—corpuscularianism was 
more intelligible and accurate than the naturalistic account. 
 
 
2.11.8 SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AS METHODOLOGICAL DYNAMISM 
 
The goal of all the philosophers, both mechanical and natural, had been, implicitly or 
explicitly, the production and extension of true or probably true knowledge. The only 
difference can be on the procedure or modality of the search for this truth. Each method 
is really authentic in as much as it offers adequate explanation to the problem field it is 
deployed. Thus, it is quite implausible to talk of the ¨essence¨ of the scientific revolution 
in just one historical era like the early modern period. Besides, this period had the most 
heterogeneous and even contested status, of the scientific knowledge. 
 
Therefore, Shapin maintained that what was ¨really new¨ and ¨really important¨ in the 
seventeenth century was the mathematization of the study of motion and the destruction 
of the Aristotelian cosmos. But then, he stated thus, 
 
¨Despite widespread contemporary professions of a natural f¨it¨ 
between mechanism and mathematically expressed physical 
regularities or laws did not depend on belief in their mechanical 
causes. That is to say, although the mathematization of natural 
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philosophy was certainly an important feature of seventeenth-
century practice, professions of a constitutive relation between 
mechanism and mathematics remain problematic¨210 
 
 This is to show that there were contestations on the efficiency of the mathematically 
formulated binding laws of nature. Some philosophers of science argued in its favour, 
while others doubted that such mathematical representations could capture the 
contingencies and the complexities of real natural processes. Shapin quoted Francis 
Bacon and Charles Boyle to have said that mathematical accounts worked very well 
when nature was considered abstractly and less well when it was addressed in its 
concrete particularities. Hence, he concluded that, though in traditional accounts 
fundamental changes in mathematical physics constitute the ¨essence¨ of the Scientific 
Revolution, the culture of physics and the mathematical sciences is not coextensive with 
¨early modern science¨.  
 
 
2.12 THOMAS S. KUHN— KUHNIAN THESIS 
 
The originality of Kuhn’s book titled ¨The Structure of Scientific Revolutions¨ lies 
precisely in the refined manner in which he brought together all kinds of previously 
wide-apart ideas on the historical growth of science and made them merge both with 
one another and with a number of ingredients of his own making so as to yield a 
smoothly appealing account of the revolutionary character of science. Kuhn 
demonstrated that there were scientific revolutions and they are responsible for the rapid 
advancements achieved in modern science. These advancements had not been uniform, 
but had followed normal and revolutionary phases. Hence, he tried to recapitulate the 
dynamic nature of the activities that go on among the scientists before and after 
revolutions, and the factors that make these activities progress through revolutions. 
 
The major factor in Kuhn’s illustrations of the scientific revolution is the concept of the 
paradigm. Paradigms are the universally recognized scientific achievements that for a 
time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. They 
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determine the legitimate problems and also deploy the tools with which they are solved. 
In other words, the paradigm is the shared belief which the practitioners of a science 
field have on the how the natural world is like. And so, it determines the problems, 
methods, and solutions within the given field.  
 
This common belief makes the adherents to be fully committed as they confidently 
employ the tools to the problems with the assurance that it provides all the possible 
explanation needed in this field. But then, when the paradigm proves incapable of 
providing solution to certain problems in some acute cases, a period of crisis begins and 
eventually ends with a revolution.  
 
Therefore, scientific revolutions are those non-cumulative developmental episodes in 
which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or part by an incompatible new one. And 
so, the progress of the scientific advancement cannot be a uniformed process. Rather, it 
is a process with both normal and revolutionary phases. Consequently, the above 
illustrations imply that an adequate knowledge of Kuhn’s concept of the paradigm is 
tantamount to having clear understanding of his concept of the scientific revolutions. 
Thus, it will be to understand properly what a paradigm means. 
 
 
2.12.1 WHAT IS PARADIGM? 
 
In the simplest form, paradigm is an accepted model or pattern. An accepted model or 
pattern shows a uniform or particular way of doing something. Likewise, the acceptance 
that is involved implies a conviction or belief in the effectiveness of the model or 
pattern that has been accepted. The accepted model acts like a guide or standard against 
which possible problems or puzzles can be resolved. This illustration is just an attempt 
to capture the ordinary sense of what a paradigm is. 
 
According to Kuhn, paradigm provides the legitimate problems for a given science 
field, and the tools for solving those problems. It is largely a promise of success 
discoverable in selected, and still incomplete, examples. Hence, it posits a number of 
selected problems and offers the tools that at given time provide the solutions to the 
102 
 
 
problems. As such, it is able to sustain the confidence and adequate commitment of its 
adherents by focusing attention to small range of relatively esoteric problems. 
 
The scientist who is guided by a particular paradigm is not just doing an undefined 
work. He knows the problem he is treating and at the same time has anticipation of what 
the result will be with the tools he deploys to solve the problems. In following this 
pattern, the paradigm forces the scientist to investigate in some part of nature, in detail 
and depth. Hence, paradigms help scientific communities to bound their discipline by 
offering them the capacity to create avenues of inquiry, formulate questions, select 
methods with which to examine questions, and define areas of relevance 
 
However, it happens that at some critical times the problems which ought to be solved 
by known rules or procedures deployed by the paradigm resists repeated trials of the 
most capable members of the group within whose competence it falls. Likewise, 
particular instruments that had been used before to solve usual problems fail to perform 
in anticipated form. Such situations imply the existence of crisis in that particular 
science field.  
 
The period of crisis leads to what Kuhn called ´extraordinary investigation´ from which 
emerges new set of commitments to another paradigm. Consequently, there is a shift 
from one paradigm to another—an occurrence known as paradigm shift.  
 
In conclusion, paradigm can be described as a mix-up of theoretical and methodological 
belief that permits selection, evaluation and criticism in scientific research. The 
complex sense in which the term ´paradigm´ was employed to elaborate a coherent 
account of consensus formation in critical moments in the scientific progress has been 
the major source of its criticism and to the kuhnian thesis as a whole. Its usage has often 
ranged from ¨a concrete scientific achievement¨211 to a ¨characteristic set of beliefs and 
preconceptions.¨212 The set of beliefs has sometimes include instrumental, theoretical, 
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and metaphysical commitments together.213 However, Kuhn acknowledged his critics´ 
complaint that he had used the term paradigm ambiguously.  
 
Responding to this criticism in The Essential Tension (1977) Kuhn introduces two new 
terms to stand for the two of the most important sense of paradigm: exemplars and 
disciplinary matrices.214 Exemplars are concrete problem solutions, accepted by a 
scientific group as, in a quite usual sense, paradigmatic. They are the types that appear 
at the end of chapters in science texts, in laboratory exercises, and on examinations. The 
exemplars are very important to teaching students of science how to use theories to 
solve problems, and such students become scientist by recognizing and imbibing the 
tacit knowledge implicit in the exemplars. 
 
Kuhn refers to the disciplinary matrices as symbolic generalizations, models, and 
exemplar.215 It is important to note that it is in this second, more inclusive sense of 
paradigm that Kuhn employs in many of his more challenging and controversial claims 
about science. Therefore, most of Kuhn elaboration of paradigm in consensus formation 
in science should be understood in this notion of disciplinary matrices. 
 
 
2.12.2 THREE PHASES OF THE SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE 
 
Kuhn used the concept of the paradigm to make distinctions between three phases of the 
scientific advancement. The first phase describes the period of science in which there 
were no coherent traditions, but only a disarray of incompatible theories aim at 
explaining physical realities. He called this phase the pre-paradigm phase. The second 
phase described the emergence of mature science which has all the characteristics that 
make a field of study scientific. It was this phase that he tended to illustrate as the 
proper history of science. For Kuhn, this second phase which is called normal science 
captures the whole scope of the scientific enterprise. Lastly, sporadic failures of efforts 
within the normal science lead the third phase which is referred to as the revolutionary 
science. This period of science refers to the durations of transformation in a scientific 
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field. Hence, it does not capture the full nature of the scientific enterprise, even though 
it is an essential ingredient that determines the dimension of the scientific progress. 
 
 
2.12.3 PRE-PARADIGM PHASE 
 
This is the prehistoric period of science, in which there was no consensus on any 
particular theory, though the researches that were carried out could be regarded as 
scientific in nature. This phase was characterized by several incompatible and 
incomplete theories. Making reference to the radical change brought by Newton’s work 
which marked the beginning of the new science, Kuhn commented thus: 
 
¨No period between remote antiquity and the end of the 
seventeenth century exhibited a single generally accepted view 
about the nature of light. Instead there were a number of 
competing schools and sub-schools, most of them espousing one 
variant or another of Epicurean, Aristotelian, or Platonic 
theory¨216 
 
This shows that this phase was more or less, the prehistoric antiquity of science in 
which there were competing schools of thought geared towards giving varying 
explanations on certain physical phenomena. Thus, it proceeded without proficient 
standard against which achievements could be measured. According to most 
philosophers of science, this phase of science does not qualify as science per se. 
Besides, we simply beg the question if we talk about ´science´ as though it always 
existed. 
 
 
2.12.4 NORMAL SCIENCE 
 
The second phase is the normal science in which puzzles are solved within the context 
of the dominant paradigm. Normal science embraces all the normal activities of the 
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community of scientists when there is no crisis. As long as there is general consensus 
within the discipline, normal science continues. Its activities are those premised on the 
assumption of knowing what the world is like, and the eagerness to defend this 
assumption. There is common belief on the standard set of problems and the methods to 
be used in solving them. And so, the choice of supporting observation and experiment is 
guided by the shared belief. 
 
In normal science, scientific research is carried out on the assumption that only certain 
sorts of circumstances will arise. The scientist, conveniently, apply a particular piece of 
apparatus in a particular way because he anticipates a particular form of solution for a 
result.  
 
Normal science has a peculiar role. According to Kuhn, this role consists in the 
actualization of the success promises implicit in an accepted model. The success 
promises are discoverable in selected and still incomplete examples. There are three 
ways by which this role is achieved. They are stated as follows: 
 
1. Extension of the knowledge of those revealing facts illustrated by the 
paradigm. 
2. Increasing the proximity between the realities of those facts with the 
predictions of the paradigm. 
3. Further articulation of the paradigm itself. 
 
The aforementioned patterns by which the normal science performs its role show that it 
is highly enclosed within itself. In fact, it is dogmatically structured. It does not seek for 
novelty neither does it has the disposition to incorporate any form of novel phenomena 
within it. For Kuhn, this peculiar characteristic of the normal science shows why the 
changes in paradigms bring about drastic transformations which transfigure the world of 
the scientist. 
 
In summary, normal science is the scientific research which deals mainly on the 
articulation of those phenomena and theories already supplied in the paradigm. But 
then, over some period of time, progress in normal science may reveal anomalies; facts 
which are difficult to explain within the context of the existing paradigm. Usually, while 
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these anomalies are resolved, in some cases they may accumulate to the point where 
normal science becomes difficult and where weaknesses in the old paradigm are 
revealed. This leads to a period of crisis, of which, when adequate efforts employed at 
resolving them fail, it yields to the third phase called the revolutionary science. 
 
 
2.12.5 REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE 
 
 This is the phase in which the underlying assumptions of a scientific field are 
reexamined and a new paradigm is established. After the new paradigm’s dominance is 
institutionalized, scientists return to normal science, solving puzzles within the new 
paradigm. A science may go through these cycles repeatedly, though Kuhn notes that it 
is a good thing for science that such shifts do not occur often or easily. Hence, it is 
incorrect to view science solely from this revolutionary phase since it does not capture 
the exact nature of the scientific enterprise. He reiterated that neither science nor the 
development of knowledge is likely to be understood if research is viewed exclusively 
through the revolutions it occasionally produces.217 
 
 
2.12.6 THE ROLE OF ANOMALIES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 
 
An anomaly is discovered when the paradigm-induced expectation within a particular 
area of the scientific research fails to be actualized. Its occurrence leads to a period of 
crisis which is intensified with the despair on the effectiveness of the paradigm. 
Eventually, it results to the loosening of the rules of normal science. And then, greater 
attention is focused on the area in which the anomaly has occurred so as to resolve it. 
 
The vital importance of the anomalies in the scientific research is that they facilitate the 
emergence of scientific discoveries. They perform this role by the inducement of 
extraordinary research. Extraordinary research begins when the scientists try to resolve, 
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by other means, problems that have defied the application of the tools deployed by the 
current paradigm. 
 
During this period of crises, the paradigm does not hold much force on the scientists. 
Rather, they are guided more by individual experience and skills acquired during the 
time of commitment to the paradigm.  
 
Consequently, individual scientists begin to encounter novel phenomenon which the 
commitment to paradigm obstructed them from seeing. Hence, discoveries commence 
with the awareness of anomalies, and the consequent exploration of the area at which 
they occur. This extended exploration results to the adjustment of the paradigm theory, 
which makes the anomaly become a normal phenomenon. 
 
Most importantly, Kuhn has shown that the transition from one paradigm to another is 
not a simple event which receives the approval of all scientists. The fact is that the 
debates that take place among the opposite groups during the period of crisis ensue from 
strong polarized ends. Each group tries to defend their stand from the frontiers offered 
by their respective paradigms. Nevertheless, scientists learn to see nature in a different 
way when the new fact discovered has been recognized as truly scientific. 
 
 
2.12.7 THEORY OF INCOMMENSURABILITY 
 
Kuhn argued that in scientific revolutions it is not only the scientific theories that 
change but the very standards by which scientific theories are judged, so that the 
paradigms that govern successive periods of normal science are incommensurable. 
The thesis of incommensurability is based on the fact that vocabulary used in some 
given theory is semantically dependent on that theory. As such, the terms of successor 
theories have different meanings.  Hence, comparison between the theories cannot be as 
straightforward, or rather; there cannot be fully adequate translation of terms between 
theories. This thesis responds to the traditional view which proposes that since new 
paradigms are born from old ones, they incorporate much of the vocabulary and 
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apparatus that the traditional paradigm had previously employed, though these elements 
are employed in different ways 
Theories are incommensurable when they share no common measure. Normally, 
paradigm provides the puzzle-solutions in a given science field. As such, it is the 
measure upon which puzzle-solutions are developed. This implies that puzzle-solutions 
developed in different eras of normal science will be judged by comparison to differing 
paradigms, and in that case, they lack a common measure. Three important issues are 
deducible from the incommensurability thesis. 
1. There is no common measure because the methods of comparison and 
evaluation often change. 
2. Observational evidence cannot provide a common basis for theory 
comparison, since perceptual experience is theory- dependent. 
3. The fact that the language of theories from different periods of normal 
science may not be inter-translatable presents an obstacle to the comparison 
of those theories. 
Consequently, Kuhn reiterated that successive theories are incommensurable (which is 
not the same as incomparable) in the sense that the referents of some of the terms which 
occur in both are a function of the theory (and belongs exclusively to it) within which 
those terms appear. Hence, there is no neutral language available for purposes of 
comparison. Nonetheless, translation is in principle possible. But to translate another’s 
theory is still not to make it one’s own. Therefore, the incommensurability thesis 
implies that scientists of rival theory who are converted to adopt a new theory practice a 
totally different new science with totally new foundation 
 
2.12.8 IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE FALSIFIABLITY THEORY 
The philosophy of science of Sir Karl Raimund Popper (1902—1994) illustrated that 
the, ¨criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or 
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testability.218 Contrasting the Einstein theory of relativity with the Marxist and Freudian 
theories, he illustrated that the superiority of the Einstein theory is that it ran a serious 
risk of refutation by predicting the result of an observational test before the test was 
made. It was this success that led to its overthrow of Newton’s theory of gravity. 
Therefore, Popper shows that the genuineness of a scientific theory lies in its possibility 
of being refuted by observation and experiment. According to Imre Lakatos: 
 
Popper’s distinction lies primarily in his having grasped the full 
implications of the collapse of the best-corroborated scientific 
theory of all times: Newtonian mechanics and the Newtonian 
theory of gravitation. In his view virtue lies not in caution in 
avoiding errors, but in ruthlessness in eliminating them. 
Boldness in conjectures on the one hand and austerity in 
refutations on the other.219 
 
However, Kuhn insisted that this kind of kind of philosophy of science, as Popper 
demonstrated, does not reflect the actual nature of the intricate events which bear on 
history of science. Besides, no process yet disclosed by the historical study of scientific 
development resembles at all the methodological stereotype of falsification by direct 
comparison with nature.220 Philosophy of science ought to describe the ways scientist 
actually behave, and the way that science has evolved over time. It is in this regards that 
Popper’s philosophy of science lacks credibility. Consequently, the falsifiability theory 
does not show the real structure of the scientific progress. 
 
According to Kuhn, the concept of falsifiability is unhelpful for understanding why and 
how science has developed as it has. In the practice of science, scientists will only 
consider the possibility that a theory has been falsified if an alternative theory is 
available which they judge more credible. If there is not, scientists will continue to 
adhere to the established conceptual framework. If a paradigm shift has occurred, the 
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textbooks will be rewritten to state that the previous theory has been falsified. This 
implies, then, that the aim of practicing scientists is not to call into question Newtonian 
mechanics or the laws of thermodynamics, but to see whether they can solve problems 
by using accepted theories in conjunction with other assumptions and models. 
Therefore, the failure to solve a science puzzle, with an accepted theory, at the time of 
normal science is considered the fault of the scientist using the theory and not the theory 
itself. However, it is only during periods of crisis do scientists deliberately question the 
received theories of their day and attempt to refute them. 
 
Kuhn concluded that if falsifiability was the criterion for distinguishing science from 
pseudoscience, then, genuine science as it is done most of the time, being normal and 
not extraordinary, would be improperly classified as pseudo-scientific.221 However, 
Kuhn´s view of the scientific advancement has been criticized by Philip Weiner. He sees 
Kuhn´s view as an important logical problem in the philosophy of science. He argued 
that current scientific theories do not ¨destroy¨ previous theories, ¨if ´destroy´ means 
eliminating them completely along with their confirmatory evidence,¨ but rather they 
¨correct¨ them by situating them in a larger explanatory context.222  For Weiner, a logical 
continuity exists between the data of the previous theory and the more precise data and 
enlarged framework of the current theory; hence, a current theoretical ¨explanation is 
part of the cumulative growth of scientific explanations.¨223 
 
 
2.12.9 QUINTESSENCE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
 
The above illustrations of Kuhn’s view of scientific revolution demonstrate clearly why 
Kuhn has stressed that the progress of science do not follow uniform pattern, but has 
normal and revolutionary phases. 
Interestingly, the essence of the scientific revolutions as he has shown is that the 
consequent shifts in paradigms bring about tremendous transformations of the world 
within which scientific work is done. It results to detailed and deep understanding to the 
natural phenomena, and also makes chance for further articulation of this understanding. 
                                                 
221 Curd, M. and J. A. Cover eds., Philosophy of Science (New York,  London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1998)  p. 68 
222 Philip P. Weiner, ¨Review, The Copernican Revolution,¨ Philosophy  of Science, 1958, 25, p. 298 
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Kuhn´s final approach to scientific development was through the analysis of three 
scientific revolutions: the shift from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics, Volta´s 
discovery of the electric cell, and Planck´s black-body radiation research and quantum 
discontinuity. From these examples, Kuhn derived three characteristics of scientific 
revolutions. The first is holistic. According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution´s ¨central 
change cannot be experienced piecemeal …Instead, it involves some relatively sudden 
and unstructured transformation in which some part of the flux of experience sorts itself 
out differently and displays patterns that were not visible before.¨224 This implies that 
scientific revolutions are all-or-none events. The second characteristic of scientific 
revolutions is the manner referents change after a revolution. Kuhn argued that ¨the 
distinctive character of revolutionary change in language is that it alters not only the 
criteria by which terms attach to nature but also, massively, the set of objects or 
situations to which those terms attach.¨225  
The third feature involves ¨a central change of model, metaphor, or analogy—a change 
in one´s sense of what is similar to what, and of what is different.¨226 These three 
characteristics of the scientific revolutions signify that it is not just the knowledge of the 
world that changes after a revolution but also the knowledge of the words used in 
science. Kuhn summaries what I tend to call the quintessence of the scientific 
revolutions thus, 
 
The central characteristic of scientific revolutions is that they 
alter the knowledge of nature that is intrinsic to language itself 
and that is thus prior to anything quite describable as 
description or generalization, scientific or everyday …. Violation 
or distortion of a previously unproblematic scientific language is 
the touchstone for revolutionary change.227 
 
Finally, the advancement of the scientific knowledge through revolutions does not 
reflect a decline or rise in standards of science. Rather, it reflects the changes which are 
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necessitated by the paradigm shifts. Hence, Kuhn illustrated that since a paradigm shift 
means complete abandonment of an earlier paradigm, and there is no common standard 
to judge scientific theories developed under different paradigms, there can be no sense 
in which theories developed after a scientific revolution can be said to add cumulatively 
to what was known before the revolution. Only within the context of a paradigm can we 
speak of one theory being true or false. 
 
 
2.13 KUHN AND SHAPIN THESES IN CLOSE PERSPECTIVE 
Both concepts seem to have been deeply structured with reliance on some sticky issues 
already illustrated in previous historiographies of science, even though they strived to 
present their own unique account of the Scientific Revolution. It is quite remarkable 
how both concepts sought to make precise analysis or resolution to the different striking 
issues demonstrated in the new historiography of science. These new historiographies 
sought to address certain irreconcilable issues inherit in the ´Great Tradition of the 
historiography of the Scientific Revolution228 which chronicles the developmental lines 
for the sciences as ¨successive increments¨.229 Thomas Kuhn’s ´The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions´ and Steven Shapin´s ´Scientific Revolution´ followed the tune of 
the new historiography. This explains why both books commenced with references to 
names like Alexandre Koyré, and Herbert Butterfield. Kuhn mentioned Koyré´s name, 
in particular, and goes on to say that 
Seen through the work that result, works perhaps best 
exemplified in the writings of Alexandre Koyré, science does not 
seem altogether the same enterprise as the one discussed by 
writers in the older historiographic tradition. By implication, at 
least, these historical studies suggest the possibility of a new 
image of science. This essay aims to delineate that image by 
making explicit some of the new historiography’s implications.230 
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 It implies that new historiographies sought to demonstrate that the concept of 
´development-by-accumulation´231 assign to the scientific advancement by the older 
historiographical tradition has proved very problematic in achieving its functions. 
Hence, the new historiographies had sought to demonstrate explicit failures of the older 
tradition by attempting to display the historical integrity of that science (early modern 
science) in its own time. Issues that are discussed boarders on the impact of humanism, 
Aristotelianism, Hermeticism and Neo-Platonism; the influence of Old magic and 
Alchemy, debates on rationality of early modern science, continuity with the medieval 
past, mathematization and mechanism; unrest in European culture and institutions, etc 
Shapin comments, 
As our understanding of science in the seventeenth century has 
changed in recent years, so historians have become increasingly 
uneasy with the very idea of ¨Scientific Revolution.¨ Even the 
legitimacy of each word making up that phrase has been 
individually contested. Many historians are now no longer 
satisfied that there was any singular and discrete event, 
localized in time and space that can be pointed to as ¨the¨ 
Scientific Revolution. Such historians now reject even the notion 
that there was any single coherent cultural entity called 
¨science¨ in the seventeenth century to undergo revolutionary 
change.232 
The above citations show that both concepts were guided by the view that the reality of 
the Scientific Revolution was meditated by social circumstances, and the body of 
knowledge that proceeded from it has imprints of the some sociological factors that 
surrounded its participants. 
In order to understand the underlying factors surrounding varying views in these two 
concepts it is necessary to resort to our earlier clarifications in section 1.2 between the 
terms ´Scientific Revolutions´ and the Scientific Revolution. ´Scientific Revolutions´ is 
a generic term. It stands for a philosophical idea about the on-going process of the 
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scientific enterprise. It implies the idea that scientific discovery usually proceeds in a 
very radical way that is somewhat frequent. This view demonstrates that the advances in 
sciences take place in leap, and are not just small incremental additions. The term 
´Scientific Revolution´ is a bit specific. It stands for a historical idea about one 
significant episode in the past of science, particularly the 17th century.  
Shapin´s view is more in line with the description of the second term, and this shows 
why he wrote more as a historically-minded sociologist. Thus, he tends to demonstrate 
the nature of the scientific knowledge as both historically situated and a process which 
is socially driven. For Kuhn, Scientific Revolution did not occur once and for all, in the 
seventeenth centuries. It is an essential phase of science, which also aids its progress. 
Hence, Kuhn’s view is mostly demonstrated in line with the first term. As such, he was 
more focused on underscoring the predominant factors responsible for why scientist that 
worked together, and were totally commitment to common belief at one point, get to 
differ at another. 
Most importantly, both theses of the scientific revolution have their points of 
convergence and divergence on issues of the objectivity of the scientific truth, 
impartiality of scientific judgement and the issue of method upon which the rationality 
of Scientific Revolution is contested. 
 
 
2.13.1 SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY 
 
The image of science as objective has a lot to do with our society’s general high regard 
for science as an institution and for scientific method as a way of knowing. 
Traditionally, science is thought to provide views of the world that are objective in at 
least two different sense of the term. In one sense, objectivity is bound up in questions 
about the truth and referential character of scientific theories. In this sense, the claim of 
objectivity of science demonstrates that the account of the world as provided is an 
accurate description of the objects in the world and the relations among them as they 
really are. In the second sense, objectivity has to do with modes of inquiry. The claim of 
objectivity in this sense demonstrates that the account of the world provided by science 
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was arrived at by methods that rely on non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for 
developing, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make up that view. 
Shapin emphasized that the claim of objectivity in science in the second sense is 
illogical due to the impropriety of treating ideas as if they floated freely in conceptual 
space.233 The objectivity of the first sense is also contested. He illustrated that the 
science practitioner of the early modern period constructed such claim because they 
believed to have achieved relative confidence in their accounts of what the real 
underlying structure of the natural world was like.234 But then, the mechanically 
explanation that was used to denigrate the Aristotle ´animistic´ physics, absolutely, 
failed in its function to give logical match between how the world was and how we 
experienced it.235 In fact, the idea of science as an entity that emerges outside cultural 
and social context cannot be plausible since the ´Scientific Revolution´ is never a 
history of free-floating concepts. Besides, the relations between the scientific changes of 
the seventeenth century and changes in religious, political, and economic patterns are 
nonnegotiable. As such, the claim for the pure pursuit of objective truth of science by 
disinterested human beings cannot be true. 
For Kuhn, the claim of objectivity in science does not do justice to the intricate 
dynamism inherent in the nature and unique advancement of science. The issue of 
arbitrariness, compounded of personal and historical accident cannot be wholly ruled 
out of science. He states, 
 
An apparently arbitrary element, compounded of personal and 
historical accident, is always a formative ingredient of the 
beliefs espoused by a given scientific community at a given 
time.236 
 
This implies that the processes by which theories are tested, justified, or judged involves 
critical and complex situation which are often rectified, only, by the arbitrary elements 
of participating members. And so, the objectivity of the scientific truth which ensues 
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from this exercise cannot be true in the ´objective sense´. He had enumerated five 
characters of a good theory to include, Consistency, Accuracy, Scope, Simplicity, and 
Fruitfulness. However, he maintained that they are insufficient to determine the 
decisions of individual scientists.237 Hence, scientific truth is objective to the extent that 
arguments are based on the objectivity or rationality of shared values applied by 
proponents of rival paradigms at the time of theory choice. 
 
The views of Kuhn and Shapin seem to illustrate, using David Bloor´s words, ´that 
scientific knowledge is whatever scientists take to be knowledge.´238 They demonstrate 
that knowledge of natural reality is mediated by social circumstance, and this mediation 
requires empirical investigation. However, both of them were not intending to return to 
the absolute scepticism of David Hume. Neither are they trying to favour a kind of truth 
relativism. They sought to address some truth-questions of scientific advancement by 
focusing on the social relations. Nevertheless, the most confusing issue of Kuhn’s view 
on objectivity is his insistence that the shared values such as accuracy, scope, etc are 
fixed and permanent features of science, while at the same time maintaining that these 
values can never determine the outcome of scientific revolutions. It implies that the 
epistemic values of science cannot be given any rational justification. In other words, he 
denies any objective progress of science. Science, he maintains, never progressed by 
virtue of some shared and binding algorithm of choice. Probably, the problem of 
induction could have been solved if there had been any philosophical justification for 
the epistemic values of science. Therefore, as long as science has not produced an 
algorithm able to dictate rational, unanimous choice, scientists would have no 
alternative but to supply subjectively what the best current list of objective criteria still 
lacked.  
 
 
2.13.2 THE PROBLEM OF METHOD 
 
The problem of method has been at the heart of the controversy of what determines a 
genuine science. Also, it has been the determining factor to the different dimensions of 
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progress made in science. The problem of method received adequate analysis in Paul 
Feyerabend´s ´Against Method´ (1975) in which he illustrated science as an essentially 
anarchistic enterprise. However, he maintained that it is such anarchism that is more 
likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives.  
Shapin argued that the seventeenth century witnessed the most turbulent quest for a 
coherent, universal, and efficacious set of procedures for making scientific knowledge 
than any other period in history science. And so, it is quite ridiculous to situate the 
origin of the scientific method in this period, and to refer to the changes wrought in 
those scientific beliefs and practices as ´revolutionary´. For Shapin, the goal of every 
scientist is to produce and extend true, or probably true, knowledge. Of course, both the 
natural and mechanical philosophers had, implicitly or explicitly desired to produce and 
extend such knowledge. Thus, it sounds unreasonable to differentiate or place the 
superiority of the one over another on the basis of intelligibility or accuracy. 
Like Shapin, Kuhn reinstated that the scientific advancement does not reflect any 
upgrade of scientific method. The Aristotelian dynamics is no less scientific nor more 
the product of human idiosyncrasy than its Newtonian counterpart. Out-of-date theories 
are not in principle unscientific because they have been discarded.239 Consequently, 
what differentiated various schools was not one or another failure of method—they 
were all ¨scientific¨—but because of their incommensurable ways of seeing the world 
and of practicing science. This is because the meaning variance which inevitably occurs 
wherever two theories differ makes it impossible that any valid logical comparison can 
be made between them. As such, the reductionist model whereby old theory is logically 
derivable from the theory that replaced it cannot depict the true nature of science. It 
means that each method is correct inasmuch as it satisfy the specific field to which it is 
deployed. 
However, as Shapin tried to use the discussion on method to soft peddle the noise about 
the radical nature of the changes on the scientific knowledge of the seventeenth century, 
Kuhn illustrated that therein lies the essence of the scientific revolution. For Kuhn, the 
radical nature of the transition from one paradigm to another lies on the fact that the 
scientist resumes his work in a totally different way and with totally new method. 
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Therefore, the advancement of the scientific knowledge through revolutions does not 
reflect a decline or rise in standards of science. Rather, it reflects the changes which are 
made necessary by the paradigm shifts. 
 
2.13.3 IMPARTIALITY OF SCIENTIFIC JUDGEMENT 
Both Shapin and Kuhn emphasized that the judgement or postulation about scientific 
facts or theories without the interference of the cultural, social or economic interests of 
the context within which an individual scientist works is quite misleading. Kuhn stated 
that such view emanated from the model which seeks to express an analogy between 
scientific theory and pure mathematical system. This is a model that has its origin in the 
twentieth-century philosophy of science. He maintained that since there is no set of 
universal rules for choosing between rival theories, cognitive values that determine the 
choice of a particular theory are ultimately a matter of subjective preference that 
transcends rationality.240 Hence, this explains why non rational psychological and social 
factors must play a vital role in determining which theory wins the allegiance of the 
community. 
For Shapin, the permanent crisis of European institutions during the early modern 
period affected attitudes toward knowledge in general, and it affected attitudes to natural 
knowledge most specially. The development of the modern scientific worldview is a 
historically situated process that has strong link to the shifts in culture and society 
which took place in response to changing intellectual agendas, political commitments, 
and religious beliefs. Likewise, the continuity of the modern science from its medieval 
past cannot be denied. Even Kuhn illustrated that men like Galileo and Descartes, who 
laid the foundation for seventeenth-century mechanics, were raised within the 
Aristotelian scientific tradition, and it made essential contributions to their 
achievement.241 Moreover, Shapin demonstrated that the ancient past was not 
transformed into the ¨modern world¨ at any single moment.242 The upheaval at the early 
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modern science was just a continuation of the medieval recipe of the ancient natural 
philosophy.  
The implication of Shapin and Kuhn views on impartiality is that scientific knowledge 
should not be treated as true and justified belief. One should rather treat knowledge as a 
´natural phenomenon´ which enjoys a special authority in society. The danger in this 
perspective is that it makes scientific knowledge a mere construction of the scientists. 
As such, it implies that knowledge is ´whatever people take to be knowledge´.243 
 
Consequently, this might lead to a situation whereby what we study are mere 
idiosyncratic beliefs of individuals and not the objective truth of natural realities. In that 
case, the aim of science must have been defeated. On the contrary, Kuhn illustrated that 
the element of arbitrariness which play role in theory choice does not, however, indicate 
that any scientific group could practice its trade without some set of ´objective´ shared 
criteria of choice. Hence, he does not undermine the objectivity of science; rather, he 
seeks to demonstrate the imports of psychology, sociology and history on science. 
 Niiniluoto commented thus, 
The acceptance of scientific evidence and the link between 
scientific evidence and conclusions depend on the standards of 
scientific inference and method adopted in the relevant scientific 
community—and such standards have varied in the history of 
science. But …this partial influence of social factors does not 
imply that scientific practice is not generally reliable for 
generating true or truthlike theories.244 
Therefore, the illustrations that both concepts made on impartiality is that the findings 
of the scientist about nature have strong ties to his standing in the cultural and political 
milieu of which he is a part. And so, impartiality cannot be totally ruled out of science, 
although what distinguishes different scientific epochs is the type of method that is 
accepted and used at a particular time. 
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2.13.4 POINTS OF SIMILITUDE AND DIVERGENCE 
 
Although Shapin rejected the reality of such thing as the scientific revolution, his 
analysis of the advancements in science does not draw any overt conflict with Kuhn’s 
description of the structure of the scientific revolutions. Kuhn was rather concentrated 
on giving a description of what goes on in the sciences at times of theory choice and 
Shapin was interested in showing that the progress from the medieval to the modern 
science did not follow any ´logically supreme model´.  In fact, it is obvious that both 
concepts, like the other historicist accounts, were deployed as ways of restructuring the 
overt misconceptions of the nature of scientific advancement developed against the 
backdrop of logical positivism and logical empiricism. 
 
Both differed in their approach to analyzing the scientific revolutions, but the truth is 
that they were together on the recognition that there were great transformations in 
science during the early modern period. Therefore, it shows that they approved the fact 
that there are peculiar characteristics which distinguished this period from all others. 
Most importantly, their reliance on the ideas of some previous historicist accounts of the 
scientific revolution helped to give shape to their unique ways of presenting their 
respective views 
 
Moreover, both of them recognized scientific revolutions as those profound scientific 
researches that resulted to great transformations in science. But then, Kuhn reiterated 
that neither science nor the development of knowledge is likely to be understood if 
research is viewed exclusively through the revolutions it occasionally produces. This is 
because scientific revolutions do not capture the whole story of what normal scientific 
practices means. 
Finally, both concepts tried to create a balance between the sociologists and rationalists 
view of scientific revolution by illustrating that the rational justifications of the 
scientific knowledge should be contextually situated. The reason is that there is a social 
dimension in cognitive processes. It explains why Shapin contested that the preference 
of mechanism to naturalism on the basis of unintelligibility and inaccuracy is illogical; 
while Kuhn maintained that the shift from one paradigm to another does not imply a 
decline or rise in standards of science.  
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2.14 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Various philosophers and historians of the Scientific Revolution have divergent opinions 
on the scope of its subjects, methodology, duration and even the nature of its 
fundamental aim. The only unifying feature that stands out in virtually all of their 
accounts is the new image of science that resulted from the activity of the scientific 
revolution. This science has displaced the earth from the centre of the universe and 
made of the universe a gigantic machine quite independent of human feelings and 
needs. Some of the accounts showed it overthrew the Aristotelian natural philosophy of 
scholasticism, substituting a search for precise mathematical regularities confirmable by 
experiment. In fact, the Scientific Revolution created modern consciousness and its 
science. In Hermeticism, Rationality, and the Scientific Revolution (1975)245, Rossi 
argued that it substituted a new view of the universe as a machine for the older Greek 
and Roman views of the universe as divine being or readable book. It also proposed that 
people could improve their lot by the application of reason and experiment rather than 
by prayer and devotion.  
 
As in all other history writing disciplines one could see that the major tension that has 
generated the differences in this historiography has mainly been between the reasons 
and causes of the Scientific Revolution. This tension arises between the rational and 
causal accounts of the event due to the controversy on how much explanatory force to 
attribute to each. Such tension has led us to see how Duhem maintained that the cause 
of the event has to be identified in the prior scientific events proceeding from the 
medieval period. The argument of the continuity thesis as discussed in the section 2.3.1 
illustrates that the casual considerations possesses more explanatory force to 
demonstrate the continuous development of the Galilean dynamics from the medieval 
dynamics. This type of argument seem to have offered insight to why Steven Shapin 
(section 2.11) made an outright negation that there was no such thing as the Scientific 
Revolution.246 He implied that since there was continuous progress of the seventeenth-
century science from its medieval past it is, therefore, irrational to talk of a revolution in 
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the science of that period. However, the revolutionists (see sections 2.2.1, 2.5.1, 2.6.1, 
and 2.12) showed that the seventeenth-century science had significant changes 
compared to the medieval and ancient science. The science of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century was totally different from its predecessors in method, scope and 
structure. 
 
The account of the scientific progress presented by Kuhn and Koyré suggests a new 
image of science that is dynamic. Science does not progress cumulatively as argued in 
the traditional account whereby it proceeds from experimental facts to theories. This 
positivist notion implies that science discovers given phenomena, the relations between 
them and certain laws that would help to describe or predict them. Hence, the 
accumulation of the experimental facts brings science closer at each stage to the 
objective truth of the realities in the world. However, arguments from the defenders of 
the historical knowledge of science show that the purported experiments are usually 
based on complicated premises, and they tend to prove the outlook behind these 
premises, rather than any real truth. Kuhn argued that, ¨…scientific research is 
inherently circular, that it does not proceed from experimental facts to theories, but that 
facts and theories are provided together, in more or less inchoate form, by scientific 
orientations¨.247 He went further to state that, hence, science progress ¨by a series of 
circular attempts to apply different orientations or points of view to the natural 
world.¨248 One of Kuhn´s innovations was to stress the social nature of science. Science 
is practised by community of scientists, not by isolated men and women. Hence, in 
order to understand working science one must understand the scientific community and 
its shared norms, which together constitute normal science.  
 
The principal implication in the analytical study of the scientific revolution as a 
historiographical concept is that it makes science to be understood within the 
framework of a larger conception of how things in the universe cohere. If science is to 
be pursued in its own right as the traditional accounts of the scientific revolution 
portend, science is unlikely to survive indefinitely. This is because the basis of its 
                                                 
247 Thomas Kuhn, MIT MC240, box 3, folder 11, ¨Evidence and explanation¨, p. 16;  ¨MIT MC 240¨ 
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pursuits provided within a particular age tends to be minute and unstable. As a 
historiographical concept science is better understood in the context of the bigger 
picture that prompts, nurtures, and sustains its progress. Consequently the analysis of 
the Scientific Revolution as a historiographical concept yielded to the historical 
epistemology of scientific knowledge. Even though, etymologically, science was taken 
to have the same meaning as epistemology, the image of science presented in the 
traditional account of the Scientific Revolution presents science as being couched in the 
epistemology of radical empiricism—the theory that all knowledge is derived from the 
senses. However, the historicist historiography questions and, in most cases, rejects  
radical empiricism as the epistemological nucleus of  science thereby highlighting the 
relevance of the wider framework in which scientific activities take place. Science is 
fundamentally recognized as a human activity and the context of its progress is made to 
incorporate the broader conception of the cosmos which prompted it in the first place.  
 
This new image of science created in the new historiography of science refutes the old 
image of science that was accepted in the old philosophy of science chiefly in the guise 
of coarse Positivism cum Logical Empiricism and to some extent the Popper´s 
Falsificationism.  When tested against the historical record, the image of science in the 
old philosophy of science, which stems from textbooks and the old history of science 
(mere chronology of scientific data), is wholly falsified. The result from such 
juxtaposition shows a science in which theories are fitted to facts and not vice versa. 
Science becomes an activity of groups rather than achievement of solitary individuals. 
In its resort to historical sources, the new historiography seeks to establish a larger 
platform for the context of discovery. This larger platform included attention to the 
dynamics of the scientific process as much as to the logic of results, concern with the 
semantics as well as the syntactics of scientific utterances, and recognition that there are 
definite limits to what can be reconstructed logically in terms of rules and criteria.  
 
Therefore, the nature of the scientific development that emerges is one that is both 
continuously cumulative as well as revolutionary. Such model of scientific development 
supersedes the ´naive cumulative´ model presented in Logical Empiricism and the 
´wanton revolutionary´ model argued in Falsificationism. I call it wanton revolutionary 
model because the falsification theory of the scientific development focuses solely on 
the occasional moments of the scientific progress rather than the usual manner in which 
124 
 
 
science is done outside such periods. The new historiography of science, however, 
reiterates the historical insight that science is not a process of discovering an objective 
mirror of nature, but of elaborating subjective paradigms subject to empirical 
constraints. It therefore elaborates a new image of science which approves of the fact 
that basic assumptions shape scientific progress. It is not surprising though why most 
historians and philosophers of science that emphasized the historical nature of the 
scientific revolution have become more influential than scientists themselves in shaping 
notions of science´s method and process.249 
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SECTION II 
 
SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS AND PROGRESS:  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.1 ´SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION´ AND THE TRADITIONAL CLAIMS OF          
SCIENCE 
 
The philosophical developments in the historiographical revolution treated in the 
previous chapter are largely intricate reactions to the traditional claims of science. 
Koyre´s illustrations, in the Etudes Galiléennes (Galileo Studies) on Galileo 
achievements, were to show that science does not necessarily prove natural truths 
through experiments (Section 2.2). The development of scientific truth is not the driving 
force that motivates scientific advancement. Besides, truth and falsity are irrelevant to 
solving empirical problems in science.250 The scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century was basically profound changes in the very framework and patterns of thinking 
of that era. This perspective does not entail outright denial of truth-seeking activity in 
science. For instance, nobody doubts the reality of the motion of fall. It rather questions 
the justification of scientific truth in relation to scientific progress—does the way in 
which science has advanced justify the authority of its truths?  
 
Francis Yates, Steven Shapin and Thomas Kuhn questioned the nature of scientific 
rationality and in what ways it determined the scientific progress of the early modern 
science. However, Rupert Hall reiterated that the very defining character of the 
seventeenth century science was its organized and rational response to the ever-present 
challenges of nature (Section 2.6.1). The scientific tradition of that period set the 
demarcation between science and pseudo-science. The fields of mysticism, magic and 
superstition are, thus, not fit to be counted as areas of scientific knowledge. What Hall´s 
failed to tell us is on which platform the standard of rationality he meant was 
                                                 
250 Larry Laudan discussed the irrelevance of truth and the falsity to solving a problem. See Larry Laudan, 
Progress and its Problems. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) p. 24 
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established. Was the standard of rationality based on or just same thing as the 
mathematical interpretation of reality expounded in the works of such achievers like 
Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and Huygens? He had posited these men as having 
consciously established the new beginnings of an exact science from the ´irrational´ way 
of those of the past. However, mathematical interpretation of reality alone cannot 
account for all the intricate concepts and beliefs that determined the change of attitude 
to nature in the early modern period. Hall agreed with this when he noted that 
¨mathematical science could not explain things by revealing the structure of reality and 
its inner logic, it could only give the possibility of predicting future results from stated 
antecedents.251 
 
To understand how science works and the character of its progress a larger framework 
of beliefs, other than mathematical realism could guarantee, was required. Mathematical 
realism entails the belief that numbers exist as objects, and it assumes mathematical 
knowledge to be on a par with that of logic.  The ontological claim that runs through 
mathematical realism is that numbers are abstract object associated with certain 
concepts. However, mathematical objects are usually thought as abstract objects that are 
non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. It is therefore difficult to understand how we can 
have knowledge of them.252 This shows that mere identification of rationality with 
mathematical interpretation of reality is implausible, besides it excludes the other basic 
principles, like mechanism and experimentation, which also determined the unique and 
differentiating character of the seventeenth century science from its predecessors. Hall´s 
description of scientific revolution as mainstream of rational scientific development 
largely shows the predominant tendency of mingling the question of scientific 
rationality with the issue of its progress.     
 
Larry Laudan (1977) had illustrated that ¨for a long time, many have taken the 
rationality and progressiveness of science as an obvious fact or a foregone 
conclusion.¨253 Such presumption emanated from the outright recognition of the 
                                                 
251 A. Rupert Hall, The Revolution in Science 1500-1750, p. 11 
252 See Gottlob Frege (1959) Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, translated by J L Austin as The 
Foundations of Arithmetic (Oxford: Blackwell); Michael Dummett, Frege Philosophy of Mathematics. 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1991) 
253 Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems, p. 2 
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traditional scientific claims such as rationality, truth, objectivity, and realism as binding 
on science. And it could be traced to the intertwinement of the scientific progress with 
scientific rationality in the falsificationism of Karl Popper and also inductive logic of 
Rudolf Carnap.  
 
Inductive logic set out to define the probabilities of different theories according to the 
available total evidence. It means that if the mathematical probability of a theory is 
high, it qualifies as scientific; if it is low or even zero, it is not scientific.254 Carnap´s 
work on probability and inductive logic were connected with the liberation of 
empiricism as a part of which he abandoned the verification principle. The idea was to 
replace the black-and-white notion of verifiability with more subtle tones of 
confirmability. Carnap sought a notion of probability suitable for this purpose, the 
frequency notion of probability not being thought suitable. He called the new kind of 
probability logical or inductive probability. Such kind of probability is used in giving an 
exact numerical value for the degree of confirmation which bodies of evidence confer 
upon scientific hypotheses. ¨Inductive logic¨, by which Carnap means any system of 
inference in which conclusions do not hold with deductive necessity, is essentially the 
rules whereby these logical or inductive probabilities are assigned to conclusions. 
Carnap´s Inductive logic eschews the ´either or´ distinctions between science and 
pseudoscience by providing a continuous scale from poor theories with low probability 
to good theories with high probability. Bringing the lessons of Carnap´s inductive logic 
into the question of the scientific progress will demonstrate that science progress when 
good theories replace poor theories as they are by all indications the more rational, true 
and objective ones. 
 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), Popper argues, on the contrary, that the 
mathematical probability of all theories, scientific or pseudoscientific, given any 
amount of evidence is zero.255 However, a theory is ´scientific´ if it designates in 
advance a crucial experiment (or observation) which can falsify it, and it is 
                                                 
254 Imre Lakatos, ¨Science and Pseudoscience¨, in Philosophy   of Science, Curd, M & Cover, J. A eds., 
(New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998) p.22 
255 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 374-78. This claim 
is elaborated in the Appendix vii. This book was first published as Logik der Forschung  in 1934, and the 
first English translation was published in 1959 by Hutchinson & Co. 
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pseudoscientific if it does not specify such a ´potential falsifier´. As Popper puts it, ¨the 
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or 
testability¨.256 Invariably, genuinely progressive theories are those which have the 
capacity to explain and predict a larger range of facts than their rival, and scientific 
progress can occur only when one testable theory succeeds another. Larry Laudan 
summaries this positivist view this way, 
 
A science progresses just to the extent that later 
theories in a domain can predict and explain more 
phenomena than their predecessors did. Since the 
seventeenth century, the sciences—at least the 
natural sciences—have done just that.257 
 
The prospective explanatory and predictive range of a theory determines its 
progressiveness. By discarding all the discredited lawlike statements associated with the 
earlier theory and correctly predicting those unexplained and unpredicted phenomena 
which its predecessor did not embrace a good scientific theory facilitates genuine 
progress in science.   
 
In very obvious way, the theories of confirmationism and falsificationism illustrate the 
traditional scientific claims to include rationality, truth, objectivity and realism. In fact, 
these four claims define the unifying character of any genuine science. Let´s see how 
these claims have been traditionally defended in relation to scientific progress, and the 
responses from the historiographies of scientific revolution. 
 
 
3.2 SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
                                                                                                                                        
One of the important traditional trademarks that various theories of scientific 
advancement have bequeathed on our understanding of science has been the idea of 
rationality. Science has often been conflated with rationality. Rationality, customarily 
                                                 
256 Karl Popper, Science: Conjectures and Refutations, p.7 
257 Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism, p. 3 
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defined as giving reasons for actions or for holding beliefs, is truly the sophist servant 
of desire. Rationality comes closer to being scientific when the desire is to aim at 
objective truth. In philosophy of science, questions about what would constitute 
scientific rationality, are usually discussed in the context of theory choice. Scientific 
rationality is normally treated in such questions as ¨What are the appropriate standards 
for evaluating scientific theories, and how do scientists adopt them¨? However, 
scientific reasoning is not just about theory choice since there are other kinds of 
scientific reasoning like analysis of experimental data. Besides, reasoning in science is 
sometimes practical as in the scientists´ decision on what research programs to pursue 
and what experiments to perform. 
 
Conflation of rationality with scientific progress finds its justification by the belief that 
the epistemic goal of science (truth) is chiefly determinant in the process of theory 
choice. The epistemic goal defines the normative standards by which a scientist´s 
practice conforms to scientific rationality. Hence, the traditional question of rationality 
in science involves, ´what is the nature of reasoning by which individual scientists 
accept and reject conflicting hypotheses´? But then, Scientific rationality not only 
involves individuals, it also involves groups, for we can as well ask whether scientific 
communities are rational in their collective pursuit of the aims of science. However, 
most relativists like Kuhn and Feyerabend raise serious doubts as to whether scientists 
are in fact rational, that is, whether they conform to normative standards of individual 
and group rationality. 
 
The two dominant theories of scientific rationality, confirmationism and falsificationism 
mainly illustrate that rationality is a rule-governed process, and that scientific progress 
is cumulative. However, relatively few theorists have offered theories according to 
which data drawn from the history of science somehow constitute or are evidential for 
the concept of rationality. Such theories are known as historicist theories of scientific 
rationality. The major difference between the two traditional theories and the historicist 
theories is that the former view scientific rationality as unchangeable over time, while 
the latter see scientific rationality to be changing over time. This difference gives clue to 
the divergent notions of cumulativity and the revolutionary progress of science by the 
two groups respectively.  The immutability of scientific rationality will be discussed 
under the notion of formal rationality, and then its mutability as informal rationality.  
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3.2.1 FORMAL RATIONALITY 
                                                                                                                            
Proponents of formal rationality as represented in logical positivism and critical 
rationalism view scientific rationality as immutable, meaning that it does not change 
over time. This immutability is very implicit in all genuine science through different 
periods of its development. The two main theories that expound this view of scientific 
rationality are confirmationism and falsificationism. Confirmationism drives from 
Rudolf Carnap´s discussion on Inductive Logic. According to this view, scientists 
should accept theories that are probably true, given the evidence. However, Popper 
maintained with his critical rationalism that we do not use evidence to prove theories. 
We use it to criticise theories. Likewise, we decide what evidence to acquire by looking 
at our best theories and what evidence would allow us to say that a particular event is 
explained by one theory but not another. Critical rationalism, therefore, illustrates that 
scientific theories, and any other claims to knowledge, can and should be rationally 
criticized, and (if they have empirical content) can and should be subjected to tests 
which may refute them. In other words, Popper´s theory of scientific rationality has its 
foundation in critical rationalism. Falsificationism shows that scientist should reject 
theories that make false predictions about observable and replace them with theories 
that conform to all available evidence. 
  
The two theories mentioned above are regarded as standard conception of scientific 
rationality. They will be briefly discussed to show how they have sought to account for 
scientific progress. The discussion will enable us to see in what ways the 
historiographies of scientific revolution have truly brought transformation to our 
understanding of science and how they have impacted greatly on the evolution of the 
trends in Philosophy of Science.  
 
 
3.2.1.1 CONFIRMATIONISM 
 
In the Logical Foundations of Probability (1950) Carnap Rudolf rejects a statistical 
frequency basis for probability in favour of a logical relation between two statements or 
propositions. Its central tenets are that all inductive inference is probabilistic, that the 
required concept of probability derives from logical relations between evidence and 
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hypotheses, and that inductive inferences are therefore analytic. Probability "is the 
degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given 
evidence (or premises)."258 Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic 
are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and 
semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic 
procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures 
are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements. 
 
The probability of a statement is the degree of confirmation the empirical evidence 
gives to the statement. For example, the statement “the score is five” receives a partial 
confirmation by the evidence; its degree of confirmation is one sixth. Carnap devoted 
himself to giving an account of the probability as a degree of confirmation. The 
philosophically most significant consequences of his research arise from his assertion 
that the probability of a statement, with respect to a given body of evidence, is a logical 
relation between the statement and the evidence. Thus it is necessary to build an 
inductive logic; that is, a logic which studies the logical relations between statements 
and evidence. Inductive logic would give us a mathematical method of evaluating the 
reliability of a hypothesis. In this way inductive logic would answer the problem raised 
by David Hume’s analysis of induction. Of course, we cannot be sure that a hypothesis 
is true; but we can evaluate its degree of confirmation and we can thus compare 
alternative theories. 
 
In spite of the abundance of logical and mathematical methods Carnap used in his own 
research on the inductive logic, he was not able to formulate a theory of the inductive 
confirmation of scientific laws. In fact, in Carnap’s inductive logic, the degree of 
confirmation of every universal law is always zero. However, Carnap tried to employ 
the physical-mathematical theory of thermodynamic entropy to develop a 
comprehensive theory of inductive logic, but his plan never progressed beyond an 
outline stage. His works on entropy were published posthumously. 
 
                                                 
258 Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1962[1950]), p. v; See also Rudolf Carnap, ¨On inductive Logic¨, Philosophy of Science,1945, 12(2) p. 72 
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The confirmationist account of scientific progress implies that scientists are 
´confirmation agents´ that operate roughly as follows. Scientists start with hypotheses 
that they use to make predictions about observable phenomena. If experiments or other 
observations show that the predictions are true, then the hypotheses are said to be 
confirmed. A hypothesis that has received substantial empirical confirmation can be 
accepted as true, or at least as empirically adequate.259 
 
  
3.2.1.2 FALSIFICATIONISM 
 
The term ¨falsifiable¨ does not mean something is made false, but rather that, if it is 
false, it can be shown by observation or experiment. Falsificationism is a rival account 
of the processes involved in scientific research as earlier demonstrated by inductivism. 
Inductivism holds that science proceeds from observation to theory, beginning with 
observations derived from experiments, and extrapolating from these to general laws. 
Falsificationism suggests that science proceeds in the opposite direction, beginning with 
scientific theories or ¨conjectures¨, and then conducting experiments and eliminating 
those theories that are falsified by results. Invariably, scientific progress results from the 
continued cycles of conjectures and refutations.  
 
Falsificationism exploits an important logical point: falsifying instances are more 
significant than confirming instances. If we have a general law, and conduct an 
experiment that confirms it, then we still do not know whether the law is true. It remains 
a live option, but nothing more. If, on the other hand, our experiment contradicts the 
theory, then we have discovered that the theory is false. Unexpected experimental 
results are far more significant than expected results. Falsificationism, thus, rejects the 
logical positivist demarcation criterion of verifiability (or confirmability) by 
demonstrating that empirical theories cannot be verified but falsified. In The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, Popper argued that scientists should not aim for confirmation, but 
should operate as the following sort of falsification agents. Scientist use hypotheses to 
                                                 
259 See Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of scientific explanation (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Hempel, C. 
G., “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.” Mind, 54, 1945; See also Franz Huber, ¨Hempel´s Logic of 
Confirmation¨, in Philosophical Studies, 2008, 139: 181-189, for analysis of Hempel´s conditions of 
adequacy for any relation of confirmation 
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make predictions, but their primary aim should be to find evidence that contradicts the 
predicted results, leading to the rejection of hypotheses rather than their acceptance.  
 
For a theory to be considered falsifiable or empirical it must divide ¨the class of all 
possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty 
subclasses.¨260 These two classes are: 1) the class containing all the basic statements that 
are inconsistent with the theory (or which it rules out, or prohibits) and 2) the class 
containing all the basic statements allowed or permitted by the theory. The former class 
is the important one for falsificationism and is dubbed the class of ¨potential falsifiers¨ 
by Popper. Thus, the class of potential falsifiers must not be empty if a theory is to be 
falsifiable.261 In addition to being falsifiable; a scientific or empirical theory must be 
consistent, since from any inconsistent system all possible statements may be derived. 
Hence, he wrote that ¨agreement upon the acceptance or rejection of basic statements is 
reached, as a rule, on the occasion of applying a theory; the agreement, in fact, is part of 
an application which puts the theory to the test.262 
 
Scientific progress, therefore, occurs when one testable theory succeeds another, and 
such theory is able to retain the successes of its predecessor and provided correction for 
its mistakes. In this way, falsificationism not only demonstrates the continuity within 
science it also demonstrates scientific rationality as the ´super-standard´ which 
demarcates genuine science from non-science and pseudo-science.  
 
Popper presents ´falsifiability´, and not verifiability (or confirmationism), as the 
distinguishing mark of scientific theories. He was apparently fond of referring to ´the 
soaring edifice of science´, an indication that scientific knowledge is cumulative.  
However, falsificationism has lots of inherent problems which provoke various 
philosophical questions demanding for clarification. For instance, assuming 
falsificationism is true, how can we rationally distinguish between a highly 
¨corroborated¨ theory and a new theory? Even if corroboration is different from 
confirmation in that it is only ¨backward-looking¨, how can it be rationally justified? 
                                                 
260 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 70, 96 
261 Ibid., p. 95 
262 Ibid., p. 88 
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Since the main motive of this work is not to discuss the intricate problems involved in 
the divergent views between falsificationism and confirmationism on the nature of 
scientific theories, It will not go into analysis of the debates that ensued from the 
deficiencies in both theories. Our interest in this part of the work is to understand the 
fundamental issues that spurred the various reactions in the historiographies of scientific 
revolution as regards the question of scientific rationality. The principal reaction to such 
question would be recapitulated as informal rationality. 
 
 
3.2.2 INFORMAL RATIONALITY 
 
Informal scientific rationality was clearly depicted in the works of those proponents of 
the revolutionary advancement of science, like Kuhn and Feyerabend. This view of 
scientific rationality claims that standards of rationality change over time. Such 
standards are mutable. They change with the change of scientific beliefs. In fact, no 
standard or method in science is insulated from the periodic changes that occur in 
science. Hence, it is not logical to accept the existence of super scientific standards 
which survive the revolutions in sciences, and consequently permit continuity within 
science. Neither are there such standards which demarcate genuine science from 
pseudo-science. Most critics of this view of scientific rationality have often tagged it as 
irrationalistic and predominately heretical conception of the scientific rationality.  
 
The most interesting thing about the informal scientific rationality is that it provides for 
methodological pluralism in science unlike the methodological monism that is implicit 
in formal scientific rationality. In order to understand this view of science rationality, 
one must also understand the distinction between methodology and meta-methodology. 
In the parlance of the history and philosophy of science, a methodology for scientific 
rationality is a theory of rationality: it tells us what is rational and what is not in specific 
cases. Thus, the rule ¨Always accept the theory with the greatest degree of 
confirmation¨ would count as (part of) a methodology. On the other hand, a meta-
methodology provides us with the standards by which we evaluate the theories of 
rationality that constitute our methodologies (be it falsifiability or confirmability). 
Informal scientific rationality is, primarily, defined by the meta-methodology. It accepts 
the claim that a good theory of rationality must fit the history of science.  Invariably, the 
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best theory of rationality is the one that maximizes the number of rational episodes in 
the history of science (subject to some filtering out of sociologically infected episodes). 
This tendency to define scientific rationality by appealing to history of science is 
generally denoted as historicism.  
 
 
3.2.2.1 HISTORICIST THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
 
Thomas Kuhn´s (1970) work effects three major great changes in the study of scientific 
rationality. First, it brought history to the fore. This is, in fact, the most important aspect 
of the transformation he brought, though following a path already established by 
Alexandre Koyré and Herbert Butterfield. The vital revelation of The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions is that a respectable theory of rational scientific procedure must 
conform to the greater part of actual scientific procedure. Unarguably, scientists do their 
work in the context of groups of various sizes, from the research teams in their own 
laboratories to community of scientists working on similar projects, and to the overall 
scientific community.  
 
Scientists operate within the context of a wider community with shared societies, 
journals, and conferences. Therefore the question of the rationality of science can be 
raised for groups as well as individuals: What is it for a group of scientists to be 
collectively rational, and are such groups generally rational? Second, instead of 
assuming that scientific theories were the units of rational evaluation, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions was based on a unit that could persist through minor theoretical 
changes. Hence, it could distinguish between revisions and wholesale rejection. Kuhn 
called this unit ¨the paradigm¨. This unit is subsequently identified as the research 
programme, the research, the global theoretical unit etc. as one could find in the 
historicist theories of scientific rationality by Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan. Third, the 
work highlighted the real problems that historically conscious accounts of rationality 
face: when all is said and done, there may be no trans-historical rule for rational 
scientific procedure. For Kuhn, scientific change—from one ´paradigm´ to another—is 
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a mystical conversion which is not and cannot be governed by rules of reason and which 
falls totally within the realm of the (social) psychology of discovery.263 
 
It is at this extreme that historicism most times descends into triviality, as the Marxist 
historiography of the scientific revolution has been accused of. In such situation 
scientific explanations are viewed as social events, speech acts, which take place in a 
certain social context. For instance the Hermeticist and Puritan reinterpretation of the 
scientific revolution tend to focus on the complex social interactions that inevitably 
surround and infuse the generation of scientific knowledge. Hence, ´instead of looking 
at scientific theories as abstract objects, historians examine how science changes, 
revealing the human dimension of science.´264 Steven Shapin wrote thus, 
 
If we want ultimately to understand the appeal of mechanical 
metaphors in the new scientific practices (referring to the 
science that ensued from the events of the scientific 
revolution)…we shall ultimately have to understand the power 
relations of an early modern European society whose patterns of 
living, producing, and political ordering were undergoing 
massive changes as feudalism gave way to early capitalism.265 
 
Traditionally, scientific rationality was structurally construed on appeal to mechanical 
metaphors in science. Such metaphors alludes that the physical realities contain ´matters 
of fact´ which exhibit some regularities that can be properly represented in theories. 
These theories represent the laws of nature derived from a number of facts. Nature was 
like a clock: man could be certain of its effects, of the hours shown by its hands; but the 
mechanism by which these effects were produced, the clock-work, might be various.266 
This type of scientific reasoning shows that theories are confronted with facts; and one 
of the central conditions of scientific reasoning is that theories must be supported by 
                                                 
263 Imre Lakatos, ¨Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,¨ in Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1970) p. 93 
264 Thomas Hardy Leahey, A History of Psychology, 6th ed.  (New Jersey: Pearson) 2004[1980], p. 14 
265 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, p. 33 
266 Steven Shapin, ¨¨Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle´s Literary Technology, ¨ in The Scientific 
Revolution. ed. Marcus Hellyer (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) p. 76 
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facts. However, any genuine scientist can easily demonstrate today that there can be no 
valid derivation of a law or nature from any finite number of facts. Isaac Newton 
claimed to have deduced his laws from the ´phenomena´ provided by Kepler. He even 
boasted not to be uttering mere hypotheses: ¨hypotheses non fingo¨ ( I feign no 
hypothese).267 He himself thought that he proved his laws from facts. But this was false, 
since according to Kepler, planets move in ellipses, but according to Newton´s theory, 
planets would move in ellipses only if the planets did not disturb each other in their 
motion. We know that planets do that. This is why Newton had to devise a perturbation 
theory from which it follows that no planet moves in an ellipse. 
 
History of science, therefore, shows that it is implausible to base the justification of 
scientific rationality on the mechanical metaphors. It means another platform for such 
justification has to be sought. But then, if scientific rationality does not derived from 
those mechanical metaphors it means that the structure of the early modern science was 
absolutely not different with its predecessor. In fact, it is one of the more profound 
ironies of the history of thought that the growth of mechanical science, through which 
arose the idea of mechanism as a possible philosophy of nature, was itself an outcome 
of the Renaissance magical tradition.268 
 
 
3.2.2.2 HISTORY AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY 
 
The major insight the theses of scientific revolution in the previous chapter proffer is 
that a comprehensive theory of scientific rationality is lacking in the traditional 
conception of scientific progress. Rationality itself has a history and it is constituted by 
that history. They imply that in our way up from the dark, from man´s first stumbling 
experiments with artefacts to its most sophisticated instruments of listening to the 
                                                 
267 The passage occurs in the final General Scholium of Newton´s Principia (1687). The English 
translation by Francis Motte (1729) states it thus, ¨Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the 
heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power…I have 
not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses 
[hypotheses non fingo]; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; 
and hypotheses whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no 
place in experimental philosophy¨. Culled from Toni Vogel Carey (2012) ¨Hypothese Non Fingo¨, in 
Philosophy Now, 20-23, p.20 
268 Francis Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2010[1972]), p.150 
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rumblings of remote galaxies, our species homo sapiens has reached out into its 
environment and moulded through its praxis the complex cognitive apparatus that many 
today take as given. But the unfolding of history at every stage entered into and 
decisively shaped the scientific and philosophical thought process itself. There are no 
non-contextual, ahistorical norms. Nor is there any need for any. There is no truth 
standing above history or beyond history. History is all there is. There is nothing in any 
of this that should undermine our confidence in scientific rationality. Quite the contrary! 
The fact that our canons of rationality are historically forged should not make us 
conclude that they are groundless, but should highlight for us how well grounded they 
actually are. This is for the reason that they represent the embodiment of centuries of 
striving, of trial and error, of continuous refinement of our cognitive apparatus. 
Definitely, scientific knowledge has its base in this process.  
 
Historicity does not imply irrationality, arbitrariness, groundlessness, discontinuity, 
incommensurability, deconstruction or hyper-reflexivity. It most certainly does not rule 
out differential assessment of conflicting claims to knowledge, of rival theories and 
paradigms. Rather it requires it. The historical process by which our embodied 
knowledge and our criteria for what is to count as knowledge have come to us has been 
one marked by constant differential assessment of alternatives and continual testing of 
alternative methods of differential assessment of alternatives. It is to the test of this 
embodied experience, socio-historically evolved, that we bring every new experience 
and move our own thinking and even the history of ideas onward. Generally, 
controversies on the nature of scientific rationality are motived by its implicit 
justification of scientific truth. 
 
 
3.3 SCIENTIFIC TRUTH 
 
The discussion in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2 shows how the traditional model of 
science tie the grounds for asserting the truth of a hypothesis to our observational 
experience. Such empirical nature of the ¨scientific method¨ informs their conviction 
that science gives us a true account of the universe. It exposes a simple-minded 
understanding of scientific methodology that is monistic. According to this 
methodology, a scientist develops a hypothesis by inductive inference from a number of 
139 
 
 
discrete observations or from inferences based on other ´true´ theories. Good scientific 
hypotheses entail particular observational consequences. Scientists confirm the truth or 
falsity of their theories by testing—looking for the occurrence of the predicted 
observational consequences. Theories should have evidence that supports them. But 
even if the evidence supports a theory today, tomorrow, new evidence may cause the 
theory to be revised just as it had been the case with Newton´s theories of mechanics 
and universal gravitation. For a couple of centuries all the evidence seemed to show 
Newton´s theories explained the universe precisely and were deemed ´true´. But in the 
late 19th century evidence started to accumulate that disturbed scientists. They were 
discovering phenomena Newton´s theory did not account for. It was in explaining how 
these new pieces of evidence, as well as other ideas, fit into a more comprehensive 
theory that Albert Einstein made his mark. And Newton´s theory which had appeared to 
be ´true´ for so long was finally shown to be ´untrue´. Eventually, Einstein´s theory 
became the new ´truth.´  
 
Obviously, there are problems with saying a scientific theory is a true theory, partly 
because we run into the problem of determining which theories are true, and deciding 
whether a term in a scientific theory actually refers to a target. Instead, science uses a 
range of representational vehicles, e.g. models of familiarity, like Bohr´s, and abstract 
mathematical models. In other words, it is not adequate to analyse scientific data using 
solely a linguistic medium.  
 
 
3.3.1 LINGUISTIC AMBIVALENCE 
 
Past scientific theories may appear false if we analyse scientific data linguistically to see 
if what is being described actually is connected to any physical reality. However, if we 
recast the superceded theory as a sort of model, we may notice that the theory, in 
essence, was structurally parallel to a current theory. A good example of this could be 
the Carnot cycle of Sadi Carnot. In a Carnot cycle, an engine accepts heat energy from a 
high-temperature source, or hot body, converts part of the received energy into 
mechanical (or electrical) work, and rejects the remainder to a low-temperature sink, or 
cold body. The greater the temperature difference between the source and sink, the 
greater the efficiency of the heat engine. Nicolas Léonard Sadi Carnot (1796 – 1832) 
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sought to answer two questions about the operation of heat engines: ¨Is the work 
available from a heat source potentially unbounded? ¨, and ¨Can heat engines in 
principle be improved by replacing the steam with some other working fluid or gas? ¨   
In his Réflexions sur la Puissance Motrice de Feu [1824/1988] (¨Reflections on the 
Motive Power of Fire) he arrived to the conclusion that the production of motive power 
was due ¨not to actual consumption of caloric but to its transportation from a warm 
body to a cold body.¨269 Likewise, ¨In the fall of caloric, motive power evidently 
increases with the difference of temperature between the warm and cold bodies, but we 
do not know whether it is proportional to this difference.¨270 
 
Carnot originally formulated his theorem on the basis of the caloric theory of heat 
which was later discarded as an incorrect concept, but in essence his theorem was found 
to be correct if the notion of heat (distinguished as chaleur from calorique by him)271 
was identified with a form of a mechanical energy, as enunciated by such heat theorists 
like Count Rumford (known as Sir Benjamin Thompson). After examination of Carnot´s 
work, R. Clausius (1850) and such physicists like W. Thomson (Lord Kevin) were able 
to modify the Carnot theorem and enunciate the second principle of thermodynamics 
when systems undergo cyclic processes. Hence, according to the Clausius principle, by 
R. Clausius, it is impossible to transfer heat from a colder to a hotter body without 
converting at the same time a certain amount of work into heat at the end of a cycle of 
changes.  
Carnot thought heat was a fluid of sorts. He was wrong, linguistically, but his ´fluid´ 
was enough like that of kinetic energy that it mattered little. In other words, the issue of 
´truth´ should not matter much as regards the efficiency of one theory over rivals. 
Duhem wrote thus, 
 
It quite naturally happens that those who believe too much in 
their own theories do not sufficiently believe in the theories of 
                                                 
269 Sadi Carnot, ¨Reflection on the Motive Power of Fire,¨ in Reflection on the Motive Power of Fire by 
Sadi Carnot and other Papers on the Second Law of Thermodynamics by É. Claperyron and R. Clausius. 
Ed. Mendoza, E. (New York: Dover, 1988[1960]) p.7 
270 Ibid., p. 15 
271 In Carnot´s theory, there appears the notion of calorique, which is distinctive from chaleur. He did not 
clarify its true nature, but it is safe to assume it is a quantity associated with heat transfer and equivalent 
to entropy or, more precisely, calortropy as the heat theory of Count Rumford suggest. 
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others. Then the dominant idea of these condemners of others is 
to find fault with the theories of the latter and to seek to 
contradict them….They are doing experiments only in order to 
destroy a theory instead of doing them in order to look for the 
truth.272 
 
However, this leaves us with another problem: Should we restrict science´s goal to 
seeking theories that are solely ¨empirically adequate¨273 while rejecting the linguistic 
representation medium entirely? Or can scientific theories, in some cases ´fit´ reality, 
which means, they are ´true´?  
The conception that observation serves as the independent foundational justification for 
our theoretical claims has been shown to be wrong. Observation is not independent of 
theory at all. All observations are dependent on some theory at some level. Observation 
alone is never enough and no matter how strong the evidence, science can never prove a 
theory true with certainty as we have seen in the overthrow of the Newtonian theory by 
Einstein theory. Eventually, there are other sources of evidence beyond the strictly 
observational that indicate truth. These additional sources of evidence do not rely on 
asserting a ¨match¨ between the claims made by the theory and the world itself. Instead, 
this evidence comes from an evaluation of the internal coherence of the theory itself. 
Evaluating a hypothesis becomes a two-step process: We want to know whether the 
hypothesis is ´empirically adequate´—is it consistent with our observations. Second, we 
want to know whether the hypothesis has certain ´virtues´ we think correlate with its 
being ´likely to be true´. These virtues include: Simplicity, Generality, Fecundity, 
Entrenchment, and Testability. This shows that scientific advancement through time 
does not move closer and closer to a correct (true) characterization of the natural world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
272 Pierre Duhem, ¨Physical Theory and Experiment,¨ in Philosophy   of Science, eds. Curd, M & Cover, 
J. A (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998) p. 258 
273 Van Fraassen´ constructive empiricism argued that ´science aims to give us theories which are 
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. 
See Bas C. Van Fraassen.  ¨Arguments concerning Scientific Realism¨, in Philosophy   of Science, eds. 
Curd, M & Cover, J. A (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998) p. 1069; see also Bas. C. 
van Fraassen, The Scientific Image. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) p. 12 
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3.4 SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY 
 
The view of scientific objectivity as one achieved by reliance upon non arbitrary and 
non-subjective criteria for developing, accepting and rejecting the hypotheses and 
theories that make up the whole view of science is derived from an initial factor. Such 
factor deals with the affirmation that science provides accurate description of the facts 
of the natural world as they really are. Precisely, this notion is derived from the 
conviction of the science practitioners of the early modern period that they have 
construed accurate accounts of the real underlying structure of the natural world. Hence, 
it implies that such accurate description of the facts in the natural world provides us 
knowledge of nature that is uninfluenced by the scientists.  
 
Precisely, the accounts of the scientific revolution by various authors in the previous 
chapter have shown that the pure pursuit of objective truth, by ´disinterested 
individuals, in science is not only implausible but incorrect. Robert Merton (1938) 
demonstrated the role of puritanism in the rise of modern science. The Marxist 
historiography of scientific revolution by Hessen (1931) instigated that the development 
of Newton´s ´ Principia´ had its root in the economic demands of the period. Frances 
Yates (1964, 1972) insisted that hermeticism must have influenced the developments in 
the physics of the seventeenth-century science and that alchemical influences were 
particularly important in relation to the development of the mathematical approach to 
nature.274 For Joseph Needham (1969) the social transformation wrought by capitalism, 
renaissance and reformation motivated the rise of the early modern science in Europe. 
 
Most traditional accounts of science repose the objectivity of science on their conviction 
that its method is purely objective. Objectivity is granted based on the theory-neutral 
nature of the observational data and the necessary nature of the logical relationship 
between hypotheses and their observational consequences. In this case, objectivity is 
attributed to the scientists to the extent that he or she follows the scientific method. 
Shapin insisted that it is incorrect to justify scientific objectivity based on the objectivity 
of scientific method.  
 
                                                 
274 Francis Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, p. xii 
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He states that, 
 
Historians and philosophers of science have traditionally paid 
far too much attention to formal methodological 
pronouncements, often taking such statements at face value as 
adequate accounts of what past practitioners actually did when 
they went about making, assessing, and distributing scientific 
knowledge. In fact, the relation between any body of formal 
methodological directions and concrete natural philosophical 
practice in the seventeenth century is deeply problematic.275 
 
In order to understand the actual identity and the worth of such formal methodology, 
like Bacon´s method, we also need to understand the context under which the 
justification for such methods is made. It means that we should have a more vivid 
picture of what a range of modern natural philosophers actually did when they set about 
securing a piece of knowledge.  
 
 
3.5 SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
 
Scientific realism is the philosophical position that ´the picture which science gives us 
of the world is a true one, faithful in its details, and the entities postulated in science 
really exist: the advance of science are discoveries, not inventions´.276 Science at the 
very least gives us knowledge about the true structures of the world. Science is more 
than a tool to ¨save the phenomena¨, and grants real insight into the truth of the 
universe. Scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist 
independently of the minds or acts of scientists and scientific theories are true of the 
objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual 
character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an 
ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the 
other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals 
                                                 
275 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution, pp. 94-95 
276 Bas. C. van Fraassen, ¨Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism,¨ p. 1065 
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exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them.  As a 
philosophical position, it is often framed as an answer to the question ¨how is the 
success of science to be explained¨? The argument mainly use to answer such question 
is popularly known as the ´miracle argument´.277 
 
 
3.5.1 THE MIRACLE ARGUMENT 
 
The miracle Argument has its origin from Putnam´s claim in Mathematics, Matter and 
Method (1975) that realism ´is the only philosophy that does not make the success of 
science a miracle´.278 Hence the argument for realism is usually referred to as the 
´miracle argument´ or ´no-miracles argument´. This argument often starts with the 
widely accepted premise that the best theories in science are extraordinarily successful: 
they facilitate empirical predictions, retrodictions, and explanations of the subject 
matters of scientific investigation, often marked by amazing accuracy and intricate 
causal manipulations of the relevant phenomena. How can one explain this success of 
the scientific theories? The main explanation that the realists give is that our best 
theories are true of a mind-independent world of entities, properties, law and structures. 
It, therefore, means that if these theories are not actually true the fact that they are so 
successful would be, indeed, miraculous. Consequently, given the choice between a 
straightforward explanation of success and a miraculous explanation, any reasonable 
mind would prefer the non-miraculous explanation going by the fact that our best 
theories are approximately true. Invariably, this account of scientific success claims 
definitive status for the unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific 
theories. 
 
                                                 
277 For detailed studies on the miracle argument see Brown, J. R., ´The Miracle of Science´, 
Philosophical Quarterly, 1982, 32: 232-244; Boyd, R. N., ´What Realism Implies and What it Does Not´, 
Dialectica, 1989, 43: 5-29;  Lipton, P., ´Truth, Existence, and the Best Explanation´, in The Scientific 
Realism of Rom Harré, ed. A. A. Derksen (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1994); Psillos, S., Scientific 
Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (London: Routledge, 1999) ch. 4;  Barnes, E. C., ´The Miraculous 
Choice Argument for Realism´, Philosophical Studies, 2002, 111: 97-120;  Lyons, T. D, ´Explaining the 
Success of a Scientific Theory´, Philosophy of Science, 2003, 70: 891-901; Busch, J., ´No New Miracles, 
Same Old Tricks´, Theoria, 2008, 74, 102-114;  and Frost-Arnold, G., ´The No-Miracles Argument for 
Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation´, Philosophy of Science, 2010, 77: 35-58 
278 Putnam, H. Mathematics, Matter and Method  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)  p. 73 
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Scientific realism grants the ontological status of unobservables. Even though we 
cannot see electrons with our naked eyes (we only observe what electrons do and 
identify them with by such characteristics) the fact that scientific theory affirms its 
existence means that it really exist, since the ´acceptance of such scientific theory 
involves the belief that it is true´. This implies then that the theoretical statements of 
science are, or purported to be, true generalized descriptions of reality.279 Scientific 
realism strongly affirms the ontological status of the unobservable facts.   Van Fraassen 
(1998) summaries scientific realism thus, 
 
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally 
true story of what the world is like; and acceptance 
of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is 
true.280 
 
The term ´literally´ that Fraassen uses in this definition should be understood as means 
of distinguishing the position of the logical positivist, conventionalist and 
instrumentalist from that of the scientific realist since the former groups have the view 
that science is true if ´properly understood´.281 They believe that science only offer 
useful tools to help understand the phenomena we observe but does not give literal true 
story about the things in the world.  
 
The general approach that the scientific realists adopt to explain how science works is 
causal oriented. This casual approach argue that the goal of science is to penetrate the 
causal structure of reality and discover the laws of nature not just to invent it as the non-
revisionary scientific anti-realism might claim. Therefore, the knowledge of the world 
that science gives us is objectively and scientifically true since science not only gives us 
the true picture of reality but also the causal explications of how reality is composed.  
 
 
                                                 
279 Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979)  p. 28 
280 Bas C. Van Fraassen.  ¨Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism¨, p. 1066; see also Bas. C. van 
Fraassen, The Scientific Image. p. 8 
281 Bas C. Van Fraassen.  ¨Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism¨,  p. 1067 
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3.5.2 CUMULATIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
 
Since scientific theories capture the nature of the objects in the world as they are in 
themselves, such realists as Richard Boyd and Hilary Putnam argue that for any science 
to be regarded as mature and well-developed its later theories should entail at least 
approximations to their predecessors.282 For the realist, science all through history 
moves closer and closer to a correct characterization of the natural world. The only sorts 
of changes this position regard as really progress in the history of science are those that 
have advanced in a cumulative manner. They are the changes that have really 
contributed to the growth of knowledge. In fact, from the origins of modern science in 
the works of Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, till the logical empiricists of the twentieth century; scientific progress has 
been viewed as an evolutionary process of uncovering truth in the physical world. 
 
The logical empiricists of the twentieth century represent the final school of thought that 
supported scientific realism and the evolutionary development of science. As the name, 
"logical empiricist" implies, this movement combined induction, based on empiricism, 
and deduction in the form of logic. Carl Hempel, one of the later advocates of logical 
empiricism, in Philosophy of Natural Science (1966) argued against those who "deny 
the existence of 'theoretical entities' or regard theoretical assumptions about them as 
ingeniously contrived fictions."283 Although Hempel recognized that many theoretical 
entities and processes cannot be directly observed (e. g. gravity cannot be observed; we 
only observe the effects of gravity), as a scientific realist he believed that a theory well-
confirmed by experiment translated to a high probability that the entities and processes 
of the theory really did exist. 
 
Because of his belief in scientific realism, Hempel was also convinced that science 
evolved in a continuous manner. New theory did not contradict past theory: "theory 
does not simply refute the earlier empirical generalizations in its field; rather, it shows 
that within a certain limited range defined by qualifying conditions, the generalizations 
                                                 
282 See Boyd, Richard, ¨On the Current Status of Scientific Realism¨, in The Philosophy of Science, 
Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J.D. Trout eds., Massachusetts: Mass. Institute of Technology Press, 1991 
pp.915-222. See also Boyd, Richard (1973). ¨Reason, Underdetermination and a casual theory of 
evidence.¨ Nous, 7:1-12 and Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge. 
283 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, p. 79 
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hold true in fairly close approximation."284 ¨New theory is more comprehensive; the old 
theory can be derived from the newer one and is one special manifestation"285 of the 
more comprehensive new theory. Nevertheless, the difference between the continuity 
thesis of scientific advancement argued by the logical empiricists and that of historicists 
like Duhem and Shapin, is the affirmation of the historical determinacy of scientific 
rationality by the latter. 
 
The logical empiricists would agree, for instance, that Newtonian physics is a special 
case of, and can be derived from, Einsteinian physics. The logical empiricist's 
conception of scientific progress was thus a continuous one; more comprehensive 
theory replaced compatible, older theory. Each successive theory's explanation was 
closer to the truth than the theory before. It was the truth, and the prediction and control 
that came with it, that was the goal of logical-empirical science. 
The notion of scientific realism held by Newton led to the evolutionary view of the 
progress of science. The entities and processes of theory were believed to exist in 
nature, and science should discover those entities and processes. The course of 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century science eventually threatened the idea of scientific 
realism. Particularly disturbing discoveries were made in the area of atomic physics. For 
instance, Heisenberg's indeterminacy286 principle, according to historian of science Cecil 
Schneer, yielded the conclusion that "the world of nature is indeterminate. The behavior 
of the particle is uncertain and therefore the behavior of the atom is an uncertainty."287 
Thus at the atomic level, "even the fundamental principle of causality fail[ed]."288 
 
Despite these problems, it was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the 
preservers of the evolutionary idea of scientific progress, the logical empiricists, were 
seriously challenged. Although Thomas Kuhn was not the first critic of traditional views 
of science (as one could see from the perspective of the historiographical revolution 
                                                 
284 Ibid., 76 
285 Ibid. 
286 According to Stephen Toulmin, the "foundations of the classical picture suddenly disintegrated" 
between 1890 and 1910 when "all the axioms of nineteenth-century physics and chemistry [then] revealed 
themselves as no more than working assumptions, which were sound only if not pressed too hard."" See 
Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Architecture of Matter (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
1962), p. 270 
287 Cecil J. Schneer, The Evolution of Physical Science, p. 364. 
288 Ibid., pp. 358-9 
148 
 
 
treated in chapter two), his work held the most important implications about the 
rationality of science.289 
Kuhn resorted to the history of science to show that it was ¨implausible¨ to say that 
theory is approaching truth. There is no linear advancement of theory toward truth. He 
states thus, 
Newton´s mechanics improves on Aristotle´s and …Einstein´s 
improves on Newton´s as instruments for puzzle-solving. But I 
can see in their succession no coherent direction of ontological 
development. On the contrary, in some important respects, 
though by no means in all, Einstein´s general theory of relativity 
is closer to Aristotle´s than… to Newton´s.290  
 
Kuhn´s statement indicates that Einstein´s theory is not merely a more complex version 
of Newton´s. Einsteinian theory heads in its own direction; there is ¨no coherent 
direction of ontological development¨.  This statement encompasses Kuhn´s conviction 
that there is ´Revolution´ in science. In order to find a replacement of the idea of 
progress toward the truth in science, he advocated on the need for a goal to guide 
science which will avert the traditional tendency of speaking about single hypotheses or 
theories being ¨well tested¨ or ¨confirmed¨ or even ¨corrigibly falsified.¨291 Such 
tendency inform the underlying motive of justifying the progress of science toward the 
truth. 
 
 
3.6 NATURALISTIC APPROACH OF THE KUHIAN ´PARADIGM´ 
 
The naturalistic approach to the account of scientific progress was first initiated by 
Thomas Kuhn. He did this by way of a historicist attempt to elaborate an historical 
account of the scientific revolution where he envisioned history of science informing 
                                                 
289 Stephen Toulmin & June Goodfield, The Architecture of Matter, p. 270 
290 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 206 
291 Larry Laudan, Science and Relativism, p.70. Laudan describes the Relativist view of theory change 
(as represented in Kuhn) to consist that ´single hypotheses are never tested in isolation but are always 
tested as parts of larger complexes or wholes´ 
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philosophy of science as an historical philosophy of science rather than the history and 
philosophy of science. In his view, the relationship between them is asymmetrical. 
Instead of analysing scientific theories as abstract objects, he sought to describe how the 
hidden worldview, or ´Weltanschaung´ shared by practitioners of the scientific 
enterprise conditions theory choice which invariably determine how science changes.  
 
Prior to 1950 history of science was a discipline practised mostly by eminent scientists, 
who generally wrote heroic biographies or sweeping overviews of the discipline, often 
for pedagogical purposes. This earlier history of science focused on, according to Kuhn, 
¨the development of science as a quasi-mechanical march of the intellect, the successive 
surrender of nature´s secrets to sound methods skilfully deployed.¨292 The kind of 
history of science that was developed by the likes of E. J. Dijsterhuis, Anneliese Maier, 
and Alexander Koyré was simply more than chronicling science´s theoretical and 
technical achievements. The important contribution from such system of history writing 
was the recognition of institutional and historical factors in the practice of science.  
 
Kuhn, rather, argued that mere chronicling of major themes and figures does not offer 
an accurate perspective of how the worldviews and changes in worldviews occur in 
science. It is the worldviews that facilitate the theoretical and technical achievements 
being chronicled. Therefore, adequate analysis of what the worldviews are, how they 
work and motivate scientific progress contributes immensely to understanding the real 
nature of the scientific achievements. He looked into the ´Weltanschauung´ shared by 
the members of the scientific community to show how it works and how it changes over 
time. He did this by means of an articulated elaboration of the cyclical nature of science 
history (see figure 1 below). Therefore, to understand working science we must 
understand the scientific community and its shared norms, which together constitute 
what he described as normal science.   
 
 
                                                 
292 Thomas Kuhn, “The history of science,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D. 
L. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968) 14, p. 75 
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Figure 1: Scientific disciplines, once they have emerged from the pre-paradigmatic 
stage, undergo periods of "normal science" which allow them to obtain a high degree of 
precision and progress rapidly. Normal science is dependent on the adoption of a 
universally accepted paradigm which defines research problems for the scientist, tells 
him/her what to expect, and provides the methods that he/she will use in solving them. 
However, in the course of research, scientists inevitably stumble upon anomalies which 
the paradigm is unable to explain. If the paradigm repeatedly fails to explain the 
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anomaly, a crisis ensues and alternative theories develop. Eventually a competing theory 
proves relatively successful in explaining the anomaly and it replaces the old paradigm. 
This replacement is Kuhn's "scientific revolution." Initially, the scientific community 
resists the replacement, but with time the success of the new paradigm gains enough 
support to win out.  
 
According to Kuhn, the adoption of a new paradigm necessarily establishes the creation 
of new research problems, methods, and expected results. The scientists within the 
discipline thus see the world in a different way than it "was" under the old paradigm. 
Once the old paradigm is replaced and the revolution has ended, normal science re-
emerges only to await the discovery of new anomalies. Kuhn, therefore, argued that 
science does not progress toward a predetermined goal but, like evolutionary change, 
one theory replaces another with a better fit between theory and nature vis-à-vis 
competitors. Kuhn believed that his use of the Darwinian metaphor was the correct 
framework for discussing science´s progress. But he felt no one took that metaphor 
seriously. This negligence was actually what led to the view of scientific progress as a 
continuous increase in a set of accepted facts and theories. Kuhn sought to correct such 
anomalous view of the scientific progress by arguing for an episodic model in which 
periods of such conceptual continuity in normal science were interrupted by periods of 
revolutionary science. The unusual emphasis on a conservative attitude distinguishes 
Kuhn not only from the heroic element of the standard picture but also from Popper and 
his depiction of the scientist as incessantly attempting to refute his or her most 
important theories.  
 
This conservative resistance to the attempted refutation of key theories means that 
revolutions are not sought except under extreme circumstances. The Falsificationism of 
the Popper's philosophy had required that a single reproducible, anomalous 
phenomenon be enough to result in the rejection of a theory.293 Kuhn's view is that 
during normal science scientists neither test nor seek to confirm the guiding theories of 
their disciplinary matrix. Nor do they regard anomalous results as falsifying those 
theories. It is only speculative puzzle-solutions that can be falsified in a Popperian 
                                                 
293 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson) 1959, pp. 86–7 
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fashion during normal science.294 Rather, anomalies are ignored or explained away if at 
all possible. It is only the accumulation of particularly troublesome anomalies that poses 
a serious problem for the existing disciplinary matrix. A particularly troublesome 
anomaly is one that undermines the practice of normal science. For example, an 
anomaly might reveal inadequacies in some commonly used piece of equipment, 
perhaps by casting doubt on the underlying theory. If much of normal science relies 
upon this piece of equipment, normal science will find it difficult to continue with 
confidence until this anomaly is addressed. A widespread failure in such confidence 
Kuhn calls a ‘crisis’295 
 
Also, Kuhn used the theory of incommensurability to demonstrate that comparison 
between theories will not be as straightforward as the standard empiricist picture would 
have it, since the standards of evaluation are themselves subject to change. This sort of 
difficulty in theory comparison is an instance of what Kuhn called 
´incommensurability´(see section 2.12.7 for detailed description  of the term). This 
Suggest that ´the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be 
resolved by proofs.´296 Many scientists and philosophers have attacked Kuhn on the 
basis that his theory is too cynical, implying as it does that scientific theories are simply 
temporarily useful utilities for explaining things. This attack comes from the fact that 
they would like us to believe that they are discovering abstract truth. Historicist account 
of the scientific advancement has made us to see that this is simply not the case. Science 
provides us with the best current explanation for things, not with truth. 
 
Kuhn ´s naturalistic approach to scientific advancement was well criticized by his 
colleagues in the history and philosophy of science. In 1965, a special symposium on 
Kuhn's SSR was held at an International Colloquium on the Philosophy of Science that 
took place at Bedford College, London, and was chaired by Sir Karl Popper The 
symposium led to the publication of the symposium's presentations plus other essays, 
most of them critical, which eventually appeared in an influential volume of essays that 
by 1999 had gone through 21 printings. Kuhn expressed the opinion that his critics' 
readings of his book were so inconsistent with his own understanding of it that he was 
                                                 
294 Thomas Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, eds. I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970)  p. 19 
295 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 66–76 
296 Ibid., p. 148 
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"...tempted to posit the existence of two Thomas Kuhns," one the author of his book, the 
other the individual who had been criticized in the symposium by "Professors Popper, 
Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin and Watkins."297 From Kuhn’s recollection, he felt that 
the reviews of Structure were good.298 His chief concern was the tag of irrationalism. “I 
was not saying, however”, stated Kuhn later, “that there aren’t good reasons in scientific 
proofs, there are good but never conclusive reasons.”299 
 
Notwithstanding the numerous controversies that trailed and still trail the Kuhnian 
Structure of Scientific Revolution our major concern here is its innovation in stressing 
the social nature of science. Science is practised by communities of scientists, not by 
isolated men and women. Even though, the adequacy of Kuhn´s specific historical 
model is still unresolved, he established without doubt the urgency for the study of 
science to incorporate historical, social, and personal influences lying outside scientific 
methodology. It is no doubt that Kuhn led a historiographic revolution in the history and 
philosophy of science.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL MODELS OF THE ´HISTORICIST´ HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
The choice of only the major historicist historiographies has been to highlight their 
concern for a shift, from the traditional mode of relying solely on the content of 
scientific beliefs and methods as the basis for justification of scientific claims, to the 
veritable consideration of the context of their development. Such approach not only 
holds great insights for genuine understanding of science, it has also influenced the 
development of the philosophy of science. It demonstrates that the very plausible way to 
make comprehensive narrative of the scientific progress is to understand the context of 
its development as well as the situations that inform the formation and choice of 
scientific theories.  
 
J.D. Bernal clearly illustrated in the four volumes of his Science in History300 the 
stimulus given to (and the limitation placed upon) discovery and invention by pastoral, 
agricultural, feudal, capitalist, and socialist systems, and conversely the ways in which 
science has altered economic, social, and political beliefs and practices. His attempt was 
to illustrate the mutual relations of science and society throughout history. Certainly, if 
the nature of the scientific claims is to be well accepted the interplay between science 
and the wider culture has to be given definite consideration. Pyenson & Sheets-Pyenson 
(1999) demonstrated that if we wish to understand why things changed in early modern 
science, not just describe how they changed, we have to look to the historical context 
out of which they arose.301 
 
The highlights on the socio-cultural, economic and political influences on science do 
not imply its unsuitability as a genuine device for the accurate study of physical world; 
                                                 
300 See John Desmond Bernal, Science in History. 4 vols (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T Press, 1971[1954]). In 
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301 See Lewis Pyenson & Susan Sheets-Pyenson, Servants of Nature: A History of Scientific Institutions, 
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rather they serve to weigh the value judgment of its claim. It all centres on the logical 
implications of adopting the scientific processes and norms of the 16th and 17th century’s 
science, which include mechanism and materialism, mathematical natural philosophy, 
and experimentalism, as functional parameter for the justification of the validity of the 
objectivity, truth, realism and rationality of scientific knowledge. (See sections 3.2.2, 
3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2). In most cases, the truth, objectivity and rationality of science are 
hinged on the processes by which theories are tested, justified, or judged. The processes 
are believed to certify the validity of the objectivity or truth of good theories that were 
chosen over the poor or less effective ones. The reason is that those processes are taken 
to be governed by a set of criteria shared by the entire group of scientists competent to 
judge. Likewise, they do not, or at least need not, involve subjective or social factors at 
all. But most surprisingly, no scientist or philosopher of science has claimed to possess 
either a complete or an entirely well-articulated list of the criteria that govern those 
processes. It therefore, indicates that to explain why particular men made particular 
choices at particular times we must go beyond the list of shared criteria to the social 
context and characteristics of the individuals who make the choice.  
 
Other factors relevant to choice lie outside the sciences. 
Kepler´s early election of Copernicanism was due in part to his 
immersion in the Neoplatonic and Hermetic movements of his 
day; German Romanticism predisposed those it affected toward 
both recognition and acceptance of energy conservation; 
nineteenth-century British social thought had a similar influence 
on the availability and acceptability of Darwin´s concept of the 
struggle for existence.302 
 
The above citation from Kuhn´s The Essential Tension (1977) shows that every 
individual choice between competing theories (as in the case of Kepler´s choice of 
Copernicanism over Ptolemy´s) depends on a mixture of objective (stipulated criteria) 
and subjective or extra-scientific factors. There are various works that strongly 
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illustrated the role of hermeticism in the thought of Bacon and Newton.303   Even if we 
do not accept wholly the claims which these historicist theses make on the authority of 
the scientific claims they have one indisputable lesson to offer not just to the 
understanding of science but to general epistemology as well. John Henry summarises it 
thus,   
 
...If we wish to achieve as full an understanding as possible of 
the Scientific Revolution we need to consider not only the role of 
natural philosophizing, and of the various technical 
considerations relevant to any aspect of scientific knowledge, 
but also religion, theology, politics, economics, metaphysics, 
methodology, rhetoric and, above all, the complex interplay 
between all these factors.304     
 
The cultural studies of science in the historicist model disapprove the claim that 
scientific knowledge has the capability to transcend any socio-cultural and political 
influence. They illustrate that such understanding of science drives from the belief in the 
internal consistency and self-sufficiency of science which has been proven to be false. 
The historicist overview of the Scientific Revolution is not particularly debates about its 
success or validity; they are, invariably, explicit appraisal of the scientific claims and its 
value judgement. Virtually all the historicist accounts attested to the success of western 
science of the early modern period and designated such figures like Galileo, Kepler, 
Descartes, Boyle, Huygens and Newton etc. as its heroes.  
 
Alexandre Koyré illustrated that the study of this epoch shows us what superhuman 
effort each step on the way to knowledge of reality has cost, effort which has sometimes 
led to the veritable ´mutation´ in human intellect.305 In the introduction to the The 
Revolution in Science 1500-1750 Rupert Hall argued that though no less part of a world-
                                                 
303 See Frances Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago 
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view than any scientific system of the past, modern science differs markedly from any 
of them.306 Modern science was unique due its rational way of establishing the factual 
knowledge of the external world through observation and experiment. Even Kuhn 
showed that it was precisely from the period of the scientific revolution that the sciences 
began to exhibit a single generally accepted view about the nature. According to 
Butterfield, the scientific revolution outshines everything since the rise of Christianity 
and reduces the previous historic events of the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank 
of mere episodes.307  
 
One of the predominant issues historicists theses press forth is the incorrectness of 
subsuming the success of the scientific revolution as a logical justification for the 
validity of the scientific claims.  In fact, the success of the scientific revolution lies in 
the fulfilment of the socials functions that have characterized early modern science ever 
since Francis Bacon proclaimed the idea of the dominion over nature by man through 
the application of science. The historicist historiography of the scientific revolution 
mostly used two major theoretical models to illustrate the principal frameworks on 
which the acclaimed success of the scientific revolution hinges. It is on the basis of such 
frameworks that they demonstrate the implications of a unilateral justification of the 
traditional claims of science.  
 
These models include the physico-mathematical current and contextualism. However, 
both frameworks suggest that the success of the early modern science does not provide 
ample justification for establishing a platform that would clearly distinguish the 
authority of its claims from those of its predecessors.  
 
The Shapin and Duhem theses would argue that the mathematical framework on which 
the scientific achievements of Kepler, Galileo and Newton are traceable to the ancient 
and medieval periods.  
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According to Shapin, 
 
Seventeenth-century confidence in the basic propriety and power 
of a mathematical framework for natural philosophy had 
ancient warrants.308 
 
The mathematization of nature was one of the prominent features which characterised 
the scientific revolution. Historians and philosophers of science show that most modern 
natural philosophers turned to Pythagoras (ca. 570 – 490 BCE), and particularly to Plato 
(ca. 427-347 B.C.), to legitimate a mathematical treatment of the world. In mathematics 
Plato´s name is attached to the Platonic solids. In the Timaeus there is a mathematical 
construction of the elements (earth, fire, air, and water), in which the cube, tetrahedron, 
octahedron, and icosahedron are given as the shapes of the atoms of earth, fire, air, and 
water respectively. The fifth Platonic solid, the dodecahedron, is Plato´s model for the 
whole universe. Unlike atomists such as Theophrastus of Eresus (ca. 371 BC – ca. 287 
BC), Leucippus of Miletus (fl. 480 BC- ca 420 BC) and Democritus of Abdera (ca. 460- 
ca. 370 BC) who based their physical theories on crude analogies of the constituent 
element of the world, the novelty of the mathematical Platonism lies in the proposition 
of precise geometrical account of the shapes of the primary bodies and the reduction of 
the changes that take place between them to mathematical formulae.309 
 
The mathematical Platonism later became transformed in the hands of Euclid, 
Archimedes, Eratosthenes, Heron, Menelaus and Diophantus. Euclid virtually invented 
classical (Euclidean) geometry as we know it. Archimedes was best known for his 
military innovations like his siege engines and mirrors to harness and focus the power 
of the sun, as well as levers, pulleys and pumps (including the famous screw pump 
known as Archimedes´ Screw, which is still used today in some parts of the world for 
irrigation). Likewise, he produced formulas to calculate the areas of regular shapes, 
using a revolutionary method of capturing new shapes by using shapes he already 
understood.  
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Subsequently, the mathematical formulations by Euclid and Archimedes exerted 
enormous spell over the minds of such thinkers like Kepler and Galileo through whose 
combined efforts the mathematization of nature was totally realized and subsequently 
led to the dethronement of the Aristotelian physics. However, there is doubt regarding 
the legitimacy of mathematical ¨idealizations¨ in the explication of physical nature as it 
actually was, and if mathematical representations could capture the contingencies and 
the complexities of real natural processes.310 
 
These problems will be discussed under the physico-mathematical current of the 
scientific revolution to see how the historicists´ theses weigh the plausibility of the 
mathematization of nature and its justification of the traditional claims of science.   
 
 
4.2  PHYSICO-MATHEMATICAL CURRENT  
 
During the ´Age of Reason´ which started in the wake of the Renaissance there was 
unprecedented explosion of mathematical and scientific ideas across the 17th Europe. 
Coming on the heels of the ´Copernican Revolution´ of Nicolaus Copernicus in the 16th 
Century, scientists like Galileo Galilei, Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler were making 
equally revolutionary discoveries in the exploration of the Solar system. Such effort 
culminated in Kepler´s formulation of the mathematical laws of planetary motion. 
Central to the flourishing of the mathematics in this period was the invention of the 
logarithm by John Napier of Merchiston (1550 – 4 April 1617).  
 
This significant mathematical development was instrumental to the performance of such 
complex calculations needed for most scientific innovations wrought by Kepler and 
Newton. Mathematics later underwent transformation in the hands of some French 
Mathematicians like René Descartes (1596 -1650), Pierre de Fermat (1601 – 1665) and 
Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662). Descartes, who is sometimes considered the first of the 
modern school of mathematics, developed analytic geometry which made possible the 
plotting of the orbits of the planets on a graph, as well as lay the foundations for the 
later development of calculus and much later multi-dimensional geometry. Fermat 
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formulated several theorems which greatly extended our knowledge of number theory, 
as well as contributing some early work on infinitesimal calculus. Blaise Pascal is most 
famous for Pascal´s Triangle of binominal coefficients, although similar figures had 
actually been produced by Chinese and Persian mathematicians long before him. 
 
The mathematization of nature by which the scientific revolution triumphed was 
culminated in the development of infinitesimal calculus, with its two main operations: 
differentiation and integration, by Isaac Newton (1642 -1727) and Gottfried Leibniz 
(1646 – 1716). The German mathematician, Leibniz, is said to have invented the 
calculus independently but did not apply it to the real world as Newton did, who for the 
rest of his life was unwilling to share the credit with Leibniz. Though there is 
controversy about who among the duo first revolutionized mathematics completely with 
the development of the infinitesimal calculus, the fact remains that calculus of some sort 
is used extensively in everything from engineering to other fields like economics, 
medicine and astronomy.  
 
 
4.2.1  THE SYNTHESIS OF MECHANICO-CORPUSCULARISM WITH    
  MATHEMATICS 
 
Among all the scientists who worked for the mathematical interpretation of physical 
realities Newton is designated as the hero by whom the mathematization process started 
by Galileo was perfectly accomplished. Newton ingenuity lies in establishing 
mathematical formulations of the regularities observable in nature for the expansion of 
the scope of casual mechanical explanation. This move was informed by the view that it 
is within this framework that the merging of the terrestrial and celestial physics could be 
established as against their initial separation in the Aristotelian physics.  
 
Aristotelian physics made distinction between the terrestrial and celestial physics. In the 
terrestrial realm (below the orbit of the Moon), each body has a rightful place and must 
move naturally (up or down) toward the earth depending on its material composition. In 
the celestial realm (at or beyond the orbit of the Moon), each body is made of 
quintessence, a perfect and unchanging element. Each must move at a constant speed in 
perfect circles. 
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Newton´s revolutionary view of falling bodies brought about the joining together of the 
physics of the terrestrial and celestial realms into one simple package. The Newtonian 
synthesis argue that all bodies, regardless of size, shape, constitution, colour, texture 
generate and respond to gravitational forces in the same way. The power of gravity … 
was not limited to a certain distance from the earth but this power must extend much 
farther than was usually thought.311 The Earth pulls on and is pulled by an apple (a 
terrestrial body) in the same way it influences and is influenced by the Moon (a celestial 
body), since ¨whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that 
other¨312 It means that if one object A exerts a force FA on a second object B, then B 
simultaneously exerts a force FB on A, and the two forces are equal and opposite: FA = -
FB
313  
 
As the perfect circles of the Aristotelian physics gave way to the ellipses of the 
Newtonian physics the distinction between terrestrial and celestial matter evaporated. 
Newton´s eventual success depended on both observational evidence and the use of 
mathematically-expressed laws, marking a new combination of observation and the 
mathematization that came to define modern physics and modern science more 
generally.314 
 
The ingenuity of the Newtonian physics is exemplified in the fit between mechanism 
and mathematics. For Newton, gravity was an action at a distance; two masses acted on 
one another despite the fact that empty space lay between them. Defined as a change in 
motion, Newton's conception of force was a mechanical, causal agent that acted either 
through contact or through action at a distance. He built a corpuscular theory with a new 
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focus on forces that could be mathematically described. For him, corpuscles are units of 
mass and his introduction of the laws of mechanics was to explain their motion.  
 
Certainly a mechanical view of the world was in principle 
amenable to mathematization, and a number of mechanical 
philosophers vigorously insisted on the central role of 
mathematics in the understanding of nature.315 
 
This mathematical tendency is closely related to the mechanical philosophy pursued by 
Descartes (1596 – 1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592 – 1655), and Robert Boyle (1627 – 
1691). Boyle accepted that a natural world whose corpuscles were conceived to be 
variously sized, shaped, arranged, and moved demanded, in principle, for mathematical 
treatment. Robert Boyle´s Sceptical Chymist316, consisted of a sustained polemic against 
the Aristotelian concept of an element and the Paracelsian concept of a principle. What 
Boyle offered in their place was mechanical philosophy.  
 
Like the Ionian philosophers, Aristotle believed in four elements, while the alchemist 
Paracelsus and his followers believed there were three elements, or as they called them, 
principles: sulphur, mercury, and salt. Boyle argued that the Aristotelian element and 
Paracelsian principle do not exist.  What does exist is the qualitatively neutral matter of 
the mechanical philosophy, divided into particles differentiated only by size, shape, and 
motion. Boyle´s corpuscular theory of matter included the void to explain diffusion and 
other gas properties. His air-pump was developed in part to test the question of 
´vacuum´ which was widely disputed in the seventeenth century.  
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Fig. 2. Boyle's air pump was an advance over Von Guericke's spheres in that it provided a glass receptacle into which 
candles, mice, and other objects could be placed for experimentation. Air was ratcheted out from a cylinder and 
piston attached through a stopcock to the receptacle. After each cylinder of air was evacuated, the stopcock was 
closed and the ratchet and piston reset. 
 
 
The existence of a ¨void¨, what we now call a vacuum, was earlier expounded in 
Descartes´ mechanical philosophy of corpuscularism. Descartes thought everything 
physical in the universe to be made of tiny vortices of matter. Like the ancient atomists, 
Descartes claimed that sensations, such as taste or temperature, are caused by the shape 
and size of tiny pieces of matter. The main difference between atomism, and Descartes´s 
concept was the existence of the void. For him, there could be no vacuum, and all 
matter was constantly swirling to prevent a void as corpuscles moved through other 
matter. Another main distinction between Descartes´ corpuscularism and classical 
atomism is Descartes´ concept of mind/body duality, which allowed for an independent 
realm of existence for thought, soul and most importantly God.  
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Unlike Descartes´ corpuscularism, the Gassendi´s system was without atheistic 
undertones, and was much closer to classical atomism. He was particularly intrigued by 
the Greek atomists, so he set out to purify atomism from its heretical and atheistic 
philosophical conclusion.317   In a close analysis of Democritus´s system, Gassendi 
credited the ancient philosopher with a deterministic cosmology based on mechanical 
motion: The motion of the atoms, their percussion and repulsion, is the cause of all 
things, and things have to happen necessarily as they have happened because of this 
motion.318  According to Koyré,  
 
By introducing Democritean atomism as the fitting ontology for 
the new science, Gassendi, more than anybody else, had broken 
up the Aristotelian ontology of substance and attribute.319 
 
Gassendi formulated his atomistic conception of mechanical philosophy partly in 
response to Descartes´. He particularly opposed Descartes´ reductionist view that only 
purely mechanical explanations of physics are valid, as well as the application of 
geometry to the whole of physics.320 However, the final form of corpuscularism that 
came to be accepted by most English scientists after Robert Boyle was a conjoined 
system of Descartes and Gassendi theories. Boyle´s corpuscular philosophy drew on 
both Gassendi and Descartes, and validated corpuscularism in the English scientific 
community in the late seventeenth century.321  
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According to Sarasohn, 
 
The Baconian tradition, with its repudiation of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy, made English thinkers sympathetic to the 
mechanical philosophy, with its close ties to atomism. English 
exiles during the Civil War period … associated with Gassendi 
and Descartes. They became the conduit for atomistic ideas to 
cross the English Channel.322 
 
Corpuscularism preserved as a dominant theory throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, 
and particularly as an idea that some of the properties that objects appear to have are 
artefacts of the perceiving mind. Though similar to atomism it maintained that atoms 
were indivisible and corpuscles could in principle be divided. It also retained its link 
with alchemy in the work of scientists such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton in the 
17th century. For instance, it was used by Newton to develop his corpuscular theory of 
light.  
 
The above discussion shows the classical view that the mechanical picture of a matter-
and-motion universe implied a mathematical conception of nature. Feingold quotes 
Boyle to have noted that the stress was upon the practical aspects of mathematics, 
especially those having to do with surveying and fortification, and it fed into the 
gentry´s current infatuation with mechanical devices as ¨artificial miracles¨ and with 
experimental displays valued ¨for their novelty or prettiness¨323  But even if there was a 
fit between mechanism, corpuscularism and mathematics the important question 
remains, how much of the mechanical philosophy was mathematized? For instance, 
Boyle´s original reports of experiments with the air-pump showed he excused his 
eschewal of physical generalization in part because this would have, he wrote, 
¨require[d] more skills in mathematics than I pretend to.¨324  
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If mathematics was acclaimed as the most proficient tool of reaching the true reality, 
what proper place did its notions of certainty and precision occupy in the practice of 
those experimentalists like Galileo, Kepler, Boyle, Newton etc in the early modern 
science? The answer to this question will demonstrate the bases of the historicists’ 
critiques of the justification of scientific truth and objectivity from the notion of 
mathematical realism. Although the combination of mathematical science and 
corpuscularian conception of nature proved quite fertile ´neither the mathematical 
exactitude of Kepler´ s laws of planetary motion nor the quantitative rigor of Galileo´s 
laws of falling bodies proved derivable by means of he explanatory tools accepted in the 
corpuscularian world-view.325 For Needham, mathematical reductionism of the 
scientific revolution is what gives prominence to mechanism over organic materialism 
which in his view should be overcome because ´such reductionism has reached its 
limits´.326 
 
 
4.2.2  SCIENTIFIC TRUTH: METAPHYSICAL OR PROGRAMMATIC? 
  
The claim for the viability of scientific truth could also be traced to mathematical 
Platonism. This aspect of Platonism is a metaphysical view that there are mathematical 
objects and they are independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and 
practices. It suggests that the natural world is made up of mathematical objects. They 
exist in this manner independent of their perception by human beings. Their nature has 
been made in mathematical forms because the ´Supreme Intellect´ who made them 
thinks mathematically and conceives of physical relations mathematically. This 
perception of physical reality defined the mathematical physics of Galileo and Kepler, 
which affirms that mathematical relations and quantities are really part of nature itself. 
This position has also been identified as Pythagorean.327  
 
The brain behind the formulation of this kind of Platonism as we now know it is Gottlob 
Frege, who in his Foundations of Arithmetic328 maintained that the language of 
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mathematics purports to refer to and quantify over abstract mathematical objects. 
Accordingly, a great number of mathematical theorems are true. But a sentence cannot 
be true unless its sub-expressions succeed in doing what they purport to do. This implies 
that there exist abstract mathematical objects which these expressions refer to and 
quantify over. Just like many other forms of Platonism it should be noted that 
mathematical Platonism is very distinguished from the view of the historical Plato. As 
we have seen from the earlier illustrations from his Timaeus Plato believed at first that 
mathematics would be the key to Thought. However, in his Meno329, we see a Plato who 
has abandoned mathematical aids and embarked on his own quest with the Ideas. Such 
tremendous shift suggests that Plato´s famous ¨mathematical examples¨ were 
illustrations rather than central to his arguments. 
 
Although Plato revered mathematics, he did so for its alleged ability to train the mind to 
receive the Forms (the higher dimension of the world) rather than as a means of gaining 
understanding of the physical world. Perhaps, this explains the bases for the difficulty in 
making neither completely logical description of how the mathematical-expressed-
physical-regularities depended on the belief in the mechanical causes nor a 
comprehensive demonstration of the ways in which the mechanical philosophy was 
mathematized in the period of the early modern science.  
 
It is not surprising that there was no experiment showing how Galileo´s mathematical 
laws of fall could be obtained in the physical world of concrete matter. Such law only 
pertained to ideal bodies moving in a frictionless environment. This raises doubt on 
whether Galilean physics was in essence addressed to the mathematical ideal or the 
concretely and physically real as the mechanico-corpuscularism pretends it was. 
Perhaps, it could be that the nature of the scientific truth that ensues from our 
knowledge of the world is a programmatic one. In that case, the Galilean mathematical 
theory of fall becomes true and represents an objective view of moving things if all 
motions only take place in a frictionless environment, which we know is not feasible. 
Assuming that the mathematical picture of the universe does not answer the questions 
that non-mathematical philosopher asked and vice versa, how could the success of the 
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early modern science provide the justification for the viability of scientific truth? The 
above discussion already shows that physico-mathematical current does not provide 
demonstrable description of natural processes any better than its Aristotelian counterpart 
on whose defeat its success hinges.  
 
Newtonian mathematical physics and scientific truth 
 
Steven Shapin illustrated that Isaac Newton´s  The Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy argued convincingly that the world-machine followed laws that were 
mathematical in form and that could be expressed in the language of mathematics.330 
His physico-mathematical approach serve to homogenise the platonic idea of 
mathematical construction of reality, which inspired Galileo and Kepler, with the 
Democritean conception of its atomic structure, which was transformed in the hands of 
Gassendi and Boyle. Shapin, summarised the Newtonian programme thus, 
  
 
The gravitational force that bound the universe together was, to 
be sure, mathematically describable. It was even offered as a 
model for a practice whose end was the lawful characterization 
of the mathematical regularities of nature—laws (as Newton 
said) ¨deduced¨ from the actual observed behavior of bodies.331 
 
Newton asserted an indefinitely sized universe united only by the identity of its 
fundamental contents and laws as against the finite universe with qualitatively 
differentiated regions of space the Aristotelian and ancient Greek physics suggested. In 
this indefinitely sized universe there is no qualitative physical distinction between 
heavens and earth, or any of their components, such that astronomy and physics become 
interdependent and united because of their common subjection to geometry. This view 
re-echoes the perspective of mathematical Platonism about the existences of abstract 
mathematical objects by illustrating that all natural processes take place on a fabric of 
abstract time and space. In such homogenized world, abstract bodies move in an 
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abstract space. Hence, a proper knowledge of such a universe becomes itself objective. 
The independent existence which the mathematical Platonism assigns to mathematical 
objects is meant to substantiate an analogy between mathematical objects and ordinary 
physical objects. Just as electrons and planets exist independently of us so do numbers 
and sets. And just as statements about electrons and planets are made true or false by the 
objects with which they are concerned and these objects' perfectly objective properties, 
so are statements about numbers and sets. 
 
 
4.2.3 MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTUALISATION AND PHYSICAL REALITY 
 
The major philosophical difficulty which the physico-mathematical current has not been 
able to surmount regards it incapability of guaranteeing a mathematical description of 
all natural processes. For instance, how does mathematics define the sweet taste of an 
orange in relation to the nature of its corpuscles? The issue of the relationship between 
mathematical explanation and the world of reality reminds us of the Platonic distinction 
between the world of ideas or pure forms and the world of reality. The debate about the 
relation between scientific explanations, particularly mathematical explanations was 
revived during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries following the Copernican 
Revolution in Astronomy. One interpretation of Copernican theory was that it was only 
a computational device designed to save the appearances of planetary motion, though 
Copernicus as a committed Pythagorean, claimed physical truth for his theory.  
 
Copernicus did not demonstrate mathematically how his system is truer than the 
Ptolemaic system. Besides, his system ´was not more accurate than Ptolemy´s until 
drastically revised by Kepler more than sixty years after Copernicus´s death.¨332 The 
astronomical theory of Ptolemy was more accurate because it fitted well with the 
Aristotelian physics and was consistent with existing scientific explanation of earth´s 
motion and other terrestrial phenomena. However, in the triumph of Pythagoreanism 
during this period, Copernicus was strongly supported by Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) 
and Galileo Galilei (1596-1650).  
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The triumph was because of the application of mathematical apparatus to explain vital 
aspects of the planetary motion, like retrograde motion and so on. In this case the 
Copernican theory was the simpler since it required only one circle per planet while 
Ptolemy´s require two. The basis on which judgments of the triumph of heliocentricism 
does not have do with its truth. The idiosyncrasy of Kepler and Galileo, and their shared 
scientific values were determinants of such scientific advancement.  Because Galileo 
believed that the universe and the world of nature were ruled by mathematical relations 
and principles, he maintained that the scientific study of nature must be aimed at those 
aspects of nature which undergo quantitative variations. He thus came to establish a 
distinction between ´primary qualities´ and ´secondary qualities´ in the subject matter of 
physics.   
 
The issue, here, is not if the science of the seventeenth century was successful or not, 
our concern is whether its success provides ample justification for its claims. The above 
discussion on the Copernican revolution showed that the Copernican theory of 
astronomy was not ´truer´ that Ptolemy´s. In fact, the scientific knowledge that ensues 
therefrom cannot be said to be wholly true and objective. Besides, Koyré (1957) and 
Dijksterhuis (1961) illustrated that the methodological maturity of science is located in 
the seventeenth century and it does not involve any obvious stipulation against the 
invocation of the supernatural. If we have to consider why physics (which provided the 
fertile ground for the triumph of mathematics) was so successful in the early modern 
period we have to learn from its rich experience over the centuries. In this way, one can 
track the changing ontologies and laws from Aristotle through Buridan and Oresme to 
Copernicus and Galileo and hence to Descartes, Huygens, Hooke, Newton et al, as the 
gradual reduction of ´primitives´ in the ontologies of motion and their replacement by 
the material implications which we now know as Newton´s laws of motion.  
 
 
4.3 THE ´INNER LOGIC´ ARGUMENT  
 
The physico-mathematical reductionism of the scientific revolution nurtured the 
assumption that science fully provides knowledge of the world that is true, objective, 
real and rational, and nothing less. Even among the historicist model this perspective 
finds ground among those who argue that the history of science is the history of the 
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inner intellectual logic of science. This internalist notion attributes simple conceptual, 
intellectual and cognitive essence to science. It maintained that the development of 
ideas following their own internal logic was the central element in the foundation of 
modern science.333 Schuster summarised the classical view of internalism: 
  
Internalists believed that scientific ideas and methods are 
autonomous, unfolding through the internal dynamics of 
rational thought and procedure alone, with social and economic 
circumstances at best affecting the timing or direction of 
research and at worst hindering progress.334 
 
This classical view of internalism demonstrates that scientific beliefs are stabilized only 
from inside the scientific community, and this is enough to demarcate science from non-
science. Its focus is on the cognitive character of theories than the context that 
motivated their formulation. The sociological and institutional factors that influenced 
scientist´s choice of a theory are out-rightly irrelevant. The important fact is that internal 
consistency of a theory constitutes its cognitive value. Theory choice is conditioned 
only by the criteria that permit the acceptance of good theories over bad ones, or most 
effective over less effective ones. The vital factors in the process of scientific 
advancement are totally pure ideas. In fact, the history of the scientific advancement is 
typically a ´history of ideas´.  
 
The internalists believe that science, or possibly an individual sub-discipline within 
science, was a system of thought which was self-contained, self-regulating, and 
developed in accordance with its own internal logic. Internalist histories of science often 
focus on the rational reconstruction of scientific ideas and consider the development of 
these ideas wholly within the scientific world. The Internalist approach to the Scientific 
Revolution (also known as ´intellectual history´ of the Scientific Revolution) conceives 
the history of the emergence of the modern science as an intellectual enterprise largely 
independent from the socio-political context in which science was practised. It is 
concerned with the growth of particular scientific, often technical, ideas: with how 
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certain ideas in a field of science arose, were influenced by or, in turn, influenced ideas 
in other fields of science (or occasionally philosophy). For instance, Dijksterhuis 
concentrated mainly on free fall and projectile motion to explain the impact of the 
transition from Aristotelian natural philosophy to early modern mechanics because, for 
him, it was with Galileo that a new period began in the history of man´s thinking about 
nature.335 Lakatos identified the problem with this approach thus, 
 
...in constructing internal history the historian will be highly 
selective: he will omit everything that is irrational in the light of 
his rationality theory.336 
 
Intellectual history seem very ´whiggish´ due to the fact that it selects and judges past 
event based on the standard of rationality established by the contemporary evaluators. 
The standard introductory texts are Koyré´s, Études Galiléennes (1939) and Newtonian 
Studies (1965), Butterfield's The Origins of Modem Science (1949) and Hall's The 
Scientific Revolution (1954), all of which were almost exclusively concerned with the 
internal history of scientific ideas. However, among the ten historiographies treated in 
chapter two, Koyré particularly represented in a very outstanding manner the 
intellectual history of the Scientific Revolution (See section 2.2.3). It is as though he 
was saying that ´Copernicus begot Galileo, Galileo begot Newton, and Newton begot 
Modern Science´. Koyré´s aim was to trace the development of ideas over time in 
Science, and he was very good at it.  He demonstrated in Metapphysics and 
Measurement, (1968) that the idea of the internal logic of science is certified by the 
theory-dependence of observation. Metaphysical ideas are considered the source and 
guideline of ´proper´ science, and in general, ideas are seen as much more important 
than experience or even a deliberately set-up experiment, unless we are referring to 
thought-experiments.337 The belief in the importance of metaphysics drives from the fact 
that physics is the science of intrinsic quantities, and mathematics is the science of 
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discrete and continuous qualities. Invariably, both physics and mathematics have 
metaphysics as their fundamental base. 
 
Metaphysics and observation are very important in science, and well controlled 
experiment serves as the bridge between then. Hence, if one seeks to explain the 
scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the 
scientist and far from speculative theories. It was not the empirical nature of Galileo´s 
and Newton´s discoveries that carried the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th 
centuries, but a shift in perspective, a change in theoretical outlook toward the world—a 
´mutation´ of the human intellect. In brief, the logical way to explain discoveries is by 
explaining their metaphysical background. Koyré appeared certain that mathematization 
of nature was at the centre of the ´decisive mutation´ during the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Thus, there is no logic in establishing historical continuity between the medieval 
physics of Buridan and Nicole Oresme and classical physics of Galileo and Descartes 
since ¨the search for a mathematical law of nature is not a medieval problem.¨338 
 
 
4.3.1 EXTRA-SCIENTIFIC IDEAS 
 
Koyré´s internalistic approach made it appeared as if he was absolutely against the 
influence of forces in the development of science. On the contrary, he accepted the 
influence of extra-scientific ideas. The Koyréan thesis (see section 2.2, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) 
illustrated the role of non-testable general views about the world in the formulation of 
mathematical derivable and experimentally testable theories about the world. For him, 
scientific metaphysics influenced scientific theories. His internalistic approach became a 
paradigm for history of science as history of disembodied ideas, thereby heralding the 
distinction between the history of ideas and sociology of knowledge. At first sight it 
might appear Koyréan thesis is totally different from the general thesis of the historicist 
model. Such mistaken understanding of the Internalist approach of the Koyréan thesis is 
what gave the perception that the history of ideas is ´uninfluenced´ in contrast to the 
sociology of scientific knowledge propounded by other historicists.  
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Koyré accepted that ideas are influenced. He was open to the influence of ¨extra-
scientific¨ factors in science. His studies on Galileo and Newton attributed significant 
role to extra-scientific ideas in the development of science. Often, his works on both 
great scientists are labelled as pure history of ideas but his acceptance of the great role 
of metaphysics in science shows the contrary. We should not forget the impact of his 
researches on the German post-Reformation mystics on his view of science. Koyréan 
thesis is not absolutely opposite to the general thesis of the historicist model which 
consists in showing how the structure of scientific knowledge fits into history. Even 
though he resisted, mainly, from giving attention to socio-economic and institutional 
factors as did the Marxist and sociologist historiographies, he showed that the body of 
scientific knowledge has extra-scientific influence.  
 
Alexandre Koyré redirected the historiography of scientific ideas 
for several generations. He actually was among the creators of 
the historical sociology of scientific knowledge, together with 
Emile Meyerson whose work he continued, with Robert K. 
Merton with whom he overlapped for some decades, and with 
Thomas Kuhn who, in a way, continues his work.339 
 
He identified the scientific revolution as the establishment of a new ¨metaphysics, ¨ or 
set of deep conceptual presuppositions for scientific thought. In the Galileo Studies 
(1939) he attributed Galileo´s success in founding the first version of classical 
mechanics to the fact that he worked within the correct sort of metaphysical 
framework—the Platonic metaphysics, which showed that the basic furniture of the 
world consists in mathematical objects, moved according to simple mathematical laws. 
 
Just like Kuhn and Merton, he knows that important influences of problem-choice and 
other aspects of scientific processes are exercised by what is thought about sources, 
aims and kinds of legitimation of knowledge. Although he recognised mathematical 
principles as playing great roles in the works of Galileo and Newton, he showed that the 
vital factor was the metaphysics behind them. Such metaphysics are those statements 
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about the object of discussion—the world, society, the biological organism or the 
individual human being—which are untestable. Certainly, he was more interested in the 
body of knowledge than its image. But he showed with his illustrations that the body of 
knowledge which is built from the mathematical principles, invariably, mirrors the 
image of the extra-scientific ideas from which they emanate—in this case ´Platonic 
metaphysics´.  
 
Koyré’s illustration shows that ideas are influenced and science is not restricted only 
within the ´testable´. That a claim cannot be unambiguously verified or falsified (see 
confirmationism and falsificationism in sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2) does not mean that 
no meaningful debate about its truth can be conducted. On the contrary many great 
scientific debates focused on metaphysical generalisations which were in principle 
untestable. For instance, Newton´s view that the world consists of discrete particles with 
central forces acting between them, or Faraday´s that the world is a continuum of forces, 
the quantity of which is conserved, or the view of the molecular biologists that with 
growing knowledge of the chemistry of life, the phenomena of evolution will be 
reducible to molecular biology, are exactly such ´untestable´ propositions. 
 
Mathematics was highly appreciated because of its social status among the prominent 
scientist of that period. In fact, some historical studies would argue that the 
´mathematization of nature´ which has been held as a sine que non for the Scientific 
Revolution, precisely, describes the changing social status of mathematical practitioners 
and concomitant changes in attitudes about the relevance and value of mathematics, in 
everyday life but also in the higher echelons of thought.340 Precisely, the major 
difference there is among the internalists and externalists of the historicist model is that 
while the internalist considers extra-scientific ideas, the externalists focus on socio-
economic and institutional factors. They all converge on the view that ideas are 
influenced. 
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4.4 EXTERNALISM 
 
The externalists emphasised the importance of social and economic forces and 
downplayed any ´internal´ factors in the development and advancement of science. 
According to Schuster,  
 
Externalists, especially of the Marxist school, held that content 
as well as the direction of scientific knowledge was shaped by 
technological pulls that ultimately depended upon economic and 
social forces and structures.341 
 
The reason for this emphasis is that, in the Marxist view, the methods and means of 
production are the fundamental factors underlying the structure of a society.  Hessen 
states thus, 
 
The method of production of material existence conditions the 
social, political and intellectual process of the life of society.342 
 
For the extreme externalist position, the ideas and directions of science are completely 
shaped by social forces. It implies that the ´inside´ of the scientific field is, using John 
Locke´s aphorism, a tabula rasa to be imprinted on by society at large. The origin of the 
externalist interpretation of the Scientific Revolution is traced to Boris Hessen´s "The 
Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia¨(1931). Recent studies have shown 
that Hessen motives for an externalist account of the Scientific Revolution were not 
completely academic.343 At that time in the Soviet Union, the work of Albert Einstein 
was under attack by Communist Party philosophers; being supposedly motivated by 
bourgeois values—it was "bourgeois science¨344, and should henceforth be banned. As a 
result of this, Hessen was more concerned with the connections between Newton´s 
Principia and the simultaneous development of the bourgeoisie and capital, and the 
                                                 
341 John Schuster, ¨Internalist and Externalist Historiographies of the Scientific Revolution¨, p. 334 
342 B. Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton´s ´Principia´.(Sydney: Current Book, 1946) p.9 
343 H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry  p. 331 
344 Loren R Graham, "The socio-political Roots of Boris Hessen: Soviet Marxism and the History of 
Science", Social Studies of Science (London: SAGE, 1985) p. 711 
 
177 
 
 
creation of technical problems that were then solved by the application of Newton´s 
work. From this he draws the conclusion that the bourgeoisie were largely responsible 
for the creation of Newton´s work, and the Newtonian achievement should be seen from 
the perspective of a man being in the right place at the right time. 
 
Hessen´s paper at the Second International Congress of the History of Science, 
convened in London in 1931, was a lobbying tactic. The Communist Party philosophers 
had no doubt about the accuracy of Newton´s theories,  but Hessen thought that to 
demonstrate those theories as being motivated by bourgeois interest would justify the 
fact that scientific validity could exist whatever the motivations were for undertaking it. 
Nevertheless, there has been no study that gives evidence that Hessen paper succeeded 
in creating such effect in the internal Soviet philosophical battles over Einstein´s work. 
Even, Hessen´s paper was not able to achieve desired effect in his home country, 
although its wide effect in Western history of science is well noted.  
 
Notwithstanding that his work has been severally tagged as ¨Vulgar Marxism¨345, its 
insights on the relationship between society and science was, in its time, seen as novel 
and inspiring. It was a challenge to the notion that the history of science was the history 
of individual genius in action which had been the dominant view at least since William 
Whewell´s History of the Inductive Sciences in 1837. Most interestingly, the idea from 
Hessen´s thesis struck profound chords in the minds of a number of somewhat vaguely 
leftist scientists and sociologists among whose works include Robert Merton´s Science, 
Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century Englang (1938), Edgar Zilsel´s 
Sociological Roots of Science (1942), Joseph Needham´s Science and Civilisation in 
China (1954), and J. D. Bernal´s The Social function of Science (1939) and Science in 
History (1954). 
 
The emergence of a new wave of externalist studies has been related to the more general 
impact of postmodernism over the social sciences. Even if ‘nothing about this term is 
unproblematic´346, postmodernism is generally employed to define a cluster of thinkers 
who, during the 1970s and the 1980s, shared a sceptical position about the major 
foundations of Western thought and about the attainment of scientific truths. The 
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externalist approach at its extreme suggests that the scientists of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries were vividly inspired and interested by problems which were 
suggested by socio-economic factors. This type of materialist historiography was widely 
seen as an aggressive attempt to devalue science by displaying its ´banausic´ (utilitarian) 
and practical origins. It was understood that to depict scientists as motivated by 
mundane and material concerns, to see the genesis of science more in craftwork than in 
philosophy, and to show that scientific concerns were animated more by the search for 
solutions to technological problems than by the disinterested quest for truth which 
simply was denigration.347 
 
Perhaps a less polemic example of externalism is Bernal´s Science in History (1954) 
Bernal looks at art, medicine, government, trade, capital, engineering, and many other 
factors to demonstrate the principal motivators of scientific advancement. Unlike 
Hessen, he did not attempt to reduce the achievements of the great scientists to any 
forces or modes of production. For him, the drive that gave the scientific revolution its 
particular novelty was the dissolution of feudalism and the birth of merchant capitalism. 
This driving factors were not only visible in the scientific revolution there were present 
in the science of previous ages. According to Bernal, 
 
The ¨flourishing periods [of science] are found to coincide with 
economic activity and technical advance. The track science has 
followed—from Egypt to … England of the Industrial 
Revolution—is the same as that of commerce and industrial.348  
 
The transformation of science in any period in history coincides with its peculiar 
flourishing economic activity. Could this then signify that that any age without 
successful economic activity cannot witness tangible transformation of its science? 
 
In a very practical sense, it is difficult to draw definitive line between the scope of the 
internalist and externalist approach since none of the historians of the respective 
approaches could insist that any of them either paints a wholly complete picture of the 
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scientific revolution or could be adopted exclusively. It can be seen that both internalist 
and externalist positions agree on two main points: Science has an ´inside´ and an 
´outside´, and these two areas have minimal effect on each other. The ´inside´ of science 
consists of all of the ideas, theories and method, while the ´outside´ of science consists 
of the larger society.  
 
Both approaches debate on which area determine the course of science. The primary 
factor affecting who became proponents of one side or another in the argument was the 
relative desirability of incorporating Marxist thinking into the process of scientific 
development. In other words, for scientists in the West, during the Cold War, anything 
that smacked of Marxism or Communism was to be avoided, while for scientists behind 
the Iron Curtain, the converse was the case. Steven Shapin suggested that neither of the 
approaches seems to have been properly established as valid or viable and it wasn’t long 
before a professed eclectic approach became all the rage.349 
 
Resuming the implication of the internalist and externalist debate 
 
As various illustrations from the internalist-externalist debate has shown, internal 
historians of science do not deny the obvious truth that an activity carried on by a 
scientist living in a society has a valid social history. Likewise, external historians of 
science do not deny that the content of science is an essential part of the story. The 
internalist and externalist debate created a richer contextualization of scientific 
knowledge.  Its result is a sub-discipline of history which is flourishing in its own terms, 
and which more generally is making a major contribution to our understanding of how 
and why science has become such an overwhelming feature of the Western culture. 
However, at heart of that debate is contained a basic question about the nature of 
science: what is the relationship between the producers and consumers of scientific 
knowledge? The answer to this question must, in some way, inform the method by 
which the history of science and technology is conducted. The question itself contains 
an entire host of philosophical questions: what is the nature of scientific truth? What 
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does objectivity mean in a scientific context? How does change in scientific theories 
occur? Shapin wrote that  
 
Treating externalism and internalism as theories of scientific 
change is the most coherent way to formulate them: scientific 
change proceeds (wholly/ mainly/partly, in response to 
intrinsic/extrinsic factors.350 
 
This formulation could serve to bring a lasting resolution to the complex 
historiographical issues in the ´Scientific Revolution´. One of the major impacts the 
internalist-externalist debate has brought to the historiography of science is that it has 
demonstrated that science does not have any ´immanent logic or rationality´, with a 
dynamic force, that guarantees scientific change. Some historically oriented 
philosophers like Lakatos, Laudan, McMullin, Shapere, and Toulmin had in their 
account of the scientific change demonstrated the role external-social and internal-
cognitive factors play in science, but were more inclined to appealing to a historical 
notion of rational progress.  
 
What differentiates the notion of rationality of the aforementioned philosophers with 
that of the historicist accounts of the scientific revolution is that they regard science as 
being globally rational. Their attempt is inversely contrary to the notion of the scientific 
rationality that the historicists’ historiography would accept. Nevertheless, the 
arguments most of the theses of scientific revolution, treated in chapter two, highlighted 
in the internalist-externalist debate helps us to see their enthusiasm and interest in 
showing how science is historically or locally rational. This type of rationality is quite 
different from the historical notion of rational progress the aforementioned philosophers 
adopted. Likewise, it is quite distanced from the logical notion of rational inferential 
argued by the traditionalist accounts of scientific change. They, therefore, insist that if 
we must talk about rationality of the Scientific Revolution that rationality should be 
historical or contextual—situated in a particular time. Scientific knowledge does not 
have global rationality. The only way we can understand adequately scientific 
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rationality is by employing the method of hermeneutic contextualism in discussing the 
science of any particular period and location 
 
 
4.5 HERMENEUTIC CONTEXTUALISM 
 
After the passionate debates of the 1950s and 1960s, most historians embraced an 
eclectic position combining ‘externalist’ with ‘internalist’ factors with the aim of 
explaining scientific change. Contextualism defines the externalists and internalists´ 
demonstration of what constitutes the ´insides´ of the sciences as mistaken. Schuster 
states thus, 
 
Inside a science we do not find concepts or ideas or theories 
rattling around in a void. We find a social institution: People in 
social and institutional relations—the people being professional 
practitioners of that science.351 
 
It shows that science is not wholly created out of a continuum of ideas as internalist 
would suppose, neither is it wholly moulded by socio-economic forces as the externalist 
insist. Science is influenced, and in turn influences the larger society in which it is a 
part. The misleading image of science as having norms and processes that are non-
contextual drives heavily from the appearance most textbooks have given of the 
physical sciences. These textbooks or their equivalent are mainly repository of the 
finished achievements of modern physical scientists. They contain few historical 
elements which attribute particular natural phenomena to the historical personages who 
first discovered them. Invariably, the image of science they present shows its important 
goal as mainly discovery. Hence, ¨to make a discovery becomes achieving one of the 
closest approximations to a property right that the scientific career affords.352  
 
Nevertheless, many scientific discoveries, particularly the most interesting and 
important, are not the sort of event about which the questions ¨Where?¨ and, more 
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particularly, ¨When? ¨ can appropriately be asked. To ask such question would be to 
demonstrate a fundamental inappropriateness in our image of discovery. But with the 
instrumentality of hermeneutics the historian could make fundamental conceptual 
readjustment of history so as to recapture the past or, conversely, of the past to develop 
toward the present. Just as the in the case of Kuhn, ¨the discovery of hermeneutics did 
more than make history seem consequential.353  
 
An elaborated history of science would not only concentrate on the substance of science 
as knowledge but also on the activities of scientists as a social group. If one thinks of 
knowledge as having a separate existence from the people who use it, one almost 
inevitably ends ups espousing a kind of Platonism, placing primacy on some Form that 
exists independently of the physical world. Given the historical fact of scientific 
revolutions, it would be impossible to argue for an idealistic Platonism without ending 
up with a Whiggish history of ideas. Such were the case where mathematical Platonism 
and mathematical realism were deployed as stance justifying the truth, pure objective 
and scientific realism. However, as Richard H. Shryock stated, 
 
We do not think that the history of science is sullied by the 
inclusion of social backgrounds, but neither are we convinced 
that scientific ideas are simply products of economic 
determinism. [The history of science] can be understood only in 
terms of a constant interplay between internal logic and 
environment.354 
 
The new hermeneutic contextualism, unlike externalists, recognise that scientific 
judgements about pertinent experimental or analytical results, or about correct theory, 
can sometimes only be understood in terms of the technical tradition within which they 
play a part, and may be insulated from wider social considerations. This is not 
tantamount to internalism since eclectic historians of science would argue (or assume) 
that in such cases the technical tradition itself is a socially constructed, or culturally 
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determined phenomenon, and that work within that tradition is affected by social 
interactions between the relevant specialists.355 However, the question still remains if 
there is really any distinction between internalism and externalism in the historicist 
model of the scientific revolution. For Kuhn, the labels ¨internalist¨ and ¨externalist¨ no 
longer quite fit. The reason is that those who have concentrated primarily on individual 
sciences, e.g. Alexandre Koyré, Rupert hall etc., have not hesitated to attribute a 
significant role in scientific development to extrascientific ideas. What they have 
resisted primarily is attention to socio-economic and institutional factors as treated by 
such writers as B. Hessen, Robert Merton, Zilsel etc.356 
 
 
4.6 THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN THE ´SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION´ 
 
The Internalist-externalist debate brought philosophical insights to the role of history in 
the structure of scientific advancement. It changed the sort of epistemological questions 
that philosophers of science work on. The epistemological question for traditional 
philosophers was, “Why should one believe a given body of knowledge claims?¨357 But 
now historically enlightened philosophers ask, “Why should one shift from one body of 
knowledge claims to another?¨358 The answer to the latter question does not involve 
evaluative criteria as absolutes, when comparing a theory to the empirical evidence. It 
highlights the interplay of the both objective and subjective or extra-scientific factors.  
 
As earlier mentioned in this work, the traditional account of the scientific development 
has the view of science as a repository of accumulated facts, discovered by individuals 
at specific periods in history. Given this traditional view of science, the historian 
therefore sees his/her main task as that of giving answer to the questions about who 
discovered what, where, and when. Even though the task seems straightforward, many 
                                                 
355 Steven Shapin makes a forceful plea for a historicist sociology of knowledge approach in ‘Discipline 
and Bounding: The History and Sociology of Science as Seen Through the Externalism–Internalism 
Debate´, pp. 352-3; He also presents a manifesto for the application of sociology of knowledge to 
historiography in Steven Shapin, ‘Social Uses of Science’, in The Ferment of Knowledge, eds. G. 
Rousseau and R. Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 93–139.  
356 T. S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension,  p. 32 
357 Thomas Kuhn, MIT MC240, box 23, folder 21, “Scientific development and lexical change,” p. 12; 
¨MIT MC 240¨ refers to the Thomas S. Kuhn papers, at the Institute Archives and Special Collections, 
MIT Libraries, Cambridge, MA, quoted in James A. Marcum, Thomas Kuhn´s Revolution: An Historical 
Philosophy of Science, p. 121  
358 Ibid. 
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historians found it difficult and doubted whether these are the right kinds of questions to 
ask concerning science’s historical record. “The result of all these difficulties and 
doubts is a historiographical revolution in the study of science.¨359 
 
This revolution changed the sorts of questions historians ask by revising the underlying 
assumptions concerning the approach to reading historical records. Rather than reading 
history backwards and imposing current ideas and values on the past, the texts and 
documents are read within their historical period, thereby maintaining their integrity. It 
is important to ask, what did science mean to the scientific revolutionaries?  But one of 
the problems inherent in this question is that the revolutionaries rarely used the word 
science. Instead, they talked and wrote about natural philosophy or the philosophy of 
nature. Nature, to them, meant the natural world, that is, what was natural, what was not 
made by human hands. 
 
I would suggest that using the expression the philosophy of nature was really a 
hangover from the medieval world. In other words, questions of science were subsumed 
under the study of philosophy, and since medieval man called the phenomenal world 
Nature, it was quite logical to refer to the study of Nature as the philosophy of Nature. 
Some works like Epistemological and Political Implications of the Scientific Revolution 
(1992) would argue that the Scientific Revolution should not be seen as a revolution in 
science, because there was nothing like our notion of science until it began to be forged 
in the Scientific Revolution out of previously distinct elements which includes the 
mathematization of nature with synthesis of mechanic-corpuscular philosophy.360 
 
 The historiographical revolution in the study of science’s record had implications for 
how science is viewed and understood philosophically. One of such implications is that 
the dichotomy which traditional accounts seem to make between the ´context of 
discovery´ and the ´context of justification´ does not really hold in the historical 
analysis of the actual situations in which knowledge is gained, accepted, and 
assimilated. Kuhn wrote that rather than being elementary logical or methodological 
distinctions, which would thus be prior to the analysis of scientific knowledge, they now 
                                                 
359 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p.3 
360 See Wilbur Applebaum, ´´Epistemological and Political Implications of the Scientific Revolution´, in 
Science, Pseudo-Science, and Utopianism in Early Modern Thought, ed. Stephen A. McKnight (London: 
University of Missouri Press, 1992), pp. 167 -202. 
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seem integral parts of a traditional set of substantive answers to the very questions upon 
which they have been deployed.361  
 
Therefore, seeing that the efforts in the traditional analysis of scientific progress has 
failed to establish a stable and theory-neutral data or observations to justify theories—a 
search that has also eluded the traditional western philosophy for the past three 
centuries—the historiographical revolution offered that recourse to the history of 
science could be effective means to actualize that. 
 
Having used the historicist model of the scientific revolution to illustrate that scientific 
claims are historically, and locally (Europe) determined, the next chapter will deal on 
the philosophical problem that ensues from this claim—How do we explain the 
universality of modern science? Is modern science really universal or Does it only have 
global extension? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
361 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 9 
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SECTION III 
 
SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES AND UNIVERSALITY OF SCIENCE: 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.1 UNIVERSALITY OF MODERN SCIENCE 
 
The issue of the universality of modern science is largely tied to the justification of the 
traditional scientific claims on the basis of the ´scientific´ processes of the 16th and 17th 
centuries being more ´rational´ and ´objective´ than its predecessors. This justification 
drives from the fact that scientific processes of the early modern period are seen to be 
very progressive and their progressiveness provides the guaranty for the authenticity of 
their claims—a notion well supported by the ´miracle argument´ for scientific realism. 
Interestingly, the philosophical implications raised in the historicist´s appraisal of  
traditional scientific claims show that all ´sciences´ in history have similar innate 
character—to expand their scope in a way that their contents are truly ¨hardcore¨ of their 
statements. However, this is an ´ideal´ which no science has achieved since there are 
always factors (metaphysical, sociological and extra-scientist) that relativize their 
contents. The case is not different for modern science. In fact, the idea of universality 
comes in when scientific traditions are shown to advance without any link to the context 
within which they were cultivated. But then the peculiar traits that mark each science 
remain with it even when it has transcended various localities.  
 
From the illustrations of the historicist model of the scientific revolution narrative we 
learn that in the development of human civilizations there was an Indian science, a 
Chinese science, a Greek science, a science in Arabic language, a science of European 
Christian Middle Age, a science of European Renaissance, a science called ´modern´, 
and then a ¨contemporary¨ science. Nevertheless, the asymmetrical characteristics of the 
debate between continuity vs. discontinuity, internalist vs. externalist, physico-
mathematical vs. magico-mystical draw our attention not only to their philosophical 
insights on the progress of science but also the issue of the universality of modern 
science. How can we defend the universality of science when the practices of scientific 
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investigation, its products, and its norms are historically variant? Besides, scientific 
work is, sometimes, culturally variant even within the same field. For instance, high-
energy physics, low-temperature physics, molecular biology, meteorology and 
paleontology are in many ways quite different epistemic practices across Europe, North 
America and Asia. Hence, how is modern science universal when its processes are 
explained by reference to the factors that can be found, and shown to be found, in 
particular localities?   
 
In section 2.7.2.1 Needham argued that the epoch making events like Capitalism, 
Renaissance and Reformation were factors that guaranteed the occurrence of scientific 
revolution in Europe, and not china. If these three historical events were what provided 
the ingredients for the transformation of science in the 17th century Europe does it mean 
the 17th century China did not have a dynamic commerce that could have facilitated 
similar breakthrough with its already advanced astronomical science? And if those 
factors did not really constitute the intricate elements that engineered the advancement 
of the 17th century science from its medieval root what factors really made the logic of 
the early modern science appear more ´scientific´ than its predecessors?  These 
questions bring us to another important one: Is there a basic difference in modes of 
thought—both in content and more especially in logic and formulation—between 
Western and non-Western societies? Or between ¨traditional¨ and ¨modern¨, ¨pre-
scientific¨ and ¨science oriented¨, literate and non-literate, industrial and non-industrial, 
¨developed¨ and ¨developing¨, etc.,? 362 
 
The dominant illustrations from the historicist analysis of the modern science traditional 
claims opine that there is no fundamental difference in mode of thought between 
modern Western and traditional non-Western societies. However, some important 
differences in the sciences of these societies can be accounted for without contradicting 
the view of the congenial similitude of their scientific practices. Although there are 
important national differences in the style, direction, standards, and goals of scientific 
work, it does not mean that different scientific cultures are self-enclosed or mutually 
                                                 
362 See Robin Horton, & Ruth Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought. (London: Faber and Faber, 1973, p. 11 
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uncomprehending. Nor does it mean that the epistemically interesting differences in 
scientific cultures neatly map onto national, linguistic, or other culture boundaries.363 
 
 
5.2 FACTS AND SCIENTIFIC STATEMENTS ABOUT NATURE 
 
Generally, the controversy regarding the universality of modern science does not, 
typically, have to do with the actual constituents of scientific phenomena but rather, the 
propositions given to the account of those phenomena. No one doubts the motion of 
falling bodies to the centre of the earth. For instance, an Orange falls from its tree to the 
ground and not in an upward movement because of the active force that pulls it 
downward. Precisely, the question of universality of science arises from the nature of 
propositions given to account the fall of the orange and the values we attach to the 
motion of the fall of such orange. According to Cobern and Loving,  
 
The question of universality does not arise over the phenomenon 
of falling. The question of universality arises over the fashion of 
the propositions given to account for the phenomenon of falling, 
the fashion of the discourse through which we communicate our 
thoughts about the phenomenon and the values we attach to the 
phenomenon – including the account offered by a standard 
scientific description.364  
 
The important fact reiterated here is that science consists of a body of knowledge about 
the world. However, this does not imply that scientific knowledge progresses steadily 
with the expansion of the accepted propositions that are given to account for the 
scientific phenomena. In the first place such understanding makes science appear as if 
its propositions capture wholly the true nature of physical things. This positivist 
understanding of science would maintain that the meaning of a scientific theory is 
exhausted by empirical and logical considerations of what would verify or falsify it. A 
                                                 
363 See Joseph Rouse, ¨What Are Cultural Studies of Scientific Knowledge?¨,  Configurations, 1992, 1 
(1), 1-22 
364 William W. Cobern & Cathleen C. Loving, ¨Defining ´Science´ in a multicultural world¨,  
Reconsidering Science Learning, eds. Eileen Scanlon, Patricia Murphy, Jeff Thomas & Elizabeth 
Whiteleg (London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004) p.195 
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scientific theory, then, is a condensed summary of possible observations. Hence, 
scientific theories are built up by the logical manipulation of observations365, and 
scientific progress consists in increasing the correctness, number, and range of potential 
observations that its theories indicate. It is such understanding of science that has given 
credence to the universality of modern science.  
 
For the logical positivists, theories develop through a method that transforms individual 
data points into general statements. This indicates why positivists tried to develop a 
logic of science that would make solid the inductive process of moving from individual 
facts to general claims within the context of discovery. 
 
They maintained this stance on the basis that the justification we have for believing a 
scientific theory is based on that theory´s solid connection to data. It is an empiricist 
reducibility thesis according to which all terms suited to describe actual or possible 
empirical facts are full definable by terms referring exclusively to aspects of immediate 
experience. However, if meanings are reduced to observations, there are many 
¨synonyms,¨ in the form of theories or statements that look as though they should have 
very different meanings but do not make different predictions. In An Introduction to 
Science and Technology studies (2010), Sergio Sismondo, gave an example of such. He 
wrote that Copernican astronomy was initially designed to duplicate the (mostly 
successful) predictions of the earlier Ptolemaic system; in terms of observations, then, 
the two systems were roughly equivalent, but they clearly meant very different things, 
since one put the Earth in the centre of the universe, and the other had the Earth 
spinning around the Sun.366 
 
                                                 
365 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, New York: Dover, 2nd ed., 1952[first published 1936]. 
The reprinted version with a new introduction, London: Penguin, 2001 is used. In this work the concept 
underlying Ayer's discussion is the "principle of verifiability," which defines a statement as being 
"literally meaningful" only if it either is logically necessary ("analytical") or can be empirically verified 
as being either true or false. Under this definition, metaphysical statements are not literally meaningful, 
and so are properly part of theology rather than philosophy. See also, Rudolf Carnap, Der Logische 
Aufbau der Welt. Berlin-Schlachtensee: Weltkreis-Verlag. (English translation by Rolf A. George, The 
Logical Structure of the World and Pseudo-problems in Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967) By utilizing logic and radical reductionism, Carnap tried to show how one's knowledge of 
the world can be reduced to sense data and how our talk about the external world is built up from our 
immediate sense data. 
366 Sergio Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology studies. 2nd ed. (West Sussex: 
Blackwell, 2010) p.2 
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In fact, many apparently meaningful claims are not systematically related to 
observations, because theories are often too abstract to be immediately cashed out in 
terms of data. Likewise, that a claim cannot be unambiguously verified or falsified does 
not mean that no meaningful debate about its truth can be conducted. On the contrary, 
virtually all the great scientific debates concerned ambiguous metaphysical statements. 
These debates focused on metaphysical generalisations which were in principle 
untestable.  
 
Very good examples of such propositions are: Newton´s view that the world consists of 
discrete particles with central forces acting between them; Faraday´s view that the world 
is a continuum of forces, the quantity of which is conserved; and the view of the 
molecular biologists that with growing knowledge of the chemistry of life the 
phenomena of evolution will be reducible to molecular biology. More still, Newton´s 
assertion that the whole is simply the sum of its component parts provided the crucial 
foundation stone for his pivotal work on gravity. But from where did he get the idea? 
The assertion cannot, of course, be proved. As we could see in section 2.9 Boris Hessen 
went far to demonstrate that the rise of capitalism after the demise of European feudal 
society provided the underlying principles that fomented Newton´s Principia.   
 
Consequently, it is as a result of the logical inconsistencies implicit in positivism that 
the Shapin and Kuhnian theses described such understanding of science is implausible 
(See sections 2.11, 2.11.2, 2.11.3, 2.12, 2.13.1, 2.13.3 and 2.13.4). Michael Reiss shared 
similar perspective thus,  
 
It is not too much of a caricature to state that science is seen by 
many as the way to truth…. The advance of science then consists 
of scientists discovering eternal truths that exist independently 
of them and of the cultural context in which these discoveries 
are made….Truth is supposed to emerge unambiguously from 
experiment like Pallas Athene, the goddess of wisdom, springing 
nature and unsullied from the head of Zeus.367 
                                                 
367 Michael Reiss, ¨What is Science? Teaching Science in Secondary Schools¨, in Reconsidering Science 
Learning, eds. Eileen Scanlon, Patricia Murphy, Jeff Thomas & Elizabeth Whitelegg (London: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2004) p.4 
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The understanding of science as a truth-seeking enterprise is traceable to its 
mathematical reductionism. However, the hypothetico-deductive methodology of 
Christian Huygens (1628 – 1695) suggested that science and mathematics were actually 
different fields, and could not be treated the same way. The distinction he made between 
the two was the idea of proof. He stated that mathematics and geometry could prove 
something beyond doubt, whereas science can never prove something emphatically. 
Science, merely, gives a probability that a certain finding is true. Although the facts 
from which scientific knowledge is constituted are derived from accurate observations 
and careful experiments that can be checked by repeating them, such knowledge is still 
conditioned by the experience and guiding principle of the community of the scientist 
that work it out. Besides other socio-cultural factors like the technological or economic 
needs (see sections 2.8, 2.9 and 2.9.1) of the society also affect the direction of the 
research whereby those facts are studied. But the fact that science and society are 
inevitably, and inexorably, intertwined does not necessarily require one to abandon all 
belief in the objectivity of science. Alan Chalmers writes thus, 
 
The natural world does not behave in one way for capitalists 
and in another way for socialists, in one way for males and 
another for females, in one way for Western cultures and 
another for Eastern cultures.368 
 
In essence, the behaviour of the natural world is not ambiguous but our understanding 
of it may. A scientist´s perceptions of the natural world, as well as his or her 
interpretations of it, are conditioned by the aptitude of his or her senses and the culture 
that nurtured them. Therefore, there can be no single, universal, acultural science. The 
implication is that all sciences of various civilizations are tainted with unique 
ethnographic colourations which explain their usual identification within such 
civilization. But if science and its content are so ethnographically determined how can 
we explain the ´universality of modern science´?—a science whose presumed universal 
practice is still invisible, and often misunderstood in most locations in Africa, East-Asia 
and South-America? Why is it that in most parts of these locations one could find many 
scientists and students that are very good in mathematics and physics but lack the 
                                                 
368 Alan Chalmers, Science and Its Fabrication (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) p. 112 
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appropriate measure on how to give practical solution to concrete local problems? How 
universal is modern science? Is universality the appropriate term to attribute to the 
concurrent presence of modern scientific practice in most localities of the world?  
Perhaps, we would have to accept that scientific knowledge is universal only in the 
sense that locomotives can move everywhere. They can move in all parts of the world, 
provided that the rail network has been built for them.369 
 
 
5.3 ´STRONG LOCALISM´ THEORY 
 
The non-restriction of the developmental character of scientific knowledge within 
particular locality provides the demarcation between the ´socio-cultural´ theory of the 
historicist model of the Scientific Revolution and the ´strong localism´ theory of various 
sociological studies of scientific knowledge. Both the strong localists/constructivists 
and most historicists treated in chapter two maintained that scientific research is a 
process of social production and certification, which must be understood in terms of 
social categories. However, the strong localists argued that locality determines the 
practice and outcomes of science, leaving a permanent imprint on them and limiting 
their applicability. According to David Livingstone, 
 
Science is not to be thought of as some transcendent entity that 
bears no trace of the parochial or contingent. It needs rather to 
be qualified by temporal and regional adjectives. At one scale of 
operations, science is an ancient, Chinese, a medieval Islamic, 
an early modern, English, a Renaissance French, a Jeffersonian 
American, an enlightenment Scottish thing—or some modifying 
variant.370 
The localism theory demonstrates that scientific products are ´occasioned´ by the 
circumstances of their production. ´Occassioned´ here means that the circumstances of 
production are an integral part of the products which emerge.  
Knorr-Cetina states thus, 
                                                 
369 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan & John Law. (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993 [1988]) p. 226 
370 David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in its place: Geographies of Science, p.13 
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This contextual location reveals that the products of scientific 
research are fabricated and negotiated by particular agents at a 
particular time and place; that these products are carried by the 
particular interests of these agents, and by local rather than 
universally valid interpretations; and that the scientific actors 
play on the very limits of the situational location of their action. 
In short, the contingency and contextuality of scientific action 
demonstrates that the products of science are hybrids which 
bear the mark of the very indexical logic which characterizes 
their production....371 
 
Thus, we are not just referring to contextual factors which influence scientific work that 
in its core is non-contextual.  For most of the historicists discussed in chapter two, 
although science is a form of social practice that takes place in some location and is 
performed by the people of that location, the social-cultural imprint on the outcomes of 
science does not limit its applicability.  This explains why most of the theses showed 
how inter-exchange of scientific practices and outcomes between locations led to the 
scientific breakthrough of the early modern period. What are known as scientific 
breakthroughs build, whether this is acknowledged or not, on previous work and rest on 
a tradition of understanding, even when the effect of the breakthrough will be to 
undermine those understandings.372 For instance, James Watson´s account of the 
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, read in conjunction with the story of 
Rosalind Franklin´s contributions to that discovery.373 The continuity thesis (see section 
2.3.1) showed the influence of the medieval science on its modern counterpart. The 
Kuhnian, Shapin, Needham, Yates and Butterfield and Hessen theses showed constant 
extra-scientific influences and exchange of science outcomes between localities.  
Likewise, various tents of the Greek and Arabic science were shown to be instrumental 
to the development of some fields of modern science 
                                                 
371 K. D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual 
Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981) p.58 
372 Helen E. Longino, ¨Values and Objectivity¨, in Philosophy of Science, eds. Curd, M & Cover, J. A 
(New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998) p.175 
373 See Anne Sayre, Rosalind Franklin and DNA. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975) 
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Nevertheless, the formulation of the ´strong localism´ theory drives from the response to 
the purported account of the Western modern science as the Standard Account of 
science. Virtually all the theses of the Scientific Revolution had based their discussion 
on the progress of science on the Ancient Greek and European culture. It implied that 
Western science was recognised simply as science, and even when Western scientists 
occasionally took note of non-Western indigenous knowledge of nature, that knowledge 
was distinctively labelled ethnoscience374. It does not mean that such ethnoscience does 
not have value—It, rather, does not qualify as Standard Account of science. But then, to 
tag the indigenous knowledge of nature as ethnoscience portrays a clear 
misunderstanding of the nature of science since all science is set in a cultural milieu. In 
this case, all science will be ethnoscience as we cannot validly distinguish a number of 
ethnosciences from a single international non-ethnoscientific science. Hence, in the 
1990s, non-Western peoples and some scholars within the West began to formally and 
overtly resist this imperial Western attitude toward indigenous knowledge of nature. 
This movement was abetted by the programme for the social study of science, founded 
in the 1970s at Edinburgh375, which argued that all science is socially contingent and 
culturally embedded. New epistemological perspectives such as multiculturalism376, 
post-colonialism and postmodernism377 rose to challenge the conventional Western 
wisdom on the relationship between science and culture. The Standard Account issue 
was also contested. 
 
However, unlike the ¨Strong Programme´ of the social constructivist tradition at 
Edinburgh the historicist model suggests that the plausible means of accounting for the 
purported universality of science and ´delocalization of scientific knowledge` lies in the 
replication of equipment (for experiment), the training of observes (scientists), the 
circulation of routine practices and the standardization of methods and measures. When 
equipment, instruments, theories, statements, expressions of scientific laws and training 
                                                 
374 See Behrens, C.A, ¨The scientific basis for Shipibo soil classification and land use: changes in soil-
plant associations with cash cropping¨, American Anthropologist, 1989, 91:83 -100 and Berlin, B. 
¨Speculations on the growth of ethnobotanical nomenclature¨, Language in Society, 1972, 1:51-86 
375 See D. Bloor, and B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge. A Sociological Analysis. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996) 
376 See D. Bloor, and B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge. A Sociological Analysis. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996) 
377 See W. B Stanley, & N. W.Brickhouse, ¨Multiculturalism, universalism, and science education¨, 
Science Education, 1994, 78: 387- 98 
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are standardized, the same kinds of practices or units will become accepted as default 
options in multiple localities. Hence, all these procedures reiterates why scientific 
research is a process of social production and certification, which must be understood in 
terms of social categories. 
 
5.4 UNIVERSALITY OF SCIENCE AS A PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA 
 
The philosophical tradition of the ancient Greeks provided the basis for the 
epistemologically formulation of the universality of science. The ancient Greeks 
philosophers established the logos as the principle of rational thought, together with the 
requirement of intelligibility, which refers to the idea of being.378 Their conception of 
the Logos strongly highlighted the role of mathematical thinking. This is because of the 
mathematical method of reasoning that overcomes the approximations of discourse in 
ordinary language. The mathematical thinking is also reflected in the Logos´ ability to 
serve as a model, because of its ideal objects that make possible to relate, through 
rigorous logical reasoning, the one and the multiple, the identical and the varied, by 
referring one to each other the elements of geometrical figures. Hence, the logos verifies 
always the validity of established meaning.  
 
In other words, every utterance asks for its own criticism, thereby illustrating ´the 
formation of positivist thought in archaic Greece´379 This internal criticism was later 
brought to full maturity in positivism and the Falsificationism of the logical positivists 
and logical empiricists. For instance, the Popper´s scientist is first and foremost 
sceptical, unwilling to accept anything as proven, and willing to throw away anything 
that runs contradictory to the evidence. For both positivism and Falsificationism, the 
features of science that make it scientific are formal relations between theories and data, 
whether through the rational construction of theoretical edifices on top of empirical data 
or the rational dismissal of theories on the basis of empirical data. Just like the Logos, 
these formalist pictures of science have analogous views about mathematics. Invariably, 
they depend on stereotypes of mathematics as a logical activity. 
                                                 
378 Jean Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought Among the Greeks (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983) 
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Similar permanent criticism was also guaranteed in Descartes affirmation of the 
possibility of a universal doubt. With Descartes, doubt is founding of a knowledge that 
is to be, at the same time, and for this very reason, universal. This implies that the only 
true knowledge is that knowledge that, for every thinking subject, overcomes the 
obstacles opposed by doubt. In fact, Descartes´ Meditations showed his conviction in 
establishing a science that is certain and effective with geometrie. Therein he proposed 
to look back to the ego cogito as the first evidence eventually able to provide an 
absolute foundation to knowledge.380 Hence, the science that is established by the 
doubting being is in all ramifications certain and universal. However, one important 
question needs clarification here: to what degree are scientific results and scientific 
theories acceptable to every human being? This aspect of the universality of science 
concerns the logical status of scientific theories and results and will be discussed as the 
epistemological aspect 
 
 
5.5 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ASPECT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF SCIENCE 
 
The universality of science is, often, taken to derive from the universality of its methods 
and the way its results are shared. The natural sciences are considered universal because 
they follow the scientific method and their results can be shared and understood by 
different human beings. Many schools of science philosophy define these two properties 
as “intersubjectivity” and “testability of science.” At the root of this concept is the idea 
that scientific results can be communicated in an unambiguous way and tested by 
anybody who wishes to do so. However, nowhere in the laboratory do we find the 
´nature´ or ´reality´ which is so crucial to the descriptive interpretation of reality. 
 Karin D. Knorr-Cetina wrote thus, 
 
In the laboratory scientists operate upon (and within) a highly 
preconstructed artifactual reality. It is clear that measurement 
instruments are the products of human effort, as are articles, 
                                                 
380 See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by John Cottingham (Cambridge: 
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books, and the graphs and print-outs produced. But the source 
materials with which scientists work are also preconstructed. 
Plants and assay rats are specially grown and selectively bred. 
Most of the substances and chemicals used are purified and are 
obtained from the industry which serves the science or from 
other laboratories. The water which runs from a special faucet 
is sterilized. ´Raw´ materials which enter the laboratory are 
carefully selected and ´prepared´ before they are subjected to 
´scientific´ tests.... the laboratory displays itself as a site of 
action from which ´nature´ is as much as possible excluded 
rather than included.381 
 
As far as simple, down-to-earth facts of science are concerned, the explanation of 
scientific methods and results seems to be relatively simple. However, when it comes to 
more sophisticated theories and results, the task becomes very prohibitive. Scientific 
theories and facts are often expressed in the kind of mathematical language or 
theoretical jargon that is far removed from the vernacular and outside the experience of 
ordinary sensual perception. To understand a scientific theory and thus to be able to test 
it, one must belong to a defined scientific community, master the language used by its 
members, and share the methodologies specific to that community. A way out of this 
dilemma is to state that scientific results are universally testable in principle. However, 
this statement does not solve the problem. The question remains how can this principle 
be realized? Finding an answer to it lies in showing how science is intertwined with 
society and not excluded from it as most historicist model of the Scientific Revolution 
have shown. 
 
The discussion in section 3.4 showed how realism depicts the core epistemic 
justification of science universality. It has taken scientific theories to be generally fairly 
abstract. According to realist intuitions, there is no way to understand the increase in 
predictive power of science, and the technical ability that flows from that predictive 
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Knorr-Cetina and Michael Joseph Mulkay, London: Sage, 1983, p. 119 
 
198 
 
 
power, except in terms of an increase of truth. This implies that if science accumulates 
truths, it does so on a rational basis, not through luck, thereby justifying the universal 
obtainability of its results. However, the universality of science appears to be measured 
in terms of the trust we place in science. In the normal daily life, the layman hardly has 
direct contact with pure science. All he knows of science is its manifestation as 
technological product, and he usually trusts the workings of those products. For 
instance, when he presses an electrical bell and it does not ring, he does not blame the 
science of electricity, but rather he thinks that something has gone wrong with the wires 
or switches. This shows a manifestation of his confidence in the technology and, 
invariably, in the science that lies behind this technology. 
 
If we accept this criterion, we can say that science is universal because our trust in 
technology is universal. But the fact remains that most people know almost nothing 
about the science upon which their technology is based, such that this kind of trust in 
technology can be equivocated with a magical view about the manner in which these 
products work. We can suppose that there is a spirit at work behind every instrument. In 
fact, we can compare this kind of trust with that which people place in religion and 
deities. Of course, science does not deal with values per se, but it contains values in the 
execution of scientific research and in the application of scientific knowledge. There are 
values in science and there are values of science. The search for truth in science 
imposes on the researcher a moral conduct, which is not unlike the moral conduct of a 
person in the broader society. 
Invariably, the theories of inter-subjectivity and the testability of science (as we have 
seen in the Cartesian formula, Confirmationism and Falsificationism) do not prove the 
universality of science but rather point to its potential. Science disciplines are 
potentially intersubjective, and scientific methods are potentially testable. These two 
potentialities can be actualized only through conscious human effort, and their 
realization depends on various factors that are not dictated only by the logic of science 
itself. For example, we can decide in principle between any two rival theories by doing 
a suitable experiment, which is usually called a crucial experiment. But in practice, to 
be able to perform an experiment demands many prerequisites as Knorr-Cetina has 
shown in the above citation. One has to have access to relevant technologies—to be able 
to build the necessary instruments—and these technologies are not always accessible. 
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Historical science presents us with many examples of theories that have had to remain 
undecided because the relevant experimental technology or instrumentation is not 
available. The question of the speed of light—whether light travels at a finite speed or 
instantaneously—is only one example. 
Thus, in its epistemological aspect, the universality of science expresses not a reality but 
rather an ideal. The potential for this ideal to become a reality depends on how much 
scientific knowledge human beings can possess. In other words, science is universal to 
the extent we want it to be universal. 
 
 
5.6 THE SOCIAL ASPECT 
 
The functionalist view of the Mertonian thesis illustrates that science served a social 
function, providing certified knowledge. Hence, as a social function each culture has 
peculiar axis on which it measures scientific development. The notion as to what 
constitutes science differs over time and between cultures.382 Though certain principles, 
such as testability and repeatability, may be central to modern science, it is now widely 
held that the question ´What is science?´ can only be answered thus—it is that which is 
recognized as such by a scientific community. It is a recognition that reflects the values 
and goals which a scientific community upholds. For instance, the Needham thesis 
demonstrated that the organic sciences were being developed optimally within the 
Chinese culture at the time when the Western culture upheld the physical sciences as the 
paradigm of science. Perhaps, it was the quest for a science that has universal 
appearance that made the West to base more on the physical science due its 
mathematical stereotypes. Mayr wrote thus, 
 
As everyone was willing to concede, the universality and 
predictability that seemed to characterize studies of the 
inanimate world were missing from biology. Because life was 
                                                 
382 See Hiatt, L. R. and Jones, R. ¨Aboriginal conceptions of the workings of nature¨, in R. W. Home 
(ed.) Australian Science in the Making. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 1-22; 
Brooke, J. H, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspective. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) 
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restricted to the earth, as far as anyone knew, any statements 
and generalizations one could make concerning living 
organisms would seem to be restricted in space and time. To 
make matters worse, such statements nearly always seemed to 
have exceptions. Explanations usually were not based on 
universal laws but rather were pluralistic. In short the theories 
of biology violated every canon of ´true science´, as the 
philosophers had derived them from the methods and principles 
of classical physics.383   
 
Certainly, the social aspect of expansion of science shows that it is of a secondary 
importance to ask where exactly one form of science first appeared when compared to 
its assimilation by all cultures—through transformations from their original forms. 
Levi-Strauss even questioned what importance it has to know in which culture industrial 
and scientific revolution began? The simultaneous coming out of the same technological 
overthrow followed by social upheaval in societies having accepted it show that these 
modifications did not hold to the peculiarity of the genius of a culture, but ¨to conditions 
that are so general that they are located outside the consciousness of men¨.384 Such 
¨revolutions¨ are not limited to the modalities of their coming out, rather, they get to 
take new forms, to which all cultures on the inhabited Earth will take part, whatever the 
conditions.  
 
 
5.7 HISTORICAL ASPECT OF SCIENCE EXPANSION 
 
Modern science, as it developed in Europe through Renaissance in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, inherited from science of Greek Antiquity, from science in Arabic 
language and from science of European Middle Age—all these scientific traditions were 
in filiation with each other although in a nonlinear way. As the Needham thesis (see 
sections 2.7.1, 2.7.2 and 2.7.2.1) has shown, modern science is also indebted to other 
                                                 
383 E. Mayr, Towards a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist. (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1988) p. 9 
384 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race and History. (Paris: UNESCO, 1952) p.38 
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traditions, such as those from the East, through the complex and various exchanges that 
never ceased from Antiquity and Middle Ages to European Renaissance, between East 
and Mediterranean shores and from there to Western Europe. We know about caravans 
and trades, about military and political conquests, and for sure exchanges of ideas and 
of knowledge have gone along with them, though little is still known on this. In such 
exchanges, openness to difference and novelty from inside a tradition towards others is 
indeed a factor that benefits the first and makes it gain in universality.  
 
Modern science itself began with an Italian period, which culminated, with respect to 
the science of nature, with Galileo; its second period witnessed the active participation 
of other parts of Europe, with the British and French sharing the first rank. Thereafter, 
the current spread and multiplied, passed to numerous European countries, and the 
development of the different branches of knowledge occurred in the most varied 
directions, giving science a new form. 
 
 
5.8 THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS  
 
The universality of modern science became an issue of debate because philosophy of 
science had long ignored the role of instruments and laboratory experiments in science. 
In the traditional philosophical view, the aim of science is the production of reliable, 
adequate or true knowledge about the world. The role of experiments is testing 
hypotheses in controlled laboratory settings. Hence, the production of empirical 
knowledge by instruments is ignored. However, the resulting picture of nature the 
scientist observes is influenced by the technological spectacle he/she uses in the 
process, thereby showing that instruments are vital to the articulation and justification of 
scientific knowledge. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina´s citation in section 5.5 had shown that 
scientists operate upon (and within) a highly preconstructed artifactual reality. In the 
same vein, Kuhn had shown that the paradigm is basic to our knowledge of the world, 
and observations through scientific instruments, only exist in so far as they emerge 
within the paradigm (see sections 2.12.1, 2.12.2 and 2.12.4). Consequently, the view 
that non-empirical factors, such as ontology and theoretical background knowledge, are 
prior to observation and experiments thwarts the logical positivists and logical 
empiricists´ view that scientific theories are tested by means of an empirical and logical 
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methodology. It shows that experimental results are not just accepted on the basis of 
epistemological or methodological arguments, since there are other extra-scientific and 
social-cultural factors which play vital role, as some of the historicist historiographies 
had shown.  
 
For social constructivists like Bruno Latour, the universality of modern science is a 
social construct, which has been created by the networks of science and specifically by 
metrological standardizations. He wrote thus, 
 
People think that the universality of science is a given, because 
they forget to take into account the size of the ´métrologie.´ 
Ignoring this transformation that makes all displacements 
possible is like studying an engine without the railway or the 
freeway networks… The cost of making society conform to the 
inside of laboratories so that the latter´s activity can be made 
relevant to the society is constantly forgotten, because people do 
not want to see that the universality is a social construction as 
well.385 
 
The role of instruments in science shows that the ´seeming universality´ of modern 
science drives from the process of standardization which is both social and situated. It, 
thereby, makes void the idea of ´placeless´ and ´non-influence´ implied by the concept 
of ´universality´. Ironically, students of science and practitioners are first encouraged to 
use robust instruments, wherein right techniques are learnt, and thereafter are told that 
the absolute system depended on no particular instruments, techniques or institutions. 
Such positivist approach strives to foster complete certainty on the validity of scientific 
knowledge produced in the laboratory. Affirming Shapin and Kuhn´s perspective on the 
nature of objectivity in science, Harry Collins (1985) argued that certainty increases 
                                                 
385 Bruno Latour, ¨Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world¨, Science Observed: Perspectives on 
the Social Study of Science, eds. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina and Michael Joseph Mulkay. (London: Sage, 
1983) p. 176 
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when the details of the social processes that went into the creation of certainty become 
invisible.386  
 
The appearance of universality is the consequence of the adoption of the same kind of 
instruments, education, practices, methods and units all around the world. Joseph 
O´Connell (1993) clearly characterized the process of standardization as a situation 
where one tries to establish a stable collective that would use the same measurement 
procedures and share the same methods.387 An example of such standardization process 
was the distribution of the boxes of resistance coils to telegraph companies, 
manufactures and physicists throughout the world by the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science. This kind of box had three important features. It had a 
certificate that connected it to its local laboratory of origin. More importantly, such 
certificate confirms that the box represented the ´legal volt´. Further, it had terminals 
that enabled a connection to what was to be calibrated. Finally, it had a handle that let 
the volt escape ¨the localism of one lab¨ and travel to others.388   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
386 H. Collins, Changing Order. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985) p. 162 
387 J. O´Connell, ¨Metrology: The creation of universality by the circulation of particulars¨, Social Studies 
of Science,1993, 23, p. 134 
388 Ibid., p. 148 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
1.1 THE IMPORTS OF HISTORICISM 
 
One of the major highlights of the historicist account of the scientific revolution has 
been the importance of understanding the processes and norms of modern science as 
model, not mode. Although its analysis of the scientific revolution might appear 
divergent on the nature of scientific advancement—with debates comprising internalism 
versus externalism, continuity versus discontinuity theses, physical versus hermeticist 
theses and so on—the appraisal of the traditional claims of science was the fundamental 
factor that underlie the dimension of its respective approaches.  
 
It proffers that the logical way of resolving the complex question that arise from the 
validity of scientific knowledge on the basis of rationality, realism, objectivity and truth 
is by resort to historicism and contextual development of early modern science. In this 
way, we would see that the standards of science change over time. They are mutable. 
They change with the change of scientific beliefs. No standard or method in science is 
insulated from the periodic changes that occur in science. Hence, it is not logical to 
accept the existence of super scientific standards which survive the revolutions in 
sciences. It is the presumption of the existence of such super scientific standards that 
gave credence to the notion of the universality of modern science. Such presumption 
derived from the theory-dominated perspective on science of positivists. Logical 
positivism and logical empiricism have long given predominant consideration to the 
logic of science while neglecting its context as non-essential.  
 
Invariably, the historicists adoption of hermeneutic contextualism implied that the 
traditional philosophical accounts of how observation provides an objective basis for 
evaluation of theories—by the use of confirmation theory or inductive logic—should be 
replaced by accounts of science that reflect, the influence of extra-scientific/social 
factors, and how experimental knowledge is actually arrived at and how this knowledge 
functions. Hence, the traditional distinction between the ¨context of discovery¨ and the 
¨context of justification¨ has to be rejected. The historicists demonstrated this rejection 
by appealing to a historical notion of rational progress rather than to a logical notion of 
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rational inference as previously conceived by logical positivism and logical empiricism. 
Nonetheless, the discussion of the historicist historiography of the scientific revolution 
demonstrated that it does not approve the idea of universal rationality and objectivity of 
science. 
 
The issue is not whether the major scientists of the early modern period had good 
arguments for the reality of the phenomena they dealt on, the real question is whether 
the propositions employed to describe those phenomena are universally valid. 
Rehearsing the events of the Copernican revolution, McMullin concluded that 
¨Copernicus and those who followed him believed that they had good arguments for the 
reality of the earth´s motion around the sun¨389 However, McMullin´s conclusion was 
based on the use of ¨super-empirical¨ values, which carry ¨special epistemic weight¨ in 
theory choice. The implication is that those super-empirical factors like ontology and 
theoretical background knowledge are precursory to observation and experiments 
thereby justifying the theory-ladeness of observation and active role of instrument in 
generation of empirical knowledge. 
 
One of the principal connections among the various approaches of the historicist 
historiography of the scientific revolution has been their use of history to demonstrate 
the local nature of rationality. Science is historically or locally rational. We should not 
forget that the origin of modern science resides in one specific geographical and cultural 
locality called Europe. Cunningham and Williams highlighted how small the area where 
modern science was born. They wrote thus, 
 
[A]lmost all the material with which the history of science 
discipline has been concerned comes from a tiny geographical 
area, about the same size as Zaire or the Sudan, and 
considerably smaller than Brazil. The only thing that is unusual 
about the countries in this area, apart from the fact that they are 
where we live, is that it was these countries which rose to world-
domination during the nineteenth century, through the formation 
                                                 
389 E. McMullin, (1993), ¨Rationality and paradigm change in science,¨ in World Change: Thomas Kuhn 
and the Nature of Science, Horwich, P. (ed) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) p. 74 
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of overseas empires. It was only this historical accident that has 
meant that what began as their own native culture—by that time 
including that recent invention, science—has now become world 
culture.390 
 
The ´domination´ highlighted above suggests the notion of the ´empire of science´. It 
implied that the subordination of other alternatives—the so-called pre-scientific local 
practices and standards of ´ethnosciences´—is what makes the standards and practices 
of Western science seem natural and appear to be derived from ´nature´ itself. However, 
Needham´s illustration of the great progress of science in China at the time shows that 
the West´s dominant way of doing science was one among many possible ones. 
Therefore, the standards and practices of Western science cannot be a manifestation of a 
neutral and universal framework of knowing across human history and cultures, nor a 
universal feature of human nature or human civilization. In fact, the knowledge of any 
society is an integral product of that society, and embodies within it the values and 
social relations of that society. Marcum cited Kuhn´s perspective on the local nature of 
scientific rationality thus, 
 
…the generation of scientific knowledge cannot be wrested from 
its historical (local) context; it is situated in a particular time 
and location. And if we are to understand the science of a 
particular time and location, according to Kuhn, we must climb 
inside the heads of its practitioners.391  
 
This perspective is in line with what the historicist historiography has demonstrated so 
far—to understand the science of the early modern period would be to look into the 
thinking of its practitioners and the socio-cultural context in which they worked. Rather 
than focus entirely on the practices and standards of science in early modern Europe 
Needham had made wonderful illustrations of those of other cultures. The historicist 
model of the scientific revolution cannot just be denigrated as a dogmatic ´localist´ 
theory of scientific rationality. It has to be noted that this model was also very 
                                                 
390 A. Cunningham & P. Williams, ¨De-centring the ´big picture´: The origins of modern science and the 
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instrumental in initiating the argument for the validity of the science of other cultures, 
and the logical way of understanding the similitude among them. It demonstrated that 
every science has its own ´outside´. However, the seeming divergence in the various 
approaches of the historicist has been to what constitute the ´inside´ of science. Even 
though the internalists like Koyré and Hall argued that concepts and ideas are what 
constitute the ´inside´ of science, they maintained, unlike the logical positivists, that this 
´inside´ of science is influenced. 
 
 
1.2 THE ´INSIDE OF SCIENCE´ 
 
The ´inside of science´ has been the central point of controversy regarding the nature 
and authority of the scientific claims. From the discussion so far it is evident that the 
demarcating factor between logical positivism and the historicist accounts of the 
scientific revolution is whether or not the ´inside of science is influenced. The 
historicists argue that the inside of science is influenced by religious, social and 
ideological forces, but the logical positivists deny it. However, there is huge similarity 
between the logical positivists and the ´internalists´ of the scientific revolution 
regarding the constituents of the inside of science. Both view the inside of science as 
comprising of only intellectual elements, concepts and ideas. They attribute simple 
conceptual, intellectual, cognitive essence to Science. Nevertheless, the factor that 
separates both groups is the importance of extra-scientific factors in shaping the content 
of science and in driving the process of knowledge generation. While the logical 
positivists maintain that such factors do not affect the content of science, the 
´internalists´ argue that they are vital in shaping it.  
 
The principal internalist treated in this work, Koyré, explored the change in intellectual 
¨mentalité¨ from the high scholastic period through the Renaissance: namely, the 
development of a consciousness of man being different from, and in a sense above 
Nature. Koyré highlighted the importance of metaphysics in science. His theory of 
scientific advancement even suggests that the scientific changes are more or less 
´spiritual changes´, which however, defined, are nonetheless social in character. In the 
Galilean Studies Koyré illustration of the Galilean and Newtonian revolution in 
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reflectivity shows that knowledge of the world is like divine knowledge in intension and 
as far as it is so, it is totally law-dependent in extension too.  
 
But then, these developments are to be explained not in terms of individual minds but as 
socially determined changes in the images of knowledge. Inside any science is a smaller 
sub-culture of the larger society, and as such that science has a definite social structure. 
Galileo invested himself in telescopic skills which were part of the social set-up of 
astronomy. It is at this juncture that the externalists of the historicist model countered 
the arguments of the internalist to demonstrate that even the inside of science is 
conditioned by external factors. There is ¨no doubt that even the mathematical 
discoveries of Galileo and Newton are conditioned by outside events of every kind, 
political, economic, scientific, military, and by the incessant demands of the arts of 
peace and war.392 Hence, It is an undeniable fact that, if we want to seek out the causes 
of the ´Scientific Revolution´, we must look for them among the wider changes taking 
place in that sea-change of European history.393 
 
Of course, careful judgement of the tenets of the externalist and internalist shows that 
both accepts that no concept, idea or intellectual element emerge from the void. 
However, unlike what the internalists might have feared, the externalist did not propose 
to reduce science entirely to its social, political, religious and economic foundation. For 
instance, Hessen´s materialism informed his attack on the supposed absolute autonomy 
of ideas—the basis for the proposal of universality. But neither he nor the historical 
materialist tradition from which his thesis derived did propose to reduce science totally 
to its economic foundation. He wrote that, ¨According to the materialistic conception of 
history, the final determining factor... is the creation and recreation of actual life. But 
this does not mean that the economic factor is the sole determining factor.¨394 For 
instance, the mechanical philosophy was probably shaped more by religious and 
ideological concerns than directly by the rising middle-class. Moreover, the Mertonian 
thesis makes us believe that in the 17th century the main external influence on science 
was from religion and the institutions of religion and education, not directly from the 
economy or the capitalist class. Nevertheless, empirical historical research shows that in 
                                                 
392 George Sarton, The study of the history of mathematics and The study of the history of science (2vols, 
bound as 1; New York: Dover, 1957; orig. publ. 1936), p.15. Italics are mine. 
393 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science, p.9 
394 Borris Hessen, ¨The social and economic roots of Newton´s ´Principia´¨, p. 177 
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the 19th century, the emerging industrial capitalist system did affect science and 
influenced its direction of progress. 
 
 
1.3 ´INTERACTIONIST EPITEMOLOGY 
 
What I have done with the historicist historiography of the scientific revolution has been 
to demonstrate the import of its hermeneutic contextualism to genuine understanding of 
science. The historicist accounts have shown that history also serves a valuable 
pedagogical role in science. It explains that though scientific rationality might be 
naturally local, such rationality is capable of transcending its locality. We can only 
expect a science cultivated in one place to take root firmly in another when it´s 
adaptability does not subjugated the other´s innate character to expand its scope in a 
way that its contents are truly ¨hardcore¨ of their statements. In order to achieve such 
goal, we need an appropriate epistemology—an interactionist epistemology—as 
opposed to the objectivist and subjectivist epistemologies of the past. Such 
epistemology should take its starting point in a higher level of integration, in the 
interaction between us and the world. It is an interaction which bears always the impress 
of ourselves and of all the socio-historical forces which have made us what we are, as 
well as the impress of a world we encounter as irreducible to ourselves.  
 
The dichotomised epistemologies were responsible for the radical cleavage between 
object and subject, between nature and history, between us and the world. But then we 
can never extricate ourselves from our social milieu to be able to say what they world 
looks like apart from it.  The discussion on the historicist´s appraisal the traditional 
claims of science show that both epistemologies have a socio-historical basis, 
representing stages in the development of our rationality, but stages to be transcended. 
Therefore, there is need to reconstruct our notion of the scientific claims and scientific 
progress at a higher level of integration. We need to see science as the highly complex, 
cognitive process that it is, intricately and inextricably interwoven with a larger network 
of processes which have shown to be progressive. Likewise, the frontiers of modern 
science need to be opened so that the functional aspect of the practices and standards of 
the so-called ethnosciences can be effectively studied and, if found genuine, 
incorporated into the mainstream science.  
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